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Using the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862 as a case study,
the thesis examined fundamental principles which determine the
effectiveness of intelligence in the planning and execution of military
operations. General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson aggressively
obtained intelligence as the foundation of his operational plans,
enabling his numerically inferior force to win victories of strategic
importance. Jackson centrally controlled intelligence at the
operational level, emphasized analysis of the area of operations, and
effectively used technical experts throughout the campaign, allowing
him to recognize operational threats and opportunities as they arose.
The Confederate commander personally directed the intelligence
effort and his operational flexibility guaranteed a harmonious
relationship between intelligence and operations. Modern armed
forces would do well to extract and apply the warfighting intelligence
fundamentals revealed in Jackson's campaign, which remain
independent of time, place, and technology.
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EXECUTIVE SUNIARY
Confederate general Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah
Valley campaign of 1862 stands as a classic illustration 3f the
strategic impact that small military fzrces may exert within a
theater of war. The results of Jackson's campaign were
significant. The abundant resources of the Shenandoah Valley were
retained under Confederate control. Major elements of three
Federal military departments were defeated in a series of small but
important battles. The Union's strategic plans for the continued
siege of Richmond, the occupation of western Virginia, and an
advance into eastern Kentucky were severely disrupted.
Throughout the course of the campaign, Jackson consistently
used his available intelligence as the foundation for many of his
operational deciLions. In those situations where the Confederate
commander specifically defined his intelligence requirements,
aggressively sought to obtain information, and decisively responded
to current intelligence assessments, Confederate operational
capabilities were improved. Conversely, in those instances where
Jackson ignored intelligence indications or failed to respond
operationally to available intelligence, such as the battles at
Kernstown and McDowell, Confederate operatior.al performance was
unsatisfactory.
Jackson centralized his intelligence at the operational level,
enabling effective direction of the intelligence effort, the most
efficient use of limited collection assets, and concentration on
those pieces of information that were of greatest significance to
viii
the operational commander. Those elements of operational reality
that could have the greatest impact on Confederate operations
received the most attention. This concentration of intelligence
also ensured a comprehensive analysis of reporting from all
available sources, the avoidance of conflicting assessments, and an
absence of duplication.
The Confederate commander emphasized analysis of the area of
operations as a means to exploit the region's geography and to
better understand the enemy situation in the context of its
physical setting. Jackson initiated extensive mapping and
topographic analysis, permitting the recognition of masked axes of
advance, suitable points of defense, and possible enemy courses of
action. This analysis, in turn, let Jackson optimize the impact of
his operations against the Federals while avoiding potential
operational pitfalls suggested by the terrain.
Jackson also used talented experts and experienced subordinates
in the performance of particular intelligence functions during the
campaign. Because he had neither the time nor expertise to
personally analyze all of the important specifics that contributed
to the overall intelligence picture, Jackson relied on the
technical expertise of statZ officers and subordinate commanders,
regardless of rank or formal military training, to help meet hiF
intelligence requirements.
The most important aspect of Jackson's intelligence was its
harmonious relationship with operations. Jackson's personal
direction and supervision of intelligence ensured that intelligence
ix
collection and analysis remained focused on areas of operational
significance. Similarly, his control over both intelligence and
operations allowed for the effective inclusion of current
intelligence in the flexible planning and execution of Confederate
operations.
While Jackson's employment of the principles of war and use of
maneuver were important factors in the success of the Confederate
campaign, his approach to intelligence and operations as
inseparable parts of a larger whole provided the bedrock for the
planning and execution of Confederate operations. The effective
application of Jackson's warfighting intelligence fundamentals
provides operational advantages that transcend time, place, or
technology.
x
I. THE INTELLIGENCE FOUNDATION
A. THE MYSTIQUE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862 stands as
a classic illustration of the strategic influence that small armies may exert in a theater
of war. By quickly maneuvering his force, which only numbered around 17,000 i1 en
at its peak strength' against various Federal commands, Jackson was able to disrupt
the strategic designs of the Union far beyor d the bounds of his own military district.
Additionally, in a series of small but significant combat victories, the Confederate
general freed the Valley from the direct threat of Federal occupation and held this
important area under Southern control. The potential lessons offered by the study of
the campaign continue to te subjects of interest to both scholars and military leaders.
During the course of the campaign, Jackson's army successfully engaged major
elements of three separate Federal military departments and altered the offensive
plans of Northern commanders in each of these areas. Although the number of troops
available to any of these individual Federal commands outnumbered the Confederate
Army of the Valley, Jackson's employment of his force against isolated parts of the
enemy allowed him to dictate the terms of the contest. Gen. Fremont, commander of
the Union's Mountain Department, was forced to cancel his plans for an offensive
'Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command; (Volume
One) Manassas to Malvern Hill (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942) 485.
1
push into Kentucky during the spring of 18622 after Jackson defeated a subordinate
Union unit and threatened that department's entire eastern flank. The forces of the
Federal Department of the Shenandoah, under the command of Gen. Banks, were
frustrated in their drive to seize control of the Valley and were eventually driven from
the district in the wake of a disastrous defeat. Although he had been planning to join
McClellan's Army of the Potomac for the siege of Richmond, Gen. McDowell, the
commander of the Department of the Rappahannock, was forced to postpone the
proposed junction and instead diverted forces towards the Valley in an attempt to aid
Banks and Fremont.3 McDowell's units, however, were also severely handled by the
Confederates.
The immediate effects of Jackson's campaign against the Federals were impressive.
The Union forces were driven from the upper Valley. The 120,000 man army under
Gen. McClellan was stalled in its move towards Richmond and over 40,000 more
Union soldiers were diverted from joining McClellan's offensive.' Jackson had used
his small army so effectively that he had forced Federal authorities to modify the
Union's strategic plait for the capture of Richmond despite the fact that the
"U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 128 Vols., ed. by Robert N. Scott,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 7.
Reference hereafter cited as "O.R." in accordance with common practice. 12 April 1862
letter from Fremont to President Lincoln.
3Freeman, 485.
'Champ Clark, Decoying the Yanks: |ackson's Valley Campaign (Alexandria,
Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1984) 21.
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diversionary nature of the campaign may have been recognized by the North's senior
leadership.'
In addition to its adverse effects on the Federal army, the campaign resulted in the
continued Southern control of the Valley's vital assets. The important transportation
and communications routes which passed through the Valley, and thereby linked
Richmond with the western Confederacy, remained under effective Confederate
control. Associated with this retention of control over the approaches to Richmond
was the general protection of the western flank of Confederate defenses in Virginia.
Because of its unique geographical situation between two mountain ranges, the
Shenandoah Valley also offered a ready offensive axis for any army moving to
penetrate deep into an opponent's territory in the eastern theater.' Under Southern
control, the Valley remained a dangerous salient which flanked Washington and
threatened Maryland and Pennsylvania as a potential route for invasion. Under
Northern control, the Valley could offer an important route for the isolation of
Richmond or movements into Kentucky. The cornucopia of foodstuffs provided by
the Valley's abundant farms, a vital Confederate supply asset throughout most of the
war, was also held." While increasingly larger sections of Southern territory and their
associated products came under Federal occupation, continued Confederate access to





Virginia with enough provisions to launch two invasions of the North and to forestall
defeat for three more years.
This operational victory came at a time when a besieged and somewhat dispirited
South needed a military win.' The campaign, conducted as an independent operation
apart from the main theater of war, helped to raise Jackson, a leader already known
for his strong religious sentiments, harsh discipline, and personal idiosyncracies, to
international fame.' The positive results of the campaign brought hope to people
throughout the South and earned Jackson the respect of senior military leaders, a
factor that would allow him to gain even greater military success and fame in
subsequent campaigns.
For military scholars, however, the basis of Jackson's success in the Valley
campaign may offer a more challenging and satisfactory area of study than an analysis
of the immediate results of the operation. In other words, how was Jackson able to
achieve these positive operational results? As has already been noted, when
compared to the forces available for employment by his opponents, Jackson possessed
inferior numbers in both men and weapons throughout the campaign. The
characteristics of the weapons used by the Confederates offered no advantage to the
Southern troops, generally being equal to or in many cases inferior to those weapons
used by their Federal counterparts. Muzzle loading percussion rifles of musket length




continued to be armed with smoothbore flintlock muskets at this stage of the war."
Muzzle loading field artillery pieces, of both smoothbore and rifled types, were also
relatively common to both sides in the campaign. The tactics employed by the
belligerents were another commonality that offered no real advantage to either side.
While Confederate execution of accepted tactics in the cavalry and artillery arms was
arguably superior during this stage of the war, the capable, though generally
unimaginative, execution of infantry tactics was similar between Union and
Confederate forces."
Many students of mili"_ry art have pointed to the general mobility and maneuvers
of Jackson's command as the causal factors of the Confederate achievement. This
argument cites the consistently mobile nature of Jackson's operations and the
numerous examples in which Southern movements put the Federal forces at an
operational and tactical disadvantage. While mobility -'d maneuver did play an
important part in the execution of the Confederate operations, movement, in and of
itself, can hardly be seen as the fundamental element of the Southern success. In the
context of the dangerous and violent realities of war as it really is, other factors had
to be present for a Confederate operational victory.
"
10O.R., Vol. 5, 389. After-action report in which Jackson credits Gov. Letcher of
Virginia with supplying 1550 percussion muskets to replace some of the flintlocks
still in use.
"Throughout the war, the standard for infantry tactics was prescribed in the text
of William J. Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott
and Co., 1861 [also, numerous other publishers and dates]).
5
In his monumental study of the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia,
Douglas Southall Freeman cites three major reasons for Jackson's success.U Proper
judgement of the ground, a sound balance of strategy, and the superior use of this
strategy to impose his will on the Union enemy are all listed by Freeman as the
leading causal factors of Jackson's dominance during the campaign. While the basic
formulation of Freeman's assessment points to these three factors as the primary basis
for the Southern operational victory, it predominantly emphasizes Confederate
reliance on the successful application of the principles of war. Although Freeman
credits the Southern leader with proper judgement of the ground, this evaluation is
balanced with the assessment that Jackson had little natural talent for remembering
details about the area's terrain."3 The Confederate commander did, however, have
the ability to correctly interpret the military significance of geography once the
physical features of an area were clearly pointed out to him. On the operational level,
the Southern general's great reliance on accurate maps and updated terrain
information allowed him to exploit the physical attributes of the theater of operations
to their greatest potential. Additionally, Jackson's tactical understanding of the terrain
allowed for a capable sense of position on the battlefield and a competent disposition
of his forces in combat.
Freeman's interpretation of a "sound balance of strategy" is based on perceptions




surprise.14 The idiosyncratic commander's extreme practices of operational security
and reliance on deception were overt attempts to realize the benefits of surprise
against the Federal forces. The application of another principle of war, concentration
of effort, was revealed in the repeated efforts to bring a superiority of numbers
against weaker parts of the enemy forces. Additionally, Freeman's representation of
Jackson's sound logistics effort emphasizes the way in which this endeavor supported
the general tempo of Confederate movements and force concentrations.
Finally, Freeman's portrayal of Jackson's use of his own strategy to impose his will
upon the Federal commanders is directly tied to the Confederate leader's ability to
seize and retain the initiative throughout the campaign." By exercising the
operational initiative, Jackson was able to limit Federal courses of action and thereby
caused the enemy to react to Southern moves rather than act according to his own
designs.
Clearly, Jackson's habitual application of the principles of war played an important
and perhaps pivotal role in deciding the outcome of the campaign. The Southern
general's dedicated use of initiative, concentration of effort, surprise, and tempo
marked his performance as the Confederate operational commander vastly superior
to the efforts of the various Union commanders whom he opposed. Despite the
appalling initial weakness of Confederate military force in the Shenandoah Valley




in November of that year. Although these initial moves were limited in their scope
and objective, they still had a profound effect on subsequent planning by Union
commanders. The destructive Confederate raid against the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal and the ensuing expedition to Romney during the winter of 1861-1862 were
overtly offensive in nature and caused the Federals to reassess the rather innocuous
approach they had previously taken towards the Southern military forces in the area.
To counter the combative Confederate general, the Federals were forced to amass a
numerically superior force to sweep the enemy from the region. Even when he was
forced to yield to the overwhelming superiority of the advancing Federals, however,
Jackson tried to capitalize on potential opportunities and regain the operational
initiative. First at Kernstown in March and then throughout his strategically
important offensive campaign in May and early June, Jackson reseized the initiative
and doggedly held on to it through repeated attacks against his foe. Although the
Union forces were eventually able to advance again up the Valley, their moves were
constantly in response to Jackson's actions and failed to reflect any plan of their own.
Additionally, various offensive actions undertaken by Jackson limited the possible
courses of action available to the Union commanders and invariably forced the
Federal units into situations that were advantageous to the Confederates.
Concentration of effort was a second principle that Jackson applied during his
offensive campaign. Recognizing the relative weakness of his own force, the
Confederate general realized the need to use the majority of the Confederate offensive
combat power against smaller, and potentially isolated, enemy detachments. By
8
uniting his own force with other available Southern units operating in the area,
Jackson was able to amass a local superiority against the Federals whom he opposed.
This concentration was first seen in his move towards Romney when he expelled the
occupying Federal forces from the Valley after combining his own limited force with
the Confederate command of Brig. Gen. Loring. It was further refined and exploited
during May and June when Jackson united his own division-sized army with the
forces of Edward Johnson and Richard Ewell and then successfully defeated the
Federals in five separate battles. Even at Kernstown, where Jackson suffered his only
real defeat in the Valley, the Confederate general attempted to concentrate his effort
against what he thought to be a smaller and unsupported enemy detachment.
Surprise, which Clausewitz suggests "...lies at the root of all operations without
exception ..... ,, was an additional principle that Jackson sought in his own
operations. Faced with an enemy who could easily have gathered a numerically larger
force at virtually any point in the theater, Jackson was forced to rely on surprise as
an integral element of his operations "...for without it superiority at the decisive point
is hardly conceivable."'" Through the consistent application of secrecy and
deception, the intelligent use of the theater's geography, and speed movement, the
Confederate general was able to appear opposite his enemy at unexpected times and
places during various phases of the campaign. Additionally, by hiding his intentions
"Carl von Clausewitz, On War (ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and peter Paret.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) 198.
"7Ibid.
9
from the enemy and thereby doing the unexpected, Jackson was able to capitalize on
the vulnerabilities of Federal forces who remained unaware of the immediate
Confederate threat.
Tempo, the hard press of military operations to ensure the maximum exploitation
of opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities, was another major principle of war that
Jackson successfully followed as a means to victory. With the initiation of his
operational offensive in May, Jackson continually kept his opponents off balance by
pressing the attack, pursuit, and counterattack against one enemy force after another
with little or no substantial break in the action. While Confederate retreats were
conducted at an exceedingly slow pace in an effort to delay the loss of territory and
to retain contact with the advancing enemy, the speed with which Jackson moved his
soldiers in offensive maneuvers led to their notoriety as "foot cavalry." Jackson's
aggressive tempo may be illustrated in the fact that his command marched over 640
miles in 48 days,1" fought and won five battles in the period of a month, and
consistently reached operationally important positions well in advance of the enemy,
despite the fact that the Union forces were often closer to the objective than the
Confederates had been.
While the effective application of these principles of war undoubtedly played a
pivotal role in Jackson's campaign, a further question is suggested by the Confederate
general's consistent use of these principles. How did Jackson know when and where
to apply these principles? In order to seize the initiative, the Confederate commander
"SClark, 21.
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had to be aware of some opportunity or enemy vulnerability that would allow him
to take the offensive. Similarly, Jackson would have to know the general location,
size, and disposition of the enemy forces in order to effectively concentrate his own
force against them. While concentration of effort appears to be an intrinsically
straightforward principle, "... the theoretical simplicity of achieving numerical
superiority at the decisive point belies the difficulty experienced in all aspects of its
implementation."'19 Similarly, surprise could only be attained by a commander who
knew something about the enemy's probable plans and courses of action. The
aggressive tempo of the Confederate offensive could only be maintained if the
Southern commander remained aware of the enemy's position, was well informed
about the best routes for movement, and was able to properly assess the enemy's
capability to resist his own moves.
Clearly then, Jackson had to have an effective understanding of the theater of
operations and the enemy situation that confronted him to effectively plan his own
operations and to correctly apply the principles of war. In turn, logic would suggest
that this knowledge would have been the natural provenance and product of a
military intelligence effort designed to meet these fundamental needs. A study of the
intelligence considerations and activities which helped to shape Jackson's operational
planning and decisions during the Valley campaign may, therefore, offer some insight
into the primary foundation for the Confederate military victory in the spring of 1862.
"
19Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations", in Michael I. Handel,
ed., Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank Cass & Company, Limited,
1990) 13.
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Such a study may also reveal certain universal aspects and characteristics of military
intelligence that could increase the overall utility and effectiveness of intelligence in
any military campaign.
B. THE FRAMEWORK OF INTELLIGENCE
Before assessing the role of intelligence in the decision making process of a
military campaign or analyzing those characteristics of intelligence which make it
useful in military operations, it is, of course, necessary to establish a definition of
military intelligence. In the most general sense, intelligence gathering may be seen
as an attempt to minimize those uncertainties and frictions that are an integral part
of armed conflict. Carl von Clausewitz, the paragon of military thought and
philosophy, wrote that "By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the
enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.'a°
Clausewitz's definition is notable both in its potentially broad scope, as consisting of
"every sort of information" regarding an enemy and a theater of operations, and in its
clear connection of intelligence with operational planning.
In an expanded definition that attempts to recognize some of the complexities of
gaining valuable knowledge about an enemy while highlighting the need for
operational relevancy, the U.S. military has defined intelligence as "...the product
resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interp:etation of




which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of
plans, policies, and operations."'2 Like Clausewitz's definition, this interpretation
emphasizes the broad spectrum of intelligence and the inherent need for operational
relevancy. The U.S. definition additionally points to the critical requirement for an
intellectual processing of the available information. This delineation of information,
or raw data, from processed intelligence clarifies the need to consistently apply the
intellect to determine the significance and relevancy of seemingly unconnected
facts.' Although the product of intelligence may be some type of formal written or
hardcopy document, a more accurate and comprehensive interpretation would simply
be that knowledge which results from the intellectual process of analyzing
information with regard to operational considerations.
Perhaps the most effective way of thinking about intelligence is as a cyclical
process.' Although this process is sometimes very formalized and easily recognized
in its constituent parts or phases, it is more frequently simply a logical progression
of thought by a commander, military advisor, or intelligence analyst. The five major
parts of this process are the planning and direction of the intelligence effort towards
operations, the collection of information, the processing and analysis of that
"
21Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Fleet Marine Force Manual 2-1", Intelligence,
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1980) 1-1.
'Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-21", MAGTF
Intelligence Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991)
2-1.
"•Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JCS Publication 2-0", Joint Doctrine for Intelligence
Support to Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Proposed Final Draft, 1992) 2-3.
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information, the dissemination of this analysis to the pertinent commanders, and the
use of this intelligence during the operational planning or decision making process.2"
Because the relative importance of certain pieces oi information may change during
the course of an operation and because the implementation of some decision at the
end of the process will naturally lead to the development of new intelligence
requirements, this process may also be viewed as a cycle. Revision, redirection, and
reassessment cf requirements, conclusions, and operational decisions will occur on a
constant basis because of the various changes that occur during active military
campaigns.
The starting point fc !he intelligence process must be the determination of the
overall direction of the intelligence effort. By narrowing the focus of intelligence to
only those things that are of importance to the commander, irrelevant collection and
analysis may be avoided. In this initial stage of the process, specific intelligence
requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated with regard to the context of
planned operations."s Although specific objectives may not be defined at this point,
broad operational goals and the commanders' intentions will help to identify specific
intelligence requirements to meet those goals. These requirements are then translated
into observable criteria for proper collection and analysis. After identifying the
"
24U.S. military publications and most scholarly works which examine the
intelligence process do not include the "use of intelligence" as an integral phase of the
process. However, its inclusion here is based on the perception that it is perhaps the
most crucial factor in the relationship between intelligence and operational planning.
'
3joint Pub 2-0, 2-4.
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particular pieces of knowledge which are essential to optiaLizing the operational
effort, the overall intelligence effort is planned to ensure that each of the
requirements will be answered through some type of collection asset, that subordinate
needs for intelligence will also be met, and that proper means of dissemination exist
for the finished intelligence to reach the decision maker.
The next logical step in the intelligence process is the collection of information
which may answer or help to answer those specific requirements identified in the
planning of operations. During this fact acquisiiion phase, military leaders must
recognize the need to properly manage the collection assets with regard to the stated
requirements. The right source has to be used to collect the right information,
unnecessary redundancy has to be avoided, and the desirability of confirmation
through multiple-source collection has to be examined. The inherent trade-offs of
continued intelligence exploitation or immediate offensive destruction of noted enemy
units must also be contemplated. Effective collection must, therefore, involve an
understanding of the realistic capabilities and limitations of potential collection
assets.
After the information is collected, it must next be processed or analyzed through
the perspective of operational significance. Raw data, such as encoded messages,
electronic intercepts, or foreign language texts, must first be translated into useable
information for analysis. This useable information is then evaluated with regard to
reliability and general applicability towards stated intelligence requirements,
interpreted through the consideration of its overall operational significance, ana
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combined with other information to develop an integrated assessment. This analysis
should be objective, based on reporting from all available sources, and focused
towards answering the commander's specific requirements.2' Further, these
assessments must clearly state the overall meaning, relevance and importance of the
analysis provided to the operational commander.
In turn, this knowledge must now be disseminated to the people that need it. In
other words, the analysis must be conveyed to the commander in an easily understood
and useable form such as a written report, electronic message, graphic, oral brief, or
annotated map." Additionally, various communications means such as couriers,
radios, telegraphs, visual signalling, or electronic video transmission may be used to
get any of these forms to the commander. Timeliness, pertinence to the commander's
needs, usability of the form of dissemination, and operational security should be the
major governing factors which determine the form and type of communication used
in the dissemination phase.2" Additionally, the general scope of this dissemination
to subordinate and higher headquarters must also be judged according to the same
criteria.
The final, and perhaps most critical, phase of the intelligence process is the use of
the finished analysis in the commander's operational planning and decision
26 Ibid., 2-13.
27 Ibid., 2-17.
"•FMFM 3-21, 3-5 and 3-6.
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making." While the successful execution of the other four phases is vital to the
development of accurate and coherent assessments, the commander's use of this
knowledge invariably determines the role that intelligence will play in the success of
the operations under consideration. Effective use of this intelligence analysis does
not mean that the commander has to accept all of the assessments made. It does
mean, however, that the commander should include the intelligence assessment in his
own evaluation of the course of future actions. Based on the changes in strategic and
operational considerations, information available only to a commander himself, and
similar factors, a commander may reject the intelligence assessments. If this
intelligence is ignored by a commander, then the entire intelligence effort to that
point has actually been a waste of time and effort since it has not contributed to the
commander's operational decision. Although a commander's use of available
intelligence may seem like an intrinsic quality of all operational planning, numerous
historical examples and the realities of war challenge this assumption.
With the implementation of some type of action by the commander, the process
does not end but actually continues in a cyclical manner as new information must
now be analyzed with regard to the present decisions. Additionally, at any phase in
the intelligence cycle, changes in the operational situation, modification of objectives,
or continuing ambiguities in analysis may suggest the need to alter the direction,
means of collection, or analytical emphasis of the process. The intelligence cycle ends
only when all operational objectives have been successfully achieved.
2 9See Footnote 24.
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The intelligence process naturally occurs at every level in the practice of war. 3
Strategic intelligence is most often conducted to support national or theater level
commanders in the formulation of policy, strategy, .nd general military plans. In this
way, strategic intelligence often helps to shape the general direction of a nation's
security policies. Operational intelligence, which is the emphasis of this study,
usually supports the planning and conduct of operations and campaigns on the theater
level. This level of intelligence is designed to meet the needs of an independent
operational commander exercising control within the overall bounds of the national
strategy. Tactical intelligence is designed to support tactical operations and is,
therefore, normally characterized by its narrow scope, limited analytical content, and
relatively perishable nature with regard to usefulness. It is important to consider that,
because of the intrinsically ambiguous definitions of the levels of operational
planning, there is also a natural overlap among the various levels of intelligence. In
many cases, intelligence that is useful at one level may be equally valuable at another.
This is especially true of operational intelligence, which acts as a bridge linking
strategic analysis with the concrete tactical requirements of war.
As Clausewitz and other military scholars have typically pointed out, this
intelligence can be divided into efforts to understand the area in which operations are
to be conducted and to understand the enemy against whom one is engaged. While
the analysis of these components is habitually conducted independently of one
3°Joint Pub 2-0, 2-1.
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another, the full impact and importance of these factors on friendly operations can
only be captured by integrating these studies into a single, comprehensive assessment.
As one of the two major components of operational level intelligence, analysis of
the area of operations forms the "...background on which military plans are drawn.'"
1
These assessments examine the possible effects that the theater of operations will
have on the actions of enemy forces as well as the ability of friendly forces to achieve
their operational goals. Included in this analysis is an evaluation of the important
aspects of the military geography, transportation and communications networks,
resources, and area inhabitants.
An intelligence appraisal of a region's military geography looks at those physical
characteristics that may influence a military unit's ability to conduct operations in an
area.' An evaluation of the topography, including such aspects as major terrain
features, obstacles to movement or observation, potentially important points of
defense, and navigational landmarks, forms the foundation for any understanding of
military geography. Associated with this examination of topography is an evaluation
of the significant hydrography of an area. Sundry details of drainage patterns, rivers,
lakes, fording points, and in the case of amphibious operations, beaches, currents, and
anchorages must be assessed with regard to their potential impact on military
operations. Additionally, the potential influence of climate and weather should be




the combat effectiveness of any military force or may cause changes in the
characteristics of the region's topography and hydrography. The effects of wind,
temperature, and precipitation may lead to fluctuations in water levels and currents,
observation distances, or trafficability.
The various transportation and communications lines within a theater are another
integral element of any assessment of the theater of operations.' All forms of civil
and military transportation associated with the particular region are examined from
the perspective of their potential impact on military operations. This part of the
assessment would include an analysis of the surface conditions and weight capacity
of roads, the amount of rolling stock and major depots of railways, important
intersections, potential chokepoints, and possible avenues of approach for various
locations within the region. Important communications networks must also be
examined with particular attention to vital switching and relay points, power facilities,
and operating stations. The interruption of enemy communications or possible use
of existing networks by friendly forces may be an important consideration for
operational planners.
The available resources of an area should also be understood in the context of their
military relevancy. Vilu-ble natural resources, vital agricultural products, or
significant industrial products may be important elements in the formulation of
operational objectives or of the means for obtaining those objectives. Friendly control
of, or denial of enemy access to, the foodstuffs or energy resources produced by a
33Ibid., 9-5.
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given region may be the pivotal factors in determining the success or failure of a
military campaign. Likewise, the targeting or capture of a strategically important
industrial asset may develop as a primary means towards victory.
Finally, an understanding of the area's inhabitants may provide insights into
possible threats or potential opportunities.3" Factors of religion, social customs, and
nationality may effect the allegiance of the local population to either friendly or
enemy forces. Additionally, the plausible use of civilians for intelligence, logistical,
or administrative support may be revealed through a careful examination of their
sociology and collective psychology. Lastly, the inseparable links of people with their
homes and society must be understood to avoid unnecessary antagonism with the
local population and to realize the possible benefits of cooperation.
The second major component of operational level intelligence is the determination
of the enemy military situation. An examination of basic enemy military capabilities
forms the fundamental framework for this assessment.3  The overall strength of
enemy forces, both those directly committed in the theater and those that might be
used to reinforce, is usually the starting point for an evaluation of enemy capabilities.
This information is then further defined in the context of the actual composition of
that force with regard to branch or arm of service, overall combat power in relation
to supporting forces, and combat effectiveness of the enemy fighting units. The
location and disposition of enemy units will, in turn, influence the relative strength
mIbid.
3 5 Ibid., 9-6.
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and effectiveness of the enemy in more localized situations or may indicate potential
vulnerabilities in the enemy's force deployment. The movement and activities of the
various enemy units will be another factor effecting the general military capabilities
of the opposing force. The maneuvering of enemy forces may point towards an
ability to concentrate or attack while various activities such as the construction of
fortifications and obstacles may improve enemy capabilities to defend a given area.
Available logistics support and weapons characteristics provide other quantifiable
indications of enemy military capability while assessments of enemy doctrine, tactics,
training, and leadership style furnish non-quantifiable clues to the enemy's overall
military potential.
However, the most important element in the analysis of the enemy situation, and
usually the most difficult to determine, is the discovery of enemy intentions. While
an analysis of capabilities points to the available assets of an enemy force and what
these assets are capable of accomplishing, an assessment of intentions focuses on what
the enemy plans to do with these assets. In the attempt to properly discern enemy
intentions, it is necessary to evaluate the possible enemy courses of action with regard
to the probability of their adoption by the enemy commander.' Again the doctrine,
tactics, and leadership style of the enemy forces may significantly influence this
decision process. Other possible methods of discerning indications of intent include
analysis of the enemy commander's personality, reexamination of operational trends




comparison to the strategic picture, and a search for possible historical surrogates or
parallels. While it may be impossible to positively know the intentions of an enemy
commander, informed deductions may indicate the most likely course of action for the
enemy to take. Additionally, if an operational commander takes overt actions to limit
the capabilities or courses of action available to an enemy commander, the likelihood
of correctly determining these intentions may be substantially increased. When
presented with an assessment of probable enemy intentions, which is itself supported
by an evaluation of enemy capabilities, an operational commander may then seek to
capitalize on perceived enemy vulnerabilities in the development of his own plans.
One final aspect of intelligence worth consideration, but one that falls outside the
traditional bounds of the intelligence definition or process, is counterintelligence. As
the practical antithesis of intelligence, counterintelligence is devoted to the protection
of information against collection and exploitation by the enemy's intelligence
effort.37 While counterintelligence may take the form of strict operational security
about one's own plans, it may also involve such overt measures as misinformation
and deception. In an offensive form, counterintelligence includes the planned
destruction of the enemy intelligence system by the elimination of enemy collection
assets, analysis facilities or command networks.
37Ibid., 4-1.
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C. INTELLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL WAR
The Civil War saw a substantial growth in intelligence as compared with previous
American wars. While traditional methods of analysis and collection dominated
military intelligence throughout the war, technological advances and new
understandings of the opportunities offered by aggressive intelligence brought about
changes in the field. Peculiarities inherent in the general character of this war also
imposed some new requirements for intelligence in the contest.
While certain technological innovations impacted on intelligence during the Civil
War, traditional military intelligence collection methods continued to play the leading
role in the acquisition of operationally significant information. Such sources as
accessible published materials and diplomatic intelligence supported national leaders
in the development of strategic plans while the use of scouts, spies, prisoner
interrogations, and captured military documents predominated in military collection
efforts on the operational level. These intelligence sources had been used successfully
by military commanders for hundreds of years and were still applicable in the context
of 19th century military campaigns.
Published materials provided some basic elements for military intelligence
although most of these would have been of strategic rather than operational value.
Great military captains such as Napoleon had long relied on published works as a
baseline for understanding the culture, political ideology, and broad geographical
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characteristics of an enemy nation.' In the Civil War, published descriptions of a
region's geography or travellers' accounts of their journeys through certain areas
might provide military commanders with a basic understanding of the general
characteristics of a theater of operations. Similarly, published texts by a military
commander might provide some insight into how that commander would employ his
forces in a given situation.
Intelligence gained by diplomatic sources was another area of collection that had
long been in use. Statesmen would typically report to their home government any
information or facts gathered at their foreign post which might be useful to their own
nation.3" During the Civil War, both the North and South made extensive use of
various diplomats in Europe to promote their own political goals and to seek some
special advantage from the intervention or neutrality of selected foreign nations.
France and Britain were particularly active arenas of diplomatic intelligence by Union
and Confederate agents. Both the North and South conducted extensive propaganda
campaigns in the European press to sway the political policies of those nations and
to influence popular opinion. James D. Bulloch, the Confederate Navy's chief agent
in Europe, consistently reported on the operations of Union agents in Europe while
Henry S. Sanford, the U.S. Minister to Belgium, was quite active in reporting the
activities of Bulloch and other Confederate operatives back to Federal authorities in
'Jay Luvaas, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence: The Jenna Campaign of 1805," in
Michael I. Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass &
Company, Limited, 1989) 41-42.
39Ibid., 44.
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Washington. Additionally, Sanford proved himself to be an energetic collector of
information concerning the status of Confederate ship building and purchasing
attempts throughout Europe." While the information provided by these diplomatic
representatives could prove valuable on the strategic level, it had little use to
operational military commanders in the field. One exception to this generality would,
of course, be the reporting of enemy ships' port visits to naval commanders which
could then allow for the possible interception of these vessels by friendly warships.
On the operational level, commanders still relied primarily on scouts and spies to
provide them with the majority of the information they needed regarding the enemy.
In the parlance of the period, the term "scout" referred to friendly personnel, either
in or out of uniform, who would make temporary probes into enemy territory to
gather information or who would observe the enemy from some vantage point beyond
friendly lines."' The intrinsic speed and mobility of mounted horsemen had led
military commanders of preceding ages to rely heavily on the cavalry as a primary
source of information. The cavalry arm continued to provide the majority of scouts
in use by field forces during the Civil War. Throughout the first two years of the
war, the Confederates enjoyed a marked advantage in their use of cavalry for scouting
purposes.' Southern social traditions of horsemanship, better training of
"
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"Jay Luvaas, 'The Role of Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, April-
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cavalrymen, superior organization of cavalry assets into a coherent unified body, and
superior employment of cavalry in a reconnaissance as well as combat role
contributed to the superior Confederate use of these mounted soldiers as scouts.'
Additionally, since most of the fighting was being done on Confederate territory,
familiarity with the ground also gave a significant advantage to the Southern scouts.
Because of the inherent mobility and defensive firepower of these cavalry units,
commanders unhesitatingly assigned these horsemen the tasks of locating and
determining the disposition of enemy forces. Civilians, using various excuses for the
passage of lines and having the potential for more readily available safe havens, were
also used extensively as scouts by both sides during the war.
Spies comprised the other most notable, and from a popular perception the more
spectacular, source of military intelligence at the operational level. The term "spy",
again in the terminology of the mid-19th century, was applied to those persons, most
often civilians, who were located on a more permanent basis behind enemy lines."
In this vocation as well, the Confederates may have enjoyed some advantage during
the opening years of the war. Widespread Confederate sympathy in the border states
and Washington, D.C. allowed for a large base of potential spies that the Confederacy
might exploit. Additionally, as Federal troops seized larger areas of the Confederacy,
the inhabitants of these territories also provided an additional pool of spies.




of the war, Federal authorities made little attempt to organize or capitalize on this
potentially useful collection asset. Despite some notable success in the use of spies
in and around the Confederate capital of Richmond in the early stages of the war,
most Federal commanders initially ignored the potential offered by the large number
of Unionists in the South. As the war progressed, hovwever, the North also made
better use of spies against their enemy. In the western theater, Federal Brig. Gen.
Grenville Dodge established an extensive spy network that provided valuable
information during the Vicksburg campaign of 1863." Under the supervision of
Brig. Gen. George H. Sharpe, spies like Elizabeth Van Lew of Richmond were also
able to pass vital intelligence to Union commanders operating in the east."' Most
effective military commanders at the operational level used spies to some extent.
Drawn mainly from some element of the native population, these spies furnished
basic information about enemy troop locations and movements in the immediate area.
Additionally, general characteristics of an operations area or information regarding
little known avenues of approach could be gained from local inhabitants.
Other traditional sources of intelligen-'0 included the interrogation of enemy
prisoners of war, and the use of captured or compromised documents. Prisoners could
be used to help discern enemy force structures, size, combat effectiveness, or
activities. Proper exploitation and use of captured documents, though far less
"Time-Life Books, ed., Spies, Scouts and Raiders: Irregular Operations
(Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1985) 72-80.
"Ibid., 80-89.
28
frequent, could prove to be of great significance. In the Antietam campaign of 1862,
McClellan's access to Lee's Special Order Number 191, the general Confederate
operational plan for the campaign, offered the potential for a decisivc Union victory.
Although McClellan failed to exploit this potential intelligence coup to its full
potential, the case illustrates the plausible impact of these documents on the
intelligence picture and ultimately on operational plans.
Various technological advances introduced new collection potel.tials Into the
intelligence arena. One of the most interesting new developments in intelligence
collection was the first serious use of balloons for aerial observation.47
Demonstrations of the potential use of balloons as observation platforms were
conducted in Washington, D.C. during June 1861 by Thaddeus S.C. Lowe. On the
18th of that nmonth, Lowe ascended over the city in a tethered balloon and, using a
telegraph, wired locational data regardi.., 'he Confederate positions across the
Potomac to President Lincoln. Several days later, the aeronaut used his craft above
Arlington, Virginia to discern the movemen" of Confederate forces to the south. With
the initial success of these two demonstrations, Lowe was hired by the Army to
organize and manage a Balloon Corps that would operaie under the Bureau of
Topographic Engineers.
Eventually, Lowe procured seven balloons of various sizes and nine aeronauts to
pilot the craft as the n , !us of his corps. Enlisted men from the engineers were also
temporarily assigned to Lowe for the movement and maintenance of the extensive
"
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inflation, tethering, and transportation equipment required for the balloons. Each
balloon was constructed of a double thickness of pongee, a type of glazed silk, sewn
to form a near-spherical envelope and inflated with hydrogen. A large rope net
covered the balloon and secured a passenger basket to the bottom of the craft.
Although some free flights occurred, most ascents took place with the balloon
tethered to a winch on the ground.
Other aeronauts were also active proponents of the use of balloons for military
purposes. Like Lowe, James Allen had conducted some initial demonstrations of the
potential for aerial observation in Washington during June but had withdrawn the
proposal when his balloons were destroyed in storms later that month. John Wise,
who had proposed the use of balloons for the bombardment of Vera Cruz during the
Mexican-American War, was hired by the Topographic Engineers in July 1861 to map
enemy positions but resigned after a command dispute with the local engineer officer.
Balloonist John La Mountain ascended over Ft. Monroe, Virginia in an attempt to
keep the local Federal commander informed about the dispositions of the surrounding
Confederate forces and was later hired by Lowe as one of the aeronauts in the Balloon
Corps.
Confederate use of balloons was much more limited, primarily because of the more
finite nature of Southern resources available for this pursuit. At Richmond in 1862,
the Southerners were able to construct two of the craft from the limited materials
available and employed them as aerial observation platforms near Yorktown during
the Peninsula campaign and closer to Richmond during the Seven Days battles. The
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loss of these craft during the latter campaign basically brought Confederate military
use of balloons to an end. Despite the relative lack of balloon assets and use by the
South, Confederate commanders clearly recognized the potential threat caused by
Federal use of these platforms and tried to avoid observation by the Federal balloons
during their own movements."
Although there were some positive results and accurate information provided by
aerial observers during the war's early campaigns, this new intelligence collection
asset was never completely accepted during the war. Following the loss of the sole
Confederate balloon in the summer of 1862, some Confederate leaders thought that
the results provided by the reconnaissance asset were too little to justify the effort of
constructing another craft. For the Union, a number of different reasons contributed
to the demise of the balloon as a collection platform. Organizationally, the Federal
Balloon Corps did not fit in to the existing military structure. At various times it was
attached to the Bureau of Topographic Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, and the
Corps of Engineers. Continued civilian control over the Balloon Corps often brought
the aeronauts into conflict with various military commanders who rarely understood
the capabilities or requirements of the unit. Despite the positive use of balloons
during the Chancellorsville campaign for topographic studies and the observation of
enemy movements, the Union defeat in this operation helped to spell the end for
"4O.R., Vol. 5, 1079. 22 February 1862 letter from Gen. Johnston to President Davis.
Also Luvaas, "Chancellorsville", 108.
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Federal use of the craft.' The Federal commander's use of intelligence as a general
scapegoat for the loss at Chancellorsville helped to bring about an end to Federal use
of balloons as an intelligence collection asset.' Within weeks of the submission of
official battle reports, which emphatically minimized the usefulness of the balloons,
the corps was disbanded.
As the first American war extensively covered by the press, the Civil War also saw
great use of newspapers as a tool of intelligence analysis."1 Newspapers offered
potentially important information through open press reporting on enemy strengths,
locations, movements, campaign plans, and battle losses in a volume that was not
duplicated or as readily accessible in any other source. Prior to the start of the
Chancellorsville campaign in 1862, Confederate forces were able to determine the
overall size and force structure of the opposing Federal army simply through the
analysis of sanitary reports and sickness ratios printed in the Northern press.5 2 In
addition to the large number of newspapers in publication during the war, the
comparative volume of articles reporting war related stories was also significant.
During the war, about one third of the text of American newspapers was devoted to
coverage of military aspects of the war."3 While these reports were always of







somewhat questionable accuracy, they did provide ready access to information that
might then be included in more objective and comprehensive assessments.
Although both sides in the conflict undoubtedly used newspapers to gain
information about their foe, the Confederacy arguably was able to use this asset more
effectively. One reason was that the North simply printed more papers and therefore
provided more potential sources for Confederate collection efforts. The South had
traditionally possessed fewer newspapers than the more populous North and, at the
beginning of the war, held only about five percent of all paper mills in the U.S."
As the war progressed, dwindling resources for paper and ink further diminished the
South's capability print the news. Manpower shortages for editors, printers, and
reporters also contributed to the shortage of Southern papers.
In addition to the relative shortage of printed news in the South, Confederate
censorship appears to have been more effective than Federal restrictions. Although
some censorship of the Southern press was eased in 1863 after effective lobbying by
press organizations, Confederate control remained tighter than efforts by the Federal
War Department, which was constantly plagued by favoritism in the enforcement of
its regulations. Also, while Federal commanders consistently had to worry about the
large press corps which continually followed their armies in the field, Confederate
policies excluded Southern reporters from active field operations with the army.
Access to enemy papers remained relatively easy throughout the war. The
Confederate Signal and Secret Service Bure,',,, which was partially responsible for the
"5Ibid., 328.
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analysis of Northern newspaper information on a national level, was able to obtain
Baltimore papers on the same day as their issue and New York papers were received
in Richmond the following day." Operational military commanders habitually
obtained enemy newspapers as a primary source of information when operating in
enemy territory. Even private soldiers had little trouble purchasing newspapers
printed in the opposing section from the various suttlers who accompanied the armies.
Many commanders undoubtedly recognized the potential use that newspapers
could be to their enemies and, therefore, increased their own security measures to
diminish the information leaks precipitated by "friendly" reporters. Confederate Gen.
Joseph Johnston became so secretive after the leak of proposed movements in
February 1862 and the ensuing suspicion that all of his plans might be revealed in the
Southern press, that he thereafter refused to reveal his military plans even to
President Davis."• Stonewall Jackson also refrained from revealing the basis of his
plans to his own staff for fear some leak might occur that would reach the press. In
the wake of the Gettysburg campaign, Robert E. Lee remained convinced that Federal
forces had become aware of the location and disposition of Confederate forces






7Jay Luvaas, "Lee at Gettysburg: A General Without Intelligence" in Michael I.
Handel, ed., Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank Cass & Company,
Limited, 1990) 122.
34
Communications intelligence, the analysis of information received through the
interception of enemy communications, also grew in importance during the war. Both
armies possessed signal corps which were used as communications apparatus and
observers throughout the conflict." Typically, signal stations were established at
easily observable points such as hilltops or in high towers and messages were relayed
from one site to another using a system of semaphore flag signals. However, the
ready observation of this system also meant that it could be easily intercepted by
enemy signalmen. Because of the perishable nature of most information passed via
semaphore flags and the relatively short range of this system, semaphore intercepts
were generally of more use at the operational and tactical levels than for strategic
value. The widespread use of telegraphs for the transmission of important military
information also opened the way for wiretapping as a key tool in communications
intelligence collection.
To combat the potential intercept of military signals, both sides often attempted
to encrypt their messages. However, cryptanalysis efforts, or the breaking of these
codes, also became another important development associated with intelligence during
the war. Cipher disks, used as a simple means of encrypting semaphore flag signals,
became standard equipment for most signalmen of the period.59 Although these
codes were usually easily broken, the rapid perishability of information transmitted
by semaphore, and the difficulty of correctly intercepting and decoding these
"
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messages under crude tactical conditions usually meant that any cryptanalysis came
long after the information ceased to be useful. Telegraph signals were also widely
encrypted during the war, especially as the conflict dragged on. The Federal War
Department's reliance on the "Route Transportation Cipher", a word transposition and
substitution system (TABLE 1), provided the Union forces with a reliable encryption
code that was easy to transmit and receive but difficult to break.'" One noticeable
Confederate success in breaking this code occurred in 1864 when cryptographer
Charles A. Gaston, who had been monitoring enemy communications for several
weeks, intercepted a plain text Federal quartermaster report and was able masterfully
to match it to other encrypted reports."'
In contrast to the effective Federal codes, the Confederates used the "Viginere
System", a diplomatic or court code that had been in existence for several hundred
years (TABLE 2). Based on the concept of simple letter substitution from a two-step
table, this system proved both hard to transmit and receive, because its coded
messages were random letter combinations rather than understandable words, and
easy to break, because it relied on a one-for-one letter substitution from a table that
was easily duplicated.' David H. Bates, Albert B. Chandler, and Charles A. Tinker,
three Federal telegraph operators, were so respected for their success in code breaking







cryptanalysis.'3 These telegraphers were able to consistently decode Confederate
communications throughout the latter part of the war and provided valuable
intelligence to operational commanders in the field as well as to strategic planners in
Washington.
Despite the phenomenal growth of photography during the Civil War, the first
American conflict to be extensively recorded in pictures, photographic intelligence
remained largely undeveloped during the struggle. Although photographs were used
to a limited extent to record enemy positions or in terrain studies, the problems of
transporting the bulky cameras and developing equipment and the time required to
process the photographs diminished the overall value of photographic intelligence
during this period.
Some of the singular characteristics which typified the Civil War provided equally
unique opportunities for intelligence in the conflict. Because of pre-war associations
in the U.S. Army or in civilian life, many military commanders were familiar with the
personalities and operating methods of their opponents. This insight into the mind
of an enemy leader often allowed commanders to correctly deduce the goals,
operational plans, and intentions of an opponent. The fact that both sides in the
conflict also shared a generally common culture, the same language, and similar
societal values also allowed for a better understanding of enemy commanders. The




of spreading misinformation by the South was a unique intelligence consideration
that both sides sought to exploit during this war."
Civil War intelligence remained generally informal, decentralized, and elementary
in its organization. While rigidly structured, centralized, and semi-autonomous
intelligence organizations typically characterize modem militaries, the formation of
specific intelligence staffs during this period was generally left to the discretion and
imagination of various military commanders. This lack of formalized organization
often led to haphazard or incomplete collection, duplication of effort, and conflicting
analysis of the enemy situation within the same headquarters. During the Gettysburg
campaign, the Federal commander, Gen. Meade, tried to form a unified picture of the
enemy situation from the reports of five separate intelligence organizations that had
overlapping responsibilities but no structured chain of command, distribution, or
communications links."5
Some attempts were made during the war, however, to formally establish more
centralized organizations for the exploitation of intelligence on the national or theater
level. In May 1861, Gen. George B. McClellan asked detective Allan Pinkerton to
form a secret service that would provide intelligence to the Federal commander."
Pinkerton was the head of a private investigative service, the National Detective
"Luvaas, "Chancellorsville", 110.
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Agency, and had worked closely with McClellan during the latter's employment as
a railroad executive in the 1850s. Pinkerton had risen to national recognition through
his exposure of the so-called "Baltimore Plot" to assassinate Abraham Lincoln during
the President-elect's trip to Washington in early 1861. When McClellan was appointed
head of the Union armies in November 1861, he added Pinkerton to his staff as his
senior intelligence advisor. Despite later claims by the detective that his organization
was the nucleus of the U.S. Secret Service, Pinkerton's unit was never a recognized
part of the Federal government nor did it really act as any centralized national
intelligence organization. Pinkerton's intelligence collection efforts were limited
almost exclusively to the interrogation of captured Confederate prisoners and the
running of a network of spies behind enemy lines in the eastern theater. The results
of the detective's intelligence effort were classic examples of overestimation and the
molding of an intelligence assessment to meet the preconceptions of an operational
commander. Throughout the Peninsula campaign of March - August 1862, Pinkerton
consistently overrated the size of the Confederate forces opposing McClellan by two
to three times their actual number."' Similarly incorrect reports characterized
Pinkerton's efforts during the Antietam campaign several months later. In fact, these
reports may simply have been used to help justify the already cautious and slow
moving nature of McClellan's operations. When President Lincoln finally relieved
McClellan in November 1862, Pinkerton also left service with the Army and returned
to his private practice.
"SSpies, Scouts, and Raiders 32-33.
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Other Federal commanders also tried to centralize their intelligence efforts. When
Gen. Joseph Hooker assumed command of the Federal Army of the Potomac in
January 1863, he was faced with a situation in which there were no estimates of the
enemy force opposing him and no apparatus in place for gathering information about
the Confederate army. To correct this obvious shortcoming, Hooker appointed Col.
George H. Sharpe of the 120th New York to the position of Deputy Provost Marshal
and assigned him the task of determining the size, location, and disposition of enemy
forces in the area."8 Aided by John Babcock, a former Pinkerton assistant who had
stayed with the army after Pinkerton's resignation, Sharpe set about in the formation
of the Bureau of Military Information, an operational level military intelligence unit
that analyzed information from all available sources to develop a coherent picture of
the enemy situation. Sharpe's reports during the opening phases of the
Chancellorsville campaign aided Hooker in the.initially successful move around the
Confederate left flank."' The accurate daily reports of enemy size, location and
movements during the Gettysburg campaign allowed the Federal commander, Gen.
George G. Meade, to stay abreast of the developing situation and deploy his forces
in an effective manner.'0 What made Sharpe's organization unique among most
intelligence organizations of the period was its use of information from all available





control over 70 civilian scouts and spies, Sharpe's bureau also drew upon vital
information provided by cavalry reports, prisoner interrogations, newspapers, and
communications intercepts to deduce probable enemy actions. So positive was
Sharpe's reputation that Federal commanders in the western theater also requested
analytical assistance from this Army of the Potomac asset, thereby making it an
organization of national significance. Despite the invaluable support provided by the
Bureau of Military Information during the war and the potential lessons it offered for
future military intelligence, the unit was disbanded as a formal organization at the
war's end.
Federal counterintelligence efforts were also largely informal during the war,
although some counterespionage units were formed. Perhaps foremost among these
was the National Detective Bureau, formed in 1862 by Lafayette Baker, Provost
Marshal of the U.S. War Department." Operating almost exclusively in Washington
and the surrounding area, Baker's unit consisted of counterespionage officers and
detectives who were involved in criminal investigations and the disclosure of
Confederate operatives in the capital.
Confederate efforts to establish any centralized national intelligence or
counterintelligence organizations were far less successful. The Signal and Secret
Service Bureau was established within the Adjutant and Inspector General's office of
the Confederate War Department in May 1862. Under the command of Maj. William
Norris, the bureau never really developed into a national military intelligence center
"7O'Toole, 42-43.
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but acted as more of a centralized communications facility which managed the routing
of intelligence information to and from various spies operating in Canada and the
North, Confederate diplomats in Europe, and the Signal Corps operating with armies
in the field. The bureau was also responsible for the procurement of Northern
newspapers but provided little analytical effort in discerning the truth or potential use
of the information reported in those papers. Instead, this organization simply passed
the papers to various political and military leaders for their own use.'
Confederate counterintelligence remained equally haphazard. As the Provost
Marshal of Richmond, Brig. Gen. John Henry Winder was responsible for
counterintelligence and counterespionage activities in and around the Confederate
capital. In this task, Winder proved himself to be particularly ineffective. Numerous
spies and Federal informants continued to operate from Richmond throughout the war
and, in some cases, Winder's office may have been the likely source of their
information.'3 In a post-war discussion of her intelligence activities in Richmond,
Elizabeth Van Lew claimed that she had consistently been able to baffle Winder's
investigations through the simple use of charm and flattery.7"
On the operational level, most military commanders continued to manage their
own intelligence efforts. During this period, military headquarters staffs were
typically lean and consisted of very few specialized staff functions. While certain
72Ibid., 132.
"Spies, Scouts, and Raiders, 56.
'Ibid., 87.
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logistical functions were assigned to the purview of specific staff officers such as the
quartermaster, chief commissariat, or ordinance officer, other duties were relegated
on an ad hoc basis. Adjutants/inspectors general, aides de camp, and members of a
commander's personal entourage were regularly assigned tasks as the need arose.
While a commander might assign tasks to a staff officer based on some particular
talent or knowledge, staff assignment typically meant that th- officer had to be
prepared to do a myriad of duties. Although commanders used their meager staifs
to serve any number of purposes, two major ingredients of the decision making
process, the intelligence and operations functions, were generally retained for
consideration by the commander himself. Whereas some military leaders might be
willing to accept input from subordinate commanders regarding assessments of the
intelligence picture and the planning of future operations, the senior officer usually
exercised the active control of both of these disciplines. While the operational
commander's direct supervision of both the intelligence and operations functions in
Civil War armies may have overtaxed the abilities of some commanders and led to
various shortcomings, it also produced an understanding of the indivisible nature of
these two factors in the decision making process.
D. INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS
The analysis of the connection between "...intelligence and military operations
relates to the contribution--real or potential--of intelligence to the military leader's
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decisions .... ,a' Logically, the relationship between intelligence and operations
functions in the decision making process would appear to be firmly established. As
noted previously, operations should be based on available intelligence. Similarly,
"The ultimate objective of Intelligence is to enable action to be optimized.""6 In
other words, operations are planned and conducted in the context of reality as
reflected in the available intelligence and this intelligence, in order to be effective,
must also be directed only towards those issues which are of operational significance.
While phases of operations and campaigns are often governed by what the opposing
commanders know about their enemies, 77 so too must the personnel who direct the
intelligence effort "be kept well informed of all the latest developments concerning
their own forces' operations and plans."'8 In theory then, these two factors in the
determination of a proper course of action would thus appear to be inseparable,
interdependent parts of a larger whole. However, the complexities of modern warfare
and the separation of operations and intelligence functions into different staffing
sections often points to a reality that is far removed from this theoretical deduction.
Various failings at any point in the intelligence process will limit the overall
impact that intelligence will have on operational planning. Shortcomings in the
execution of one phase will obviously influence the effectiveness of the other phases
"
7SHandel, "Intelligence and Military Operations", 1.
"R.V. Jones, "Intelligence and Command," in Michael I. Handel, ed., Leaders and
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of the process because of the inherently cyclical nature of intelligence. Further,
because of the interrelated nature of the intelligence and operations functions, any
failing in the intelligence process will adversely effect the performance of the
proposed operations.
One of the major problems that may occur in the planning and direction phase is
that the wrong requirements will be identified or that the requirements will be
incomplete. Because of this, truly important aspects of the intelligence picture may
remain unexamined or efforts may be directed towards answeriug questions that
really have little significance to the conduct of friendly operations. Similarly, some
questions simply can not be answered with any degree of assurance by the
intelligence assets available.
The correct identification of intelligence requirements must be the basis for the
entire intelligence effort. Although operations or intelligence staff officers may have
some idea of the broad requirements of needed information, commanders must ensure
that they clearly spell out the elements of information that are needed to support their
intentions. Otherwise, requirements that are not of significance to the operational
planning may be tasked for collection, analyzed and disseminated with no potential
for impact on the decision process. Another potential pitfall of the misidentification
of requirements is that some key element of information would be overlooked by
staff officers. Again, the direct involvement of the commander or primary operational
planner may help to avoid this error.
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During this phase of the intelligence process, it is equally important to discern
what questions can and can't be answered by the available intelligence assets. The
complexities of positively determining enemy intentions or specifically identifying
all available options for an enemy commander are usually beyond the capability of
any level of military intelligence but these are usually the very things that most
operational planners would like to know. It is therefore important for all of the
participants in the intelligence planning phase to remember that uncertainty must
always become irreducible at some point.7" This will only be possible if the
operations and intelligence sections work as a single, coherent team in the
development of the intelligence plan.
Several inherent problems may effect the strength and management of the
collection phase. First among these is a failure to recognize the capabilities and
limitations of the various collection sources. Associated with this consideration, is the
fact that, when faced with the common division of intelligence and operations staff
functions in modern militaries, the operations branch invariably controls the
collection assets that the intelligence staff needs to fulfill its requirements. Collection
assets must be managed properly to ensure their maximum effectiveness in gathering
the information that will support operational plans.
All intelligence assets possess inherent limitations to the types and value of
information they can collect. Communications intelligence is naturally effective only
"
9Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington,
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if enemy forces are actively using their communications networks and can therefore
be intercepted. Human collectors, such as scouts or spies, must have some access to
the type of information that they have been tasked to collect. Many forms of
information will naturally be of limited use because of the inherent time delays in
collecting the information and then transmitting that information back to a processing
point for analysis by a commander, operational planner, or intelligence advisor.
While operations staffs traditionally control the assets, personnel, and equipment
that are required for the collection of intelligence information, these staffs must
understand the importance of the required information and the capability of a source
to gather that information. While a commander may task his intelligence advisr, with
specific informational needs, only the operations staff has the capability of gathering
this information. While operational necessities may require that certain assets would
not be used, these decisions need to be made with the understanding that some
information may therefore not be available for use in operational planning. As in the
intelligence planning phase, the commander, intelligence, and operations sections
must understand the priority of operational concerns and work as one to maximize
the collection potential of available assets.
In the processing and analysis phase, numerous potential pitfalls may inhibit the
contribution of intelligence to the leader's decisions. The most obvious of these is
that the analysis will be wrong in its conclusions. Incomplete analysis or analysis
that really fails to address one of the commander's requirements is another threat to
the maintenance of a positive bond between intelligence and operational planning.
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The most fundamental quality that will influence the impact of intelligence
analysis on operational planning is its accuracy. If false or incorrect assessments are
acted upon by commanders, intelligence will invariably have a negative effect and
could even lead to the failure of the proposed operation. "...A commander's belief in
the credibility of intelligence provided is probably the most essential factor in his
readiness to make use of it."' If the analysis provided by an intelligence staff is
consistently wrong, commanders and operational planners will eventually ignore these
assessments in the development of operational plans, thereby leading to a situation
in which intelligence has no significance towards the decision process.
Incomplete analysis or analysis that fails to address key operational concerns may
also fail to have an influence on the decision making process. For analysis to be
effective, it must convey to a commander or operational planner the importance of a
given set of facts. Without this operational relevancy, analysis is of little value.
Similarly, if a key piece of analysis is absent from an assessment, it may also be of
little value. Intelligence staffs must always address the primary operational concerns
of the commander in their assessments. While the inclusion of other significant
analysis may improve the positive influence of intelligence on the decision making
process, this analysis is useful only if the commander's principal requirements have
been satisfied as well.
Numerous factors may present themselves as potential obstacles to efficient
analysis. Time, objectivity, the amount of detail required, and the desire for positive
"•Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations", 51.
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conclusions will all influence the effectiveness of the analysis phase. The time
required to perform proper analysis is often much greater than that allowed in a
period of crises in which the dynamics of decision making and data accumulation
outpace intellectual refinements."1 When faced with a forceful or charismatic
commander, analysts may be swayed in their objectivity and may then tell a
commander what he wants to hear rather than assessments supported by facts and a
logical flow of thought."2 Finally, a commander's desire for positive assurances from
analysis that is designed to "...reduce uncertainty by extrapolating from evidence
riddled with ambiguities'43 will also have a profound effect on the overall
intelligence effort. While operational planners might be best served by assessments
that were undeniable in their accuracy, analysis is more typically characterized by the
Clausewitzian reality that "In war, more than anywhere else, things do not turn out
as we expect.""4
Misdirected, exclusive, or untimely dissemination will further limit the. impact of
intelligence on operations. Equally detrimental is the dissemination of intelligence
in a form not readily useable by an operational planner. Late, infrequent, or
misdirected dissemination of intelligence might force a commander to make decisions
without use of the assessments provided in these products. Dissemination of
"
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intelligence on too frequent a basis may lead operational commanders to discount the
assessments as being alarmist" or may also desensitize decision makers to the
potential threats or opportunities suggested by these assessments." Dissemination
of intelligence in a form that is neither understandable nor useable by an operational
commander could also negate any potential impact of intelligence on operations. The
key to the proper form of dissemination is "..to paint the picture in a style that will
best convey its intended content to the commander."' This, in turn, would demand
a proper understanding of operational command and planning considerations by
intelligence analysts and advisors.
Finally, one of the most damaging factors in the intelligence process' failure to
support operations is the failure of the commander or operational planner to include
intelligence assessments in the operational planning process. This problem might be
the result of any number of diverse causal elements. Obviously, shortcomings in any
of the previous phases of the intelligence process would influence a commander's
willingness or ability to use intelligence assessments in the formulation of operational
plans. Intelligence will be used in the development of operational plans only if
proper requirements have been identified, suitable information collected, correct
analysis performed, and completed assessments transmitted to the commander. If the
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intelligence may fail to influence the decision process. "If a leader is dogmatic, he
will not be receptive to new information or information that contradicts his objectives
and earlier policies and decisions.'"" Instead, these commanders may simply refuse
to accept the assessments provided and may therefore fail to include any intelligence
in the formation of operational plans. Additionally, second stage intelligence, that
assesses enemy reactions to friendly operations, may be unacceptable to commanders
if positive or desired results are not noted in the intelligence reports."' Due to the
inherently uncertain and sometimes ambiguous nature of intelligence reports, some
commanders prefer to be given information only and conduct all analysis themselves.
While this method may work effectively in some cases, commanders must be willing
to accept assessments in fields that they know nothing about. Further, the volume of
information and speed of communications which characterize modem military
campaigns may quickly overload a commander's mind with seemingly unconnected
details that might actually be the keys to a comprehensive analysis of the situation.
To ensure the inclusion of intelligence in the decision making process, a commander
must remain convinced that his use of the analysis provided by intelligence will
increase the effectiveness of his operational plans and will also raise the probability
of success.
"UHandel, "Leaders and Intelligence", 5.
"Ibid., 9.
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One of the obvious characteristics of the intelligence relation to operations is the
fact that even "...the best intelligence alone is no panacea."'s Good intelligence, in
and of itself, can not win campaigns. Other ingredients in the operational picture will
have to be present to ensure military success. Sufficient manpower, firepower, and
logistical support as well as effective leadership and combat styles are all necessary
ingredients for victory. Therefore, "Intelligence, perhaps even more so than any other
factor in war, is valuable only if many other conditions are met."'
Commanders use intelligence as a means of recognizing opportunities and threats
to their operational planning. While unquestionable numerical superiority or the
supremacy of certain weapons may make the outcome of war more certain,
intelligence offers a way of maximizing the potential benefits of these assets.
Conversely, use of intelligence by a weaker opponent may negate some of the
advantages held by the stronger side. Although "...excellent generalship and highly
motivated soldiers can temporarily substitute for good intelligence,'" 2 the competent
combination of intelligence and operational planning may increase the overall
effectiveness of military operations.
However, it is important to remember that the successful execution of operations
must remain the central focus of all military decisions. Intelligence is important only
in the sense that it provides another tool for achieving operational goals.
"Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations", 33.
"Ibid., 43.
'Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", 19.
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...Intelligence, like logistics, should always play a supportive role; yet the word
supportive as used here is not synonymous with secondary or unimportant.13 The
indivisible relationship of operations and intelligence is similar to any goal and the
means of achieving it. Only when the two fields are closely linked can operational
plans be developed to their maximum potential.
'31bid., 21.
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THE ROUTE TRANSPORTATION CIPHER"
(TABLE 1)
are Valley the reinforcements sufficient too
[church] (civilians]
forces fzr in be that scattered
present a massing sent request to
my possible are to therefore form
Washington offensive troops this I an
[south]
towards march enemy district deterrent effective
CAIRO
METHODOLOGY:
A keying word would be selected from a cipher book to indicate
the number of columns and rows used in the table and the starting
point for the message. The text would then be organized in the
table according to a predetermined route established by the keying
word. Sensitive words listed in the cipher book would be
substituted by alternates. Using the keying word as the first word
in the transmission, the message would then be sent as it read from
left to right and top to bottom within the table. Decryption would
simply reverse the process.
EXAMPLE:
Plain text message- Enemy troops are massing in the Valley for
a possible offensive march towards Washington. My present forces
are too scattered to form an effective deterrent. I therefore
request that sufficient reinforcements be sent to this district.
Encryption process- The keying word CAIRO indicates a table of
six columns and six rows with the starting point of the message
being the bottom of the third column and travelling up the third
column, down the second, etc. Words would then be inserted in the
table substituting the words in brackets for the sensitive words
above them. The message would then be transmitted as it read from
left to right, top to bottom.
Encrypted message- CAIRO, are church the civilians sufficient
too forces for in be that scattered present a massing sent request
to my possible are to therefore form south offensive troops this I
an towards march enemy district deterrent effective.
"Spies, Scouts, and Raiders, 70-71.
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THE VIGINERE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM"
(TABLE 2)
Message letter axis
ABC DE FGH I JKLMNOPQRSTUVWQyZ
BC D E F G H I J K LMNO P Q R ST U VW X Y Z A
CDEFGH I J KLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZAB
DEFGH I JKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC
E FGH I JKLMNO PQRSTUVWXYZABCD
K FGH I JKLMNO PQRSTUVWXYZABCDE
e GH I JKLMNO PQRSTUVWXYZABCDEF
y H I J KLMNO PQRSTUVWXY ZABCDE FG
I J K L MN OP Q R ST U VW X Y Z A B CD E F G H
1 JKLMNO PQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGH I
e KLMNO PQR S TUVWXYZABCDEFGHI J
t LMNO PQRS TUVWXYZABCDEFGH I JK




a QRS TUVWXYZABCDEFGH I JKLMNO P
x RS TUVWXYZABCDEFGH I JKLMNO PQ
i S TUVWXYZABCDEFGH I JKLMNO PQR
s TUVWXYZABCDEFGH I JKLMNOPQRS
UVWX Y ZABC DEFGHI JKLMNO PQRS T
VWXYZABCDEFGHI JKLMNO PQRSTU
WXY ZABCDE FGH I JKLMNO PQRSTUV
XY ZABCDEFGH I JKLMNO PQRSTUVW
Y ZABC DEFGH I JKLMNOPQRSTUVWX
Z A B CD E F G H I J K LMNO P Q R S TUVW X Y
METHODOLOGY:
Letters from a plain text message were matched to the letters
of an encryption keying phrase. These two letters were then
assigned to the different axis of the table above and, where the
two lines intersected, a new letter was substituted for
transmission in place of the plain text message.
EXAMPLE:
Message-SEND PONTOON BRIDGES FORWARD
Key- C O M P L E T E V I C T O R Y C O M P L E T E V I




A. JACKSON AND THE VALLEY
On 28 October 1862, the Confederate War Department issued Special Order Number
192, assigning command of the Shenandoah Valley District to Maj. Gen. Thomas
Jonathan Jackson." The senior commander of the Confederate Army of the Potomac,
Gen. Joseph Johnston, was initially hesitant to transfer this promising subordinate
from his own operational command at Manassas but the strategic importance of the
Valley and Jackson's proven military abilities soon led Johnston to conclude that the
appointment was appropriate. Johnston, in his role as the commander of the
Department of Northern Virginia, would still exercise authority over the subordinate
district commander but Jackson would now be allowed a greater degree of operational
independence. By 4 November, Johnston had notified Jackson of the new assignment
and the junior general made immediate preparations to assume his duties. In a short
speech delivered at Fairfax Courthouse, Jackson bade farewell to his former command,
the "Stonewall" Brigade, the unit with which he had gained fame at Manassas and
whose sobriquet he shared. He then boarded the first available train leaving
Manassas for the Shen,.ndoah Valley and arrived in the town of Winchester that same
evening."'
%O.R., Vol. 5, 930. Adjutant and Inspector General's Office Special Order Number
192, issued at Richmond.
"'
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Jackson was a stranger to neither the area of his new assignment nor to military
life. A native Virginian, Jackson had been born in 1824 in the town of Clarksburg,
a rough little village located in the mountainous western region of the state.'"
Following the deaths of their father in 1826 and mother in 1831," Thomas and the
other Jackson children were raised by various relatives in the region. In 1842, Jackson
was presented with an unexpected opportunity."' Through the resignation of a
locally appointed cadet and the influence of some long standing friends of the family,
the enterprising young man secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy and
reported for duty that June. Despite the fact that he had only the equivalent of a
fourth grade education, Jackson diligently applied himself to his studies and
graduated 17th of 59 cadets in the class of 1846.10°
With the U.S. at war with Mexico, Jackson soon found himself in the thick of
military action. Assigned to Company K of the 1st Artillery,"° the young officer
first saw action during the siege of Vera Cruz and was promoted to 1st Lieutenant for
his courage under fire.'0 3 Subsequent combat included the assaults on Churubusco,
"Clark, 22.
"Frank E. Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M







Chapultapec, and the San Cosme Gate during Scott's campaign against Mexico
City.1" Conspicuous throughout each of these actions, Jackson rose to the rank of
Brevet Major before the war's end.
Like many Mexican War veterans, however, Jackson found the peacetime Army far
less satisfying. Following an uneventful two-year assignment with the garrison at
Fort Hamilton, New York,"'0 Jackson was ordered to Fort Meade, Florida, in October
1850 as part of the move to suppress hostilities during the Third Seminole War.'"
After a lingering and bitter personal feud with the post commander, Jackson decided
to leave the Army."'0 In August 1851, Jackson reigned his Army commission and
accepted a position as an instructor at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington,
Virginia.
Although his students often characterized him as an uninspiring martinet,
Professor Jackson sought to establish himself as an upstanding member of the
Lexington community. He bought a small house in town and became an active
member of the local Presbyterian congregation. In August 1853, Jackson married
Elinor Junkin, a minister's daughter, but his young wife died 14 months later."'0








Mary Anna Morrison of North Carolina, another minister's daughter, and the two
were married in July 1857.
With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, Jackson returned to military life. In
April he led a group of VMI cadets to Richmond to serve as drill masters for the
growing number of Confederate volunteers around the city and was himself soon
appointed to command the garrison at Harper's Ferry with the rank of Colonel.'"
At this new post Jackson began to show many of the qualities that would characterize
his future performance in the war. The raw militia and volunteer troops that formed
his command were subjected to endless drill and military exercises to improve their
proficiency and discipline. Then, in May Jackson seized the operational initiative in
the area with a raid against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, an important supply
route for goods travelling to Washington from the west. By simply closing off both
ends of a 32 mile section of track for a single day, the Confederate commander
captured huge amounts of Federal supplies and rolling stock that included over 56
locomotives and 300 cars.110
After turning command of Harper's Ferry over to Gen. Joseph Johnston on 24 May,
Jackson was assigned the command of the First Brigade in Johnston's recently formed





Brig. Gen. in mid-June." At the battle of Manassas in July, Jackson's stubborn
defense of Henry House Hill earned the nickname of "Stonewall" for both himself
and his brigade of five Virginia regiments and marked the commencement of
Jackson's rise to prominence in the Confederate army. It was largely because of his
performance at Manassas that he was promoted to Maj. Gen. in October and
subsequently assigned to the Valley.
With his headquarters formally established in Winchester, Jackson began to assess
the state of military affairs in his district. The Confederate military forces that
Jackson had available for his own use were weak. The only Southern military assets
under Jackson's immediate control were 1461 militiamen loosely organized in three
brigades, three field artillery pieces, and 130 mounted militia. An additional force of
485 infantry and 60 cavalry were also within the boundaries of the district but,
because of a unique command relationship wherein these units reported directly to
the War Department, Jackson was initially unsure whether his authority extended over
these troops.
The Federal forces opposing Jackson's meager command were considerable. From
an escaped Confederate prisoner, the Southern general learned that 1200 Union
soldiers were positioned in Williamsport and might be preparing to cross the Potomac
River as soon as it was fordable. Lt. Col. Turner Ashby of the cavalry reported 800
Northern troops near Shepardstown with the possibility that reinforcements had been
moving in that direction. Scouts near Romney had reported 4000 Federal troops under
"IFreeman, 41.
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Gen. Kelley in possession of that town and that this force might be preparing for an
advance on Winchester."3 The Confederates would have to improve their own
circumstances if they were to hope for success against the Federals.
In addition to the enemy forces, Jackson also had to consider the physical
characteristics of his area of operations during the development of any plans (MAP
1). The district to which Jackson had been assigned was an area whose strategic
importance would become apparent as the war continued. Located between the
heights of the Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains in western Virginia, the
Shenandoah Valley was one of the most significant geographic features of the eastern
theater of war. Stretching from the James River in the south to the Potomac River in
the north with an average width of about 40 miles, the Valley District encompassed
a vast area of several thousand square miles that Jackson was now tasked with
defending."'
The two mountain ridges, parts of the Appalachian chain, that bounded the district
on the east and west were major barriers that separated the Valley both physically
and culturally from other parts of the state. The eastern boundary of the Valley was
formed by the Blue Ridge. This feature formed a natural barrier between the Valley
and the eastern part of the state that helped to underscore the district's physical
differences from the tidewater and piedmont. While much of the land east of the
1 13 0.R., Vol. 5, 937. 5 November letter from Jackson to Benjamin.
"...Freeman, 678. Footnoted M.F. Maury, Physical Survey of Virginia Preliminary
Report No. 2, 97-98.
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Blue Ridge was characterized by tangled forests and worn out farmland, the Valley
had woods with little undergrowth... and rich soil in its fields. Numerous gaps,
most of which could be held against any frontal assault by a single cavalry regiment
and a field battery, passed through the Blue Ridge and were important choke points
on any east-west routes to or from the Valley."' In the west, the Alleghennies
separated the Valley from the mountainous pro-Union counties that were to secede
from the rest of the state and become West Virginia. The geography of the Valley
itself reflected the mountainous character of the greater region. "Drained by the
Shenandoah with its numerous affluents the surface is nowhere flat, but a succession
of graceful swells, occasionally rising into abrupt hills."'' The headwaters of the
Shenandoah River began about 18 miles south of Staunton and then, after uniting its
various branches and forks, flowed to Harper's Ferry where it joined the Potomac.
Numerous hills and ridges were scattered throughout the Valley and thereby served
to subdivide the district into smaller compartments. "But the glory of the Valley is
the Massanutten,"""8 a 60-mile long series of low, but steep, mountains in the east
central part of the district that actually separated the greater Shenandoah Valley area
into two distinct valleys. While the western part continued to use the name
Shenandoah, the eastern division was known as the Luray Valley. The obstacles to
1151bid., 679.
"'Ibid., 690.
"'Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction (D. Appleton and Company,
1879. reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1992) 43.
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both movement and observation provided by the Massanutten would play a key role
in the upcoming campaign.
While the natural geography of the Shenandoah region offered some unique
considerations for the conduct of military operations, certain man-made features
would also influence planning within the district. Transportation networks,
population centers, and production efforts were all factors that had to be examined
by military commanders in the area. The character of the local inhabitants themselves
was another element in the makeup of the district that suggested examination.
The transportation networks that existed in the Valley were a major area of
concern. Although the geography of the Valley suggested its use as a natural north-
south axis of movement for the opposing armies, this movement could only be made
if the existing transportation systems were also suitable for such an endeavor.
Infantry and cavalry soldiers might be able to march cross-country over the fields and
forests of the district but less mobile assets such as artillery and supply trains would
have to rely on the use of roads and railroads.
The most significant characteristic of the railroads in the district was the absence
of any continuous line down the Valley."' The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
transitted across the lower Valley near Harper's Ferry and linked Washington to the
west. Because of its east-west orientation, the B&O offered little support for forces
moving up or down the Valley. Although it might serve as a means of moving units
to the district from some other region, its location so close to the opposing armies
"'Freeman, 681-682.
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meant that neither side could use it effectively unless large numbers of troops were
allocated for its protection. The Winchester and Potomac line, which ran the 32 miles
between Winchester and Harper's Ferry, offered some use as a means of limited north-
south movement but, like the B&O, its position in the lower Valley also left it in
contention between the belligerents. The Winchester and Potomac's use of light
weight rails and sleeper ties also restricted the weight of loads it could carry.u' The
Manassas Gap Railroad ran 77 miles from Mt. Jackson, through Strasburg and
Thoroughfare Gap, to Manassas Junction, east of the Blue Ridge. In the upper Valley,
the Virginia Central ran through Staunton from Charlottesville to the east then
continued southwest toward the Allegheny range. Like the other lines, it could
primarily be used as a means of moving supplies and men to or from other regions.
Roads formed the other major transportation network in the district. In contrast
to the railroads of the region, roads of varying quality were so numerous that local
inhabitants sometimes had difficulty remembering where each of the tracks led. In
many cases several roads might simply link the same two endpoints but take different
routes to get there. To further complicate military planning, the roads of the region
were not only confusingly numerous but were also largely unmapped."
While most roads throughout Virginia remained unimproved dirt tracks, the
abundance of limestone in the Valley had allowed for the construction of improved
UOIbid., 681. While standard rail weights for the period were 50 pounds per yard,




surface thoroughfares that could support heavy traffic in any weather. The
macadamized Valley Turnpike was the major north-south line of communication
throughout the region. Other macadamized byways served to link the turnpike with
various towns throughout the Valley. Although these "metaled" roads provided a
solid marching surface, the majority of the roads in the Valley remained simple dirt
routes. Like the unimproved roads throughout most of Virginia, "their badness was
a joke when they were at their best and a calamity when they were at their worst."'
From November to April, rain and snow general'y made most of these roads
impassable unless they became frozen and the hot, dry summers left them dusty,
choking byways."23
Travelling the length of the Shenandoah Valley from Staunton to Martinsburg, the
Valley Turnpike was perhaps the most significant avenue of advance for any force
operating in the region. Its improved surface and resulting all-weather capability
allowed for the rapid movement of armies at any time of year. The overall quality
of the road also made it an ideal route for the movement of heavily laden supply
wagons and other weighty equipment. So stable was this roadbed that, during the
course of the war, Confederate forces dragged captured locomotives along its surface
without doing substantial damage to either the train or the thoroughfare. The




was another factor that contributed to its value as an important line of
communication.
Other roads in the Valley were also of significance in military planning. The
Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike in the upper Valley was an important route which
linked the Valley with the regions west of the Alleghennies.n' Roads of differing
quality also passed through each of the gaps in the Blue Ridge, thereby providing
access to eastern Virginia. The rough parallelogram formed by roads surrounding and
crossing the Massanutten would be among the most significant aspects of the road
network in the Valley.US While the Valley turnpike ran along the western base, an
inferior road passed along the length of the Luray Valley to the east. Unimproved
roads also linked the towns at the north and south ends of the Massanutten while a
single track traversed its heights between New Market and Luray.
Although the towns of the district were often nothing more than small country
villages, their location at the intersection or terminus of various roads or rail lines
often gave them a significance they would not otherwise have held. Harper's Ferry,
located at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers in the lower Valley,
had been the site of a major U.S. arsenal and was also an important rail center.
Winchester was a sizeable community important as a major road intersection and
railroad terminus. Strasburg, at the northwest end of the Massanutten, could, in




significant defensive point along the Manassas Gap Railroad. New Market and
Luray, as previously noted, were the endpoints of the road traversing the Massanutten
and were the approximate midpoints on each side of that mountain obstacle. Farther
south, Staunton was a sizeable community whose location along both the Virginia
Central Railroad and the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike made it a vital point of
defense for the east-west supply line to Richmond. At the upper end of the Valley,
Lexington was a prosperous community which served as home to the Virginia
Military Institute.
The Valley's inhabitants themselves were an important consideration for military
commanders on both sides of the conflict. Like civilians in any Civil War, their
loyalties were often divided by competing interests and they often found themselves
trapped between the warring factions. Many were descendants of German immigrants
who had prospered in the fertile lands of the region. 'These were thrifty, substantial
farmers, and, like their kinsmen of Pennsylvania, expressed their opulence in huge
barns and fat cattle.""• A large minority were pacifist Mennonites and Dunkards,
a quiet, religious people who worked diligently to improve their blessed land. Unlike
other areas of the South, there were no great planters and few slaves, no
conspicuously wealthy families and likewise little poverty."2' Most of the
population remained supportive of the Confederacy, more for reasons of local loyalty




One Confederate general noted that, aside from the significant passivist population,
"The women sent husbands, sons, lovers to battle as cheerfully as to marriage
feasts."''
The various goods that were produced by these industrious people gave the Valley
even more significance than its strict geographical setting. Agriculturally, the region
was unsurpassed. Farms were prosperous and efficiently run. Gen. Richard Taylor
recalled that:
At that time everything in the valley had a thrifty look, the horses and cattle
were fat and sleek, the large barns overflowing with the gathered crops, the
houses which were small in comparison with the barns, looked comfortable,
the fences, post and rail or stone, were in splendid order; in fact everything
looked well, and showed a thriving population. It was truly a land of milk and
honey.'
The Valley, "...that great place of wheat, flour, and hogs .... ,,0 was the most
productive area in Virginia both for cattle and grain."' Its fields produced wheat
at twice the yield of farmland in other parts of the state"' and the livestock always
appeared to be healthy and well fed. In the early stages of the war, the Confederate
troops stationed in the Valley took full advantage of the fruits of this agricultural
UaTaylor, 45.
"U'John H. Worsham, One of Jackson's Foot Cavalry (Neale Publishing Company,






wealth. One Southern soldier stated that "In going down the valley, we had a feast
all the way; the people had just finished killing hogs, and every house had sausage,
spare ribs, chine, liver, etc., to give us.""' An abundant region such as the Valley
would be a great subsistence asset to any military force that controlled it.
Although most commercial enterprises remained relatively small, manufactured
goods were another important asset to the region's productivity. Capture of the
precious rifle manufacturing machinery located in the U.S. arsenal at Harper's Ferry
had been a major objective of Virginia officials during the opening days of the
conflict."M The numerous streams and rivers throughout the district provided an
ample power supply for the many textile factories and grain mills in the Valley. 3"
The presence of iron ore, coal, and timber allowed for the establishment of various
small pig iron furnaces. The limestone underlying most of the district's terrain was
extensively quarried and used for road surfacing.
An area as vast and important as the Valley would require a much larger military
force for its protection than Jackson possessed in early November, 1861. Soon after
his arrival in Winchester, Jackson had sent a plea for reinforcements to the
Confederate War Department in Richmond and, on 7 November, Secretary of War
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of the Rockbridge artillery were to be detached from Johnston's army and sent to the
Valley District.1" Gen. Johnston, still somewhat miffed about Jackson's departure,
objected to the removal of the veteran Stonewall Brigade from the Confederate Army
of the Potomac"" but Secretary Benjamin and President Davis, pointing to the
urgent need for troops in the Valley, overruled this objection. Jackson's familiarity
with the unit and the fact that many of the troops in this brigade were drawn from,
and therefore familiar with, the district were other positive factors influencing the
decision."' A force of about 6,000 men was also to be detached from Brig. Gen.
Loring's Army of the Northwest, which was then operating in the Allegennies, and
sent to Winchester, via Staunton."'° As an additional measure to increase the size
of his developing army, Jackson then issued another call for mobilization of the
district's militia."' However, because of Federal occupation of areas within the
district, Jackson expected this call to yield few new recruits.
In accordance with Benjamin's instructions, the Stonewall Brigade set out from
Fairfax Courthouse towards the railroad depot at Manassas on the 8th."• The next
137Ibid., 939. 6 November letter from Benjamin to Jackson.
13'Ibid., 940. 7 November letter from Johnston to Cooper.
139 Ibid., 946. 10 November letter from Davis to Johnston. Also 940, 7 November
letter from Benjamin to Johnston.
'"Ibid., 938. 5 November order from Gen. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General
of the Confederate army, to Brig. Gen. Loring.
'"Ibid., 942. 7 November report from Jackson to Maj. T.G. Rhett, Assistant
Adjutant General of the Confederate Army of the Potomac.
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day the troops boarded the cars and travelled to Strasburg where they debarked for
the march to Winchester, which they reached by the lith."3 Jackson continued to
train and arm the militia forces and quickly enfolded new recruits into the existing
units. Although Loring's troops had yet to arrive, Jackson already began to plan for
the use of the growing Confederate military force in the Valley.
B. OPERATIONS ALONG THE POTOMAC
With the overall size and quality of his little army improving, Jackson now made
plans to go on the offensive against the still larger Union forces in the area. In a 20
November message to Secretary Benjamin, Jackson proposed an attack against the
Federal force in Romney."' The Confederate general had several reasons for
suggesting such an operation. Jackson reasoned that the Union commanders in that
area were probably not expecting an attack during the winter months and that their
guard would therefore be somewhat relaxed. If the Southerners waited until spring
to attack the area, this would allow the Northern troops to prepare formidable
defenses and would also prevent Confederate access to the needed resources around
Romney. Further, Jackson believed that a Confederate advance on Romney might
cause Gen. McClellan, the commander of the Federal Array of the Potomac, to believe
that Johnston's army had been substantially weakened and thereby induce the
Federals into a hasty assault against the formidable Confederate defenses near
"
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Centreville. Jackson might then take his force from the Valley and fall upon the right
or rear of McClellan's army.
Various delays, however, were hindering the movement of Loring's command to
Winchester. Brig. Gen. Loring himself seemed less than enthusiastic about the
proposed junction with Jackson and had suggested that, due to the vigors of previous
operations in the Alleghennies, his entire force should be allowed to rest and refit
during the winter rather than continue active field operations. On 21 November,
however, Gen. Johnston urgcd the War Department to order Loring's force to
Winchester instead of allowing them to simply go into winter quarters.14S
Confederate manpower was too precious to let Loring's troops remain idle for several
months. On the 14th, Secretary Benjamin sent a letter to Loring outlining the benefits
of a union between the two Confederate forces, but still left much discretion to Loring
as to whether or not any junction should take place."4' Although the brigadier
agreed to march his troops to Winchester, he continued to delay the movement,
offering a variety of reasons for his tardiness.4" Finally, on 4 December, Inspector
General Cooper issued Loring a peremptory order to send Taliaferro's brigade to
Winchester."" This, in turn, was followed the next day by an order for Loring to
145Ibid., 966.
'"Ibid., 969.
"'47Ibid., 983. 29 November letter fhom Loring to Benjamin.
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move his entire command from Staunton to Winchester."' Although Taliaferro's
unit arrived in Winchester several days after these orders were issued, the rest of
Loring's command would not reach the town until the middle of the month."•
The delays in concentrating a sufficient force for an advance on Romney had
caused Jackson to modify his plans. Federal reinforcements had been moving towards
Romney since November and Jackson now believed that up to 9,000 Northern soldiers,
under the command of Gen. Kelley, were located around the town."' The
Confederate general now thought that an expedition against the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal, a major transportation route along the Potomac River for the shipment of
supplies to Washington from the west, might be more favorable than an immediate
attack against the sizeable enemy force at Romney (MAP 2). Coal was a particularly
important commodity that typically travelled via the canal to Washington. Although
Jackson realized that he would still have to maintain a watch on Kelley and other
Federal forces in the area, he also reasoned that, if sufficient damage could be done
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On 16 December, Jackson initiated his plan "...to cut off western supplies by
breaking Dam No. 5."'s3 Confederate cavalry, under Lt. Col. Ashby rode to the
vicinity of the dam to reconnoiter Union positions and to screen Jackson's movement.
The Stonewall Brigade left its camp at Winchester and marched the 15 miles northeast
to Martinsburg. After leaving its baggage at Big Springs, the unit then travelled an
additional 13 miles to the southern bluffs overlooking Dam No. 5 on the Potomac.
Throughout the night of the 16th and most of the 17th, the Confederate troops
huddled in their blankets to fight the effects of the bitter cold that had recently
arrived. As night fell on the 17th, "...Capt R.T. Colston, Company E, Second Regiment
Virginia Volunteers, who was well acquainted with the locality of the dam and its
structure, volunteered to take charge of the weiking party to accomplish the desired
object."'" Using picks, shovels, and crowbars, Colston's party of about 20 men
descended into the cold water and began dismantling a section of the structure.
While the Stonewall Brigade and much of Ashby's cavalry were employed near
Dam No. 5, Carson's militia brigade had also marched north from Winchester and
made a demonstration towards Falling Waters and Williamsport to distract the Federal
forces in the area."5 Jackson knew that the lUnion had been forming a substantial
force on the Maryland side of the Potomac and that its intervention could wreck the






commanders as to Jackson's true objective and would also serve to divert some of the
Federal response away from the area of the dam.
The Union commander in the region, Gen. Banks, had some indications of
Southern activity in the area but was initially unsure what the objective of this
activity might be. At 10:00 p.m. on the 16th, Banks advised Col. Leonard, the
commander of the Federal forces in Wiliamsport, that a night attack against Gen.
Kelley in Romney might be in the making."5 ' Additionally, Banks related that
reports had been received which indicated a possible Confederate crossing of the
Potomac near Sharpsburg. Early on the morning of the 18th, Col. Leonard reported
the presence of the Confederate covering force at Falling Waters and suggested the
possibility of a Southern attack against Dams No. 4 and 5.1"7 While Banks warned
Leonard that any attack against the dams might simply be a feint for a larger
movement elsewhere1 "', he also dispatched the 1st Maryland to Williamsport to
assist Leonard in the defense of the area."5 ' Later in the day, however, Banks
received some confirmation that the dams were the true target of the Confederate
operation. Banks wired authorities in Washington that a "Citizen of Baltimore from
15' Ibid., 688.
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Richmond reports that Richmond papers Saturday stated that orders had been given
for the destruction of the canal, thinking it essential to Washington."'"
At daylight on the 18th, when Federal soldiers discovered the Confederate presence
at Dam No. 5 and began firing on the demolition party, the Southern chief attempted
to drive off the enemy through the use of artillery placed on the Virginia bluffs. To
counter this shelling, however, Union forces also brought up their own artillery pieces
and began a slow cannonade against the Confederate infantrymen who attempted to
seek shelter behind a large grist mill located along the southern shore.1"1 With the
Confederate presence at Dam No. 5 confirmed, Banks sought to further reinforce
Leonard's command at Williamsport. In addition to the previously dispatched 1st
Maryland, the Union commander now sent the 5th Connecticut, 29th Pennsylvania,
Company F 4th US Artillery, and two companies of Maryland cavalry from their
position near Frederick to the aid of the Federals near the dam.162
The Federal presence made the work of Capt. Colston's party that much more
difficult. Throughout the daylight hours on the 18th and 19th, the opposing forces
continued their light artillery firing and infantry skirmishing across the river. Each
night the Confederate working party rejoined its destructive efforts against the dam.
In an effort to distract the Federal forces, Jackson sent a body of troops upriver
6` 0Ibid., 398. Banks to Williams.
"161Denney, 103.
"1620.R., Vol. 5, 400. Banks.
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towards Dam No. 4 on the morning of 20 December.1 ' 3 When the Union troops
followed, Colston resumed work with increased vigor.
By the "...morning of the 21st a breach, supposed to be sufficiently large for the
object in view, was effected"'" and Jackson decided to hreak off the action along
the canal. The Confederates had lost only one man during the expedition.1"'
Although some light skirmishing between the Federals and Ashby's cavalrymen
occurred near Little Georgetown, the majority of Confederate forces were w'ithdrawn
from their advance positions and reunited for the march back to Winchester. Union
scouts reported the absence of Southern troops at Dam Number 4 and the movement
of those enemy units that had been near Falling Waters towards Dam No. 5.'"
Jackson considered the raid a success and held that there was ample "...reason to
bel;. -e that the recent break in Dam No. 5 will destroy any vestiges of hope thdt
might have been entertained of supplying Washington with Cumberland coal by the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal...."167  However, the true result of the destructive
expedition may have been far less than that hoped for by the Confederate general.
On the 20th Banks had reported that the dam was "...but little injured ....." and would
"163Denney, 103.
'"O.R., Vol. 5, 390. Jackson.
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"...be repaired at once."'" On the 22nd, after the Confederates had begun their
withdrawal from the canal, Col. Leonard was able to report to Banks that there were
"Canal-boats running to-day both ways."169
With the offensive operation against the canal at a close, Confederate units moved
back towards the district's strongpoint at Winchester. On the 23rd, after a two day
march through bitterly cold weather, the Stonewall Brigade, Carson's militia, and
other units that had participated in the expedition reached their camps in
Winchester."7 ' Jackson again requested that Loring's troops be hurried in their move
towards Winchester. Reports of the still growing Federal presence at Romney
suggested the need to concentrate all Confederate forces in the Valley as soon as
practicable. In a letter written to Generals Johnston and Cooper, the district
commander stated that "Recent intelligence from Romney gives reason to believe that
the force of the enemy in Hampshire County is about 10,000 and that reinforcements
are continuing to arrive."'" On the 24th, Gen. Loring finally reached the town."2
Although the Confederate commander was able to spend a quiet Christmas day
with his wife in Winchester, he was already preparing for his next move against the
'"Ibid., 398. Banks to Williams.
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Federals. The arrival of Loring's command now made an advance against Romney
seem possible and Jackson did not want to delay too long before resuming active
operations. On the 25th, Jackson wrote to Ashby in Martinsburg asking the
cavalryman to keep him advised of any enemy movements in Morgan County or along
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad."7 3 The Southern commander had to know the
general strength and disposition of the Union forces before he could deduce their
potential vulnerabilities and Thereby refine his own operational plan. Two days
later, Jackson's Assistant Adjutant General, Lt. Pendleton, again implored Ashby to
provide key information to the Confederate commander:
Ascertain definitely the facts in regard to the enemy's reoccupancy of Bath;
their force, etc. and report the facts to him. He can undertake no movements
except upon certain information.""
With typical energy, Ashby aggressively sought to fill these information gaps and
itported his findings back to Jackson. The ground work had been completed for the
next stage in Confederate operations.
Since his arrival in the Valley, Jackson had initiated an intelligence effort whose
characteristics were to be repeatedly illustrated throughout the tenure of his
command. The first among these characteristics was a willingness to draw upon
various sources for his information. While some commanders or intelligence advisors




to fulfill certain intelligence requirements, Jackson had used several different assets
to meet his informational needs. The Confederate commander had used whatever
means were available, including cavalry patrols, escaped prisoners, military and
civilian scouts, and his own general knowledge of the region's geography when he
first tried to determine the general dispositions of the Federal forces opposing him.
In much the same way, Jackson continued to use various assets to remain abreast of
the changing enemy situation and to update his own plans according to information
provided by these sources. In this way, reports from different sources might serve to
confirm initial indications, contradict spurious assessments, and generally provide a
more comprehensive and unified picture of the operational situation.
Jackson had obviously used intelligence as a primary element in the identification
of specific operational objectives and the subsequent development of plans to achieve
those objectives. The Confederate commander's perceptions of the enemy force at
Romney had initially led him to believe that surprise against that Federal force was
possible and that Romney would therefore be an appropriate objective of his
offensive. As the need to modify his plans became evident after the arrival of Federal
reinforcements in that town, Jackson had then used his understanding of the
importance of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and reports of Federal troop locations
near Williamsport as the basis for his decision to attack Dam No. 5.
This understanding of the relationship between intelligence and operational
planning had also led Jackson to important conclusions regarding enemy use of
intelligence. Believing that the Federal commanders would similarly base their own
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operational plans on available intelligence, Jackson had undertaken actions that were
designed to elicit a particular response from the Union forces opposing him. The
obvious posting of Confederate troops near Falling Waters was intended to distract
the Federals from the intended target at Dam No. 5. Similarly, Jackson believed that
Federal reports of his planned move on Romney would have lured Gen. McClellan
into a costly attack against Johnston's defensive position at Manassas.
Another characteristic of Jackson's intelligence effort was the way in which
changes in the enemy situation were accurately reflected by changes in operational
planning. The Southern general's flexible approach and modification of operational
plans and objectives reflected an understanding of the basic influence that
intelligence should have on operations. As it became apparent that Federal
reinforcements in Romney had made an attack against that town unfavorable for the
present, Jackson had simply altered his operational plan to secure a less valuable,
though arguably more achievable, objective. While this operational flexibility may
seem like an inherent quality of military decision making, it is common for many
commanders to become so focused on an objective that they fail to modify their plans
even when fundamental changes have occurred in the relative balance of combat
power with the enemy. Once he had been reinforced by Loring's units and had been
apprised of the general Federal dispositions by Ashby, Jackson had been able to once
again turn his attention toward Romney.
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C. THE ROMNEY EXPEDITION
During the final day of 1861, Jackson's troops prepared to move. Camp baggage
was packed for transport and three days' rations were issued to all the Confederate
soldiers around Winchester."" On 1 January 1862, Jackson began his march towards
Romney. "...Garnett's brigade, with McLaughlin's, Carpenter's, and Water's batteries,
Loring's command, consisting of Anderson's, Gilham's, and Taliaferro's brigades,
Shumaker's and Mayre's batteries, and Meem's command, moved from their various
camps near Winchester in the direction of Bath,""' site of a Federal outpost and,
therefore, an intermediate objective on the way towards Romney. As the Confederate
soldiers set out from their former bivouac sites, it was "...a beautiful day, the sun
shining brightly and the atmosphere bracing."'"7 After several hours on the road,
however, the weather began to deteriorate rapidly with snow, ice, and bitterly cold
wind harassing the soldiers. By evening the army had reached Pughtown, where it
camped for the night (MAP 3).78
"We marched the next morning at early dawn ....,' remembered one infantryman.'"
Again, however, the cold weather and resulting poor marching conditions slowed the
171Thomas J. Jackson, Orders, 68. Transcripts of letters and general orders, 1861-
1863. Part of Jedediah Hotchkiss collection. Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.





progress of the Confederate column. Only about 8 miles were covered that day and
the army established its bivouac near Unger's Store. The men of Loring's command
suffered under particularly harsh conditions that night because of poor campsite
selection and the fact that the food and baggage wagons failed to reach their location
until the following day."' That evening part of Carson's militia brigade and two
cavalry companies joined Jackson's force at the camp site."' This brought the
Confederate aggregate force total to around 8500 men.
Heading north from Unger's Store, the Confederate force continued its march on
the 3rd. While the Southern main body, led by Loring's command, moved up the
Frederick and Morgan turnpike, the two militia brigades "...inclined to the left and
crossed Warm Springs Mountain for the purpose of attacking Bath from the
west....""6 2 Several miles from the town, the Confederates ran into a small Federal
outpost which was easily scattered by Loring's advance skirmishers. Similarly,
another Union party was driven from its position west of Warm Springs Mountain by
the Southern militia. Jackson had been travelling immediately behind the
Confederate scouts of the main column, ahead of the advance guard, and was
therefore instantly aware of the Federal presence."' Following the brief contact with
the Federal outpost, Jackson had expected Loring "...to attack and press forward with
1
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requisite promptness", but, owing to Loring's own position in the marching column,
it was some time before the brigadier was even aware of the enemy presence and any
additional Confederate troops dispatched forward.
Although the Union outposts had been swept aside with relative ease, they had
still spoiled Jackson's desire to take Bath by surprise. With nightfall approaching, the
Confederate commander decided to encamp for the night and assault the town the
following morning."" The Southern soldiers could hardly enjoy the delay, however,
since "It snowed during the night and the weather became cold."''s
Reports of the Confederate advance had been reaching the Union forces in Bath for
several days and outposts had been quickly established to provide tactical warning
of Jackson's arrival. 6' One company of the 39th Illinois was divided into squad-
sized scouting parties and disposed in an extended perimeter of observation several
miles from the town. As one of these reconnaissance parties observed the approach
of Confederate scouts, the Southerners fired three warning shots and brought up
infantry skirmishers to drive the Northern pickets away. In the wake of the brief
clash, the Federal scouts of this party were so scattered that they were unable to
reunite and return until the following day.'87
'"Ibid., 389. Jackson.
1'sWorsham, 44.




On the morning of the 4th, Loring's command again assumed the lead in the
Confederate advance. About 2 miles from the town, however, Loring perceived that
his troops were in danger of "...being enfiladed by the enemy's cannon on a hill in
front and flanked by a party of his infantry stationed on a wooded hill on our
left."'" The Confederate brigadier halted his troops several times as he tried to
figure out the next appropriate move. Incensed at these seemingly unnecessary halts,
Jackson now moved torward to determine the reason for the delay and, after a quick
consultation with Loring, personally ordered several regiments forward to deal with
the Federals. The 1st Tennessee would advance on the left with the 7th Tennessee in
support while the 48th Virginia moved on the right.'"
Around noon the Confederates began their attack against the Federal positions
guarding the town.1 "' "We came in sight of the enemy, who were in line of battle
on that ridge, about one and a half miles from Bath," recalled one Southern
private."' After several volleys of fire, the obvious strength of the Confederate force
became all too apparent to the Federal troops on the ridge and the Union units began
a rapid retreat. Although the Northern position had completely collapsed, Loring
'"Ibid., 1070. Loring to Benjamin.
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failed to aggressively rush his own men forward and thereby lost contact with the
retreating enemy."92
Jackson, however, was not content to let the Federals flee unmolested. Anxious to
begin the pursuit of the obviously beaten enemy, "Jackson now arrived at the front
and took the lead on horseback .... With Lt. Col. Baylor of the staff and a small
body of Southern cavalry, the Confederate commander entered the town ahead of his
leading infantry units and attempted to discern the route of the Federal retreat from
the town. Jackson believed that the Union troops would try to reach Hancock,
Maryland via the route through Sir John's Run depot and directed his infantry to
pursue in that direction.'" Pvt. Worsham of the 23rd Virginia stated that, as the
Southern troops quickly passed through the town in pursuit of the Federals, he
"...could see the Yankees disappearing at the far end of a field going toward the
Potomac river. We followed, but the road ran through a defile and we could
not go as fast as the enemy, because we had to look out for their rear guard, who
occasionally came in sight and fired."'95
News of the fight at Bath quickly spread to other Northern units throughout the
area. From its position near Sir John's Run, the 84th Pennsylvania had moved to
support the Union troops in Bath but, when faced with the sight of other retreating
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Federals and the lack of combat experience within its own ranks, this unit also joined
the retreat back towards its former post.-' The 39th Indiana, which had been
dispatched to the depot at Sir John's Run aboard railroad cars, simply turned around
when its members saw the other retreating troops and headed back towards the
railway bridge at Great Cacapon."'
By 8:00 p.m., when the main Confederate body reached Sir John's Run,1" all of
the Federals had crossed the Potomac.'99 After using some Confederate cavalry units
to clear the nearby woods of any Union skirmishers, Jackson attempted to continue
his pursuit across the river towards Hancock, Maryland, the supposed destination of
the retreating enemy force. Although his own units were somewhat fatigued and
disorganized by the brief clash and pursuit, the Confederate commander believed that
it would be advantageous to strike the Union units before they could organize a
credible defense. An attempted ambush by Federal units along the route to Hancock
and the growing darkness, however, led Jackson to call off actions for the night.2.
Although Federal troops remained posted on a hill on the Maryland side of the
railway bridge at Great Cacapon,/' Jackson issued orders that night for Col. Rust
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of the 3rd Arkansas to begin the destruction of that span."2 This would help to
eliminate any future communications or troop movements between Hancock and
Romney. Cavalry pickets were posted along the banks of the Potomac to guard
against any possible counterattack. Since the terms of enlistment for many of the
militia troops were about to expire, Jackson also issued orders extending the militia's
service until the present campaign was over with.20 ' The Confederate commander
needed to retain all available manpower to continue his offensive towards Romney.
On the morning of the 5th, Jackson sent a written message to the Federal
commander at Hancock in which he formally demanded the surrender of that town.
Then, in retaliation for what he considered to be the unprovoked shelling of
Shepardstown, Virginia by Union forces, Jackson sent several artillery shells flying
into the small Maryland town. Although Federal artillery responded by lobbing a few
shells back at the Confederate forces near the river,"' neither side did any real
damage to the other. As it became obvious that the Union commander would not
promptly surrender, Jackson readied his forces to attack the town. Southern troops
began preparing a bridge across the Potomac 2 miles above the town. The weather
continued to plague Confederate operations and, that night, more snow, hail, and cold
winds harassed the troops of the Confederate bridging party.20 5
"
20 Ibid., 391. Jackson.




By 6 January, Jackson received reports that the Federals in Hancock had been
substantially reinforced.20' The Southern general had recognized the necessity of
clearing the Federals from Bath, who otherwise would have threatened the
Confederate flank during any advance towards Romney. Similarly, Jackson had been
willing to continue the attack against the Federal force at Hancock as long as it
remained a small and isolated detachment. The presence of Union reinforcements
changed Jackson's assessment. The defeat of the Federal force at Romney remained
the prirmary object of the expedition and the Confederates could not afford to waste
more time or manpower against Hancock. Since the Federals at Bath had been
"...driven across the Potomac, the telegraph line broken at several points, and the
railroad bridge across Great Cacapon destroyed, thus throwing material obstacles in
the way not only of transmitting intelligence from Romney to Hancock, but also of
receiving re-enforcements from the east, arrangements were made for moving on
Romney."a0 7
Gen. Kelley, the Federal commander at Romney, was far from idle during the
Confederate advance. Various sources had warned of Jackson's movements and
Kelley decided to take action. On the 6th, he ordered Col. Dunning of the 5th Ohio
to assemble a body of 2,000 men for an operation against the Confederate force
reported to be in the vicinity of Hanging Rock..2 " Kelley thought that an attack




against this Confederate body might prompt Jackson to abandon his operations
against Hancock and to withdraw back to Winchester.2' At 12:30 a.m. on the 7th,
Dunning's column set out from Romney towards the Southern outpost.210 By 7:00
a.m., the Union force had reached a hill 1 mile from the gap. On top of this hill,
which offered a clear field of view of the enemy position, Dunning placed his
artillery and disposed his available infantry for an immediate assault against the
Confederates. With the 5th Ohio advancing on the left and the 4th Ohio on the right,
the Federals charged against Col. Monroe's Southern militia"11 and easily drove the
Confederates from the gap. In addition to wresting control of the gap from the
estimated 800-1000 enemy soldiers, the Union troops also captured two pieces of
artillery.lu
Despite the onset of an ice storm, the Confederates began a southward march from
the Potomac on the 7th.2 3 While Ashby's cavalry stayed in the rear as protection
against any attempted Federal counterstroke, the infantry struggled through the
terrible weather.
The march was a terrible one; the road had become one sheet of ice from
constant marching over it, and the men would march in the side ditches and
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and wagons, and men with chains and ropes pulled them, the horses being sent
forward through the woods; and at many hills the pioneers had to cut trenches
across the road, in order that the men might have footing...I saw Gen. Jackson
marching along the road with the men several times.21"
After arriving at Unger's Store that evening, Jackson decided to allow his troops to
rest for several days before resuming the march. 1"
On the 10th, the Confederates recommenced their trek towards Romney. Again,
the weather seemed to be working against the Confederates as a hail storm pelted the
exposed Southern troops.2"' That day some Confederate units marched only 4 miles
over the frozen and icy ground. As Jackson's infantry was struggling over the
slippery ground, the Union forces under Gen. Kelley were evacuating Romney.2"7
Ever watchful of Kelley's actions. the Confederate cavalry companies of Captains
Sheetz and Shand occupied the town soon after the Federal departure.
Although Romney had been abandoned by the Federals and was now in Southern
hands, the main Confederate body was still miles from its objective. On the 11th,
many units made only 4 miles during the entire day's march and one regiment logged
a mere 500 yards as its progress.2"8 A soldier in the 21st Virginia stated that "Owing
2 14Worsham, 45-46.









to the terrible weather, our line was scattered over ten miles of road.'a1 9 Snow and
hail again plagued the Southern troops on the 14tha 0 On 15 January, after two
weeks on the march, the leading brigade of Loring's command, under Taliaferro,
finally reached Romney."' Many of the Confederate units would still be on the
road for another two days before reaching the town.' Only after their arrival in
Romney did the weather start to show some favor on the weary Southern soldiers for
"Here the sun came out and shone on us, the first time for nineteen days.'"
Upon his arrival in Romney, however, Jackson remained far from content with
simply occupying the town. Instead, the Confederate chief now sought to continue
his offensive against the 11,000 Federal troops located near the town of Cumberland,
Maryland, about 27 miles from Romney. The Confederate commander wrote to Gen.
Johnston that "At last accounts the enemy were crossing the Potomac into Maryland
on the railroad bridge below Cumberland.""4 On the 16th Jackson hoped to begin
his movement towards Cumberland with Taliaferro's brigade but "...such was the
extent of demoralization in the...brigade as to render the abandonment of that
2191bid.
=°Ibid.
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enterprise necessary.'" Although the Confederate commander referred simply to
the "demoralization" of Taliaferro's command, sickness and the effects of exposure
during the march to Romney were probably equally responsible for the lack of
effective manpower in the brigade. When Jackson was forced to cancel the offensive
a second time on the 17th, one regiment had reported only 15 men capable of
walking."'
Jackson, believing that it would be inopportune to keep the entire army at Romney
"...less Gen. Banks should cross the Potomac .... ,227 and attack the Confederate flank
or rear, issued orders on the 18th to place his army into winter quarters."a Loring's
three brigades, along with 13 artillery pieces, were to remain in Romney.
Additionally, Jackson detached three cavalry companies to provide Loring with the
necessary number of scouts for reconnaissance and screening duties in the area.
Among these mounted units was the company commanded by Capt. Sheetz, whom
Jackson believed provided the "...most reliable information regarding the
enemy ..... a" The remaining cavalry assets under Lt. Col. Ashby were to be
distributed along the Potomac to provide similar warning and screening ability for the
rest of the district. The militia brigades were to be stationed near their home
22 0.R., Vol. 5, 393. Jackson.
2 26Denney, 114.
22 7Jackson, Letters, 10. @0 January letter from Jackson to Secretary Benjamin.
'O.R., Vol. 5, 393. Jackson.
229Ibid.
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mustering sectors. Gen. Carson's men were stationed around Bath while Meem's
command moved to Martinsburg. Finally, Garnett's Stonewall Brigade was to be
moved back to Winchester where it could act as a mobile reserve to reinforce any part
of the district that might be threatened by a Federal advance.
Although Jackson was aware of the continued presence of strong Federal
formations in the area, he believed that the disposition of his own forces would allow
for ample warning and concentration to meet these various threats. The Confederate
commander was well aware of the 11,000 Union troops at Cumberland and also knew
that the enemy was "...still in force on this side of the Potomac, 7 miles below
Cumberland and 20 miles from here.'a3  Intelligence reports indicated that the
Federals had also positioned 2,000 men at Hancock, 8,000 at Frederick and a force of
unknown size in Williamsport. 3' The Confederate cavalry had already proven itself
quite capable in detecting enemy locations and movements. Ashby's position would
allow for sufficient notice of any Federal units crossing the Potomac and the three
companies with Loring should have been more than sufficient to provide constant
picketing and screening to the west and north of that position. Jackson further
believed the position at Romney to be relatively safe because of the overall size of
Loring's force, the presence of a defensible mountain to the rear, the proximity of
Confederate Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson's force, and the presence of three improved
'Jackson, Letters, 18. Jackson to Johnston.
"Ilbid., 8. 16 January 1862.
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roads as possible lines of retreat.'2 The Stonewall Brigade's location at Winchester
placed it in a position to defend against any Federal attack from Williamsport or
Harper's Ferry, threaten the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, reinforce Loring or any of
the militia brigades, withdraw up the Valley turnpike, or prepare for an eastward
movement to reinforce Gen. Johnston.
With the order placing his troops into winter quarters, the offensive portion of
Jackson's Romney expedition effectively came to a close. The Confederates had
evicted the Federals from the northwestern corner of the Valley District and had
positioned themselves to defend against any subsequent Federal attack or to launch
further offensive actions.
While Confederate intelligence had been generally competent during the
expedition to Romney, certain features of Jackson's approach to the intelligence effort
were especially notable. Cavalry reports from Ashby and other trusted subordinates
had formed the framework on which the Southern general had based his offensive
plan for the expedition. These mounted forces had to locate, track, and report the
movements of Federal units near Bath, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and
throughout Morgan County before Jackson could undertake any offensive action.
Advanced pickets and scouts provided tactical updates to the location of enemy
positions during the movement phases of the operation and allowed for the proper
deployment of combat units to capitalize on Federal vulnerabilities. At Hancock,
2320.R., Vol. 5, 393. Jackson.
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Jackson had shown flexibility in canceling his proposed attack against the town once
intelligence reached l.,'n of the arrival of Federal reinforcements there.
One signific,,tt factor that effected Jackson's use of intelligence during the
operation was his forward position throughout much of the action. During the attack
",i Bath on the 4th, Jackson's presence near the front of the Confederate column had
allowed for the initial deployment of the Southern infantry to meet the perceived
threat on Loring's left, the rapid pursuit of the Federals towards Sir John's Run, and
the attempted push towards Hancock. Because of his forward position in the
attacking Confederate formation, Jackson was able to rapidly assess current tactical
information in the context of broader operational level intelligence and make
decisions that would have a positive influence on the course of the engagement.
While it might have been safer for the Confederate commander to remain further from
the front, this type of detachment from the action would have resulted in delays in
the transmission of significant but perishable combat information and associated
delays in the decision making process. Instead, Jackson's presence with his main
effort, Loring's command, allowed him to properly exploit the Federal retreat and
immediately order his entire army into a pursuit of the fleeing Northern soldiers.
D. PROBLEMS OF COMMAND
Despite Jackson's own belief in the success of the recent expeditions and the
strength of the army's present dispositions, discontent within his command was
building. Most of this contention was centered among the officers of Loring's
command, who believed that their units' assignment to Romney for the winter was
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unfairly harsh for the soldiers as well as operationally unsound. On 23 January, Col.
Samuel Fulkerson, commander of the 37th Virginia, wrote to Walter Staples, an old
friend and Confederate politician in Richmond.233 In this letter Fulkerson voiced
great concern over the "...terrible exposure since leaving Winchester, which has
emaciated the force to almost a skeleton, compared to what it was on marching from
that place."'3" From his post at Romney, Fulkerson also voiced the opinion that
"This place is of no importance in a strategical point of view; the country around it
has been exhausted by the enemy, and its proximity to the enemy and the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad will wear us away (already greatly reduced) by heavy picket and
guard duty."2 35 After airing these grievanccs Fulkerson then asked Staples to take
the matter before the "...Adjutant-General, the Secretary of War, and the President, if
necessary ....." in the hopes of getting some favorable reaction."' In an enclosure
attached by Taliaferro, Fulkerson's brigade commander, Staples was informed that it
would be "...suicidal in the Government to keep this command here."23" Like
Fulkerson, Taliaferro also asked Staples to use his influence to "...urge the withdrawal








On 25 January, 11 of Loring's subordinate commanders signed a petition calling for
the removal of the command from Romney, a p )sition they characterized as "...a place
difficult to hold, and of no strategical importance after it is held."239 The signators
also stated that the command would be better positioned to meet an enemy threat at
"...almost any other place." Upon his receipt of the petition on the 26th, Loring wrote
a brief endorsement in which he stated agreement with his subordinates, asked that
the letter be sent to the Secretary of War, and forwarded the document to Jackson.
240
The district commander's own covering letter was short and accurately reflected his
own assessment of the operational situation and of Loring's command -- "Respectfully
forwarded, but disapproved."2 "1  The document was then sent to the War
Department.
The petition's effect on Secretary of War Benjamin was almost immediate.
Coupled with reports from Gen. Joseph Johnston that large bodies of Federal troops
had been noted moving towards Harper's Ferry, the message from Loring filled the
Secretary with apprehension. On the 26th he wrote to Gen. Joseph Johnston and
asked the senior field commander to "...examine for yourself into the true state of the
case, take such measures as you think prudent under the circumstances, and report to
the Department whether any measures are necessary on its part to restore the
23Ibid., 1046-1047. 25 January petition to Brig. Gen. Loring signed by Col. W.B.
Taliaferro, Col. S.F. Fulkerson, Maj. V.H. Manning, Maj. J.W. Anderson, Capt. AN.
Scott, Col. J.S. Burks, Lt. Col. D.A. Langhorne, Maj. P.B. Adams, Capt. J.Y. Jones, Capt.
R.H. Cunningham, and Col. J.A. Campbell.
240Ibid., 1048. Loring.
24 1Ibid., 1048. 4 February endorsement by Jackson.
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efficiency of that army, said to be seriously impaired."a" On the 29th, Johnston
dispatched his acting departmental Inspector General to the Valley to investigate the
true state of affairs in the Valley District.2"3
The War Department, however, would not allow Johnston enough time to exercise
his normal authority or discretion in this matter. On 30 January, Benjamin sent the
following peremptory order to Jackson:
Our news indicates that a movement is being made to cut off General
Loring's command. Order him back to Winchester immediately."'
President Davis, after reading the letters of complaint and glancing at the Confederate
positions on a rough map of the area, had personally instructed Benjamin to issue the
order. Because the order had been transmitted directly to Jackson, neither Gen.
Johnston nor any other senior military leaders were informed of the directive.
The directive character of the order as well as the identity of the originator
indicated that Jackson would be allowed no discretion in its execution. After
receiving the telegram, Jackson immediately began readying the units near Romney
for a prompt withdrawal. Loring's units were told to prepare for a march back to
Winchester and, on the 31st, orders were also issued to the militia commander in Bath
to prepare for a withdrawal to Unger's Store. With typical regard for operational
242Ibid., 1049. Beniamin.




security, Jackson also enjoined his subordinates not to share the information
regarding the destination of the movements with any of the troops.2 4"
Despite his prompt compliance with both the spirit and letter of Benjamin's order,
Jackson was furious over this interference in the operational military affairs of his
district. Although national decision makers might typically try to guide the strategic
direction of military campaigns or divert forces from one operational command to
another for strategic reasons, the War Department's peremptory order had bypassed
all normal military channels and effected the status of operational level, not strategic,
unit dispositions. Apparently, Gen. Johnston had not even been consulted prior to
the issuance of the order. Frustrated by almost every aspect of the order, Jackson
wrote to Secretary Benjamin on the 31st:
With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much service
in the field, and accordingly respectfully request to be ordered to report for
duty to the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, as
has been done in the case of other professors. Should this application not be
granted, I respectfully request that the President will accept my resignation
from the Army.24'
In accordance with accepted military procedures, Jackson routed the letter of
resignation, along with a copy of Benjamin's order, through Gen. Johnston. He also
sent a copy of the letter of resignation to Virginia Governor John Letcher.2 47 When
Johnston received the package, he too was incensed by Benjamin's interference in the
245Jackson, Letters, 36.
2160.R., Vol. 5, 1053. 31 January letter from Jackson to Benjamin.
2
"ibid., 1060. 3 February letter from Letcher to Benjamin.
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positioning of operational field forces. Jackson's letters were the first notice that the
senior general had of the order and this angered Johnston even further. A subsequent
letter from Jackson on 1 February seemed to illustrate the logic of the original
dispositions and the lack of an immediate Federal threat to the Valley.'" In an
uncharacteristically personal response to Jackson, Johnston attempted to mollify his
subordinate. While Johnston admitted that he could not override Benjamin's
directive, he suggested that he too might resign if such interference continued.
On 3 February, Loring's Confederates were withdrawn from Romney. The troops
left the town "...late in the night, and it snowed again.""'' Throughout the 4th and
5th, the Southern infantry continued their march toward Winchester without incident,
although the weather remained cold. On the 6th, Maj. John Harman, Jackson's
quartermaster, observed that "Loring's command has 'een dropping in all day, a
terribly disorganized band...""0 Whether due to poor discipline and leadership or
the harsh conditions in Romney, Loring's command was truly in bad shape. Many
soldiers were sick, most were in want of new equipment, and morale was low. One
soldier remembered the expedition as"...the most terrible experience during the
war.lasl
2 Ibid., 1056. Jackson.
249Worsham, 48.
2
"John A. Harman, Manuscript. Collection of letters, 1861-1862. Manuscript
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After receiving Jackson's 31 January resignation, Governor Letcher took immediate
action to forestall the general's departure from active military service. The governor
recognized Jackson's military talents and the justified nature of his complaint. To
Secretary Benjamin, Letcher personally protested the direct interference in the Valley
District's operational command. He also wrote a letter to Jackson asking the
Confederate commander to reconsider his decision, for the good of the army. The
content and wording of the governor's message obviously struck a patriotic chord
with the general. On 6 February, Jackson responded to Letcher's letter. While
Jackson allowed that his basic views regarding Benjamin's interference remained
unchanged, he also authorized Letcher to withdraw the letter of resignation.252
Letcher communicated the withdrawal to President Davis on the 10th, effectively
bringing the incident to a conclusion.25 3
Benjamin had realized, however, that relations between Jackson and Loring would
never be conducive to good military order. On 9 February, in an effort to ease some
.-f the internal tensions within the Valley District, Secretary Benjamin issued orders
transferring much of Loring's command to areas outside of the Valley.2
Additionally, Loring himself was transferred to Georgia for duty with Gen. Lee.255
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Loring's departure from Romney had again left that region open to possible
occupation by the Federals. On 6 February, Jackson advised Col. Sencindiver, the
commander of the militia units guarding Bloomery Gap to "...keep well informed of
what is passing in the neighborhood" and to rely on hard facts rather than local
rumors in determining the enemy situation.s6 Sencindiver's position now served
as an important Confederate outpost guarding the western approaches to Winchester.
With the withdrawal of Loring's command, the Federals easily reoccupied Romney on
the 7th"7 and Moorefield on the 12th.2 58
Other Union troops were making preparations for an advance across the Potomac.
On the 13th, two Federal columns of 2,000 men each marched over 30 miles to an
assembly area on the north side of the Potomac."' That night, working parties from
this force built a bridge across the river at Great Cacapon. The following morning
Lander's troops advanced on Bloomery Gap in a "forced reconnaissance" that drove
Sencendiver's small Confederate militia force from the area. While Lander was
pushing towards Bloomery Gap, a smaller Union force under Col. Carroll temporarily
occupied Unger's Store" ", only 21 miles from Winchester.261 Although Ashby was
2%Jackson, Letters, 60.









able to recover control of Bloomery Gap after a skirmish two days later, Jackson was
still being forced to react to Federal initiatives.2"2 To increase the warning of any
Federal advance, Jackson now ordered Ashby to post one cavalry company at
Bloomery Gap and a second company between that position and Winchester.2"3
From an intelligence perspective, the Confederate War Department's interference
in Jackson's operational deployments was a basic violation of the natural link
between intelligence and operational planning. Secretary Benjamin and President
Davis had, from their detached perspective in Richmond, rejected Jackson's use of
intelligence as the basis for force dispositions and opted instead for deployments
which failed to reflect an accurate understanding of the operational situation. While
Jackson's dispositions had been based upon a detailed intelligence assessment of the
probable enemy courses of action, the characteristics of the area of operations, and his
own army's capabilities, the peremptory orders calling for Loring's withdrawal from
Romney had been based on near-mutinous complaints from subordinate officers,
unsubstantiated rumors of possible Federal movements near Harper's Ferry, and a
cursory examination of Confederate locations in the lower Valley without the benefit
of understanding their operational significance. In essence, national decision makers
had rejected the intelligence assessment of an operational commander although they
had no hard additional information which would suggest that the original assessment
was wrong.
2
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E. THE BEGINNINGS OF JACKSON'S INTELLIGENCE
Throughout the Confederate operations during the winter of 1861-1862, Jackson had
revealed several fundamental characteristics in his execution of the intelligence effort.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Confederate intelligence in the Valley District
was the active role taken by Confederate commander. While many military
commanders might have left the planning and direction of the entire intelligence
effort to a specific staff officer or subordinate, Jackson himself played the central role
in almost every phase of the intelligence process. Jackson had initially sought
information regarding the size, location, and activities of Federal forces within his
area of operations and had repeatedly reemphasized these points as basic
requirements for his intelligence collection assets. As the Confederate general had
narrowed his area of operational interest, he also became more specific in the
statement of his intelligence requirements. While broad area searches may have
sufficed in the initial stages of operational planning, a narrower focus towards enemy
positions in Bath and Morgan County were needed to support planning for the attack
on Romney. Jackson's own understanding of the area of operations and possible
operational objectives complemented this personal involvement and allowed the
general to assess the overall importance of reported enemy actions with regard to his
own plans.
Associated with Jackson's personal involvement in the intelligence endeavor was
the centralization of that effort at the operational level. While Confederate
intelligence assets might have been diffused to provide subordinate commanders with
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a collection capability or to cover a wider area of the vast Valley District, Jackson
chose instead to retain all intelligence assets under his own direct command and meet
the operational, rather than tactical, requirements for intelligence. Because almost all
of the operational planning was done by Jackson and select members of his
immediate staff, intelligence that was centrally controlled at the operational level
could remain focused towards operationally significant requirements. Additionally,
this centralization meant that all information gained by collection assets could be
centrally analyzed for consolidation into a single, comprehensive intelligence
assessment. The resulting "fusion" of seemingly unrelated bits and pieces of
information would provide Jackson with an understanding of the enemy situation that
wa.; based on a variety of sources and yet focused towards the commander's
operational goals. Although Jackson often disseminated key intelligence assessments
to meet the needs of subordinate commanders, these subordinates were forced to rely
on organic elements of their own units, rather than some temporary augmentation, to
meet any separate needs for tactical intelligence that they might have.
Another important aspect of Confederate intelligence during this phase of the
campaign was the inseparability of intelligence and operational planning. While the
primary reason for this was Jackson's own central role in both the intelligence and
planning functions, the balanced approach that Jackson exercised indicated an
understanding of the unified nature of these two areas. Jackson obviously had some
broad operational goals in mind when he first arrived in the Valley-namely the
defense of the Valley against invasion, the expulsion of any Federal units presently
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in the Valley, and the projection of Confederate military power into Federal territory.
By tasking his various intelligence assets to locate and track the Federal forces in the
area, and by balancing these reports with his previous knowledge of the area of
operations, Jackson hoped to identify specific operational objectives and targets, the
seizure of which would help him to obtain his goals. After these objectives had been
identified, Jackson would attempt to refine his operational plans by determining the
enemy's potential strengths and vulnerabilities that would effect his own ability to
achieve that objective. Given Jackson's goal of expelling the federals from the
district, the Confederate commander then planned for an attack against Romney once
Federal troops were identified at that location by Ashby in November. As Jackson
increased his intelligence focus on Romney during December, he became aware of the
unexpected strength of the Federal force there and was forced to change his planned
operational objective to a less heavily defended site such as Dam No. 5. The constant
interaction between intelligence and operational planning had allowed Jackson to
properly weigh his own combat strength with that of the Federals and opt for the
most advantageous course of action.
Finally, the general flexibility which Jackson exercised in his decision making
process allowed the Confederate commander to efficiently use his intelligence as an
integral part of operational planning. Although Jackson had identified Romney as the
primary objective of his offensive plans in November, reports of Federal
reinforcements and the absence of Loring's command altered Jackson's assessment of
the enemy's relative combat power. Rather than ignoring the importance of this
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intelligence and continuing to pursue the capture of an already identified objective,
Jackson simply modified his operational plans and refocused his intelligence effort
towards Dam No. 5. The failure to change his operational plans would have meant
that Jackson had similarly failed to include intelligence in the planning process. In
some ways, Benjamin's peremptory order of 30 January fell into this trap of
operational inflexibility and the exclusion of intelligence from key decisions. Davis
and Benjamin had based their decision to recall Loring's force to Winchester largely
upon subordinate officers' personal objectives and a cursory look at Confederate force
dispositions rather than on a balanced intelligence assessment weighing the effects
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Ill. FEDERALS TAKE THE OFFENSIVE
A. THE ADVANCE ON WINCHESTER
Throughout the month of February, the Federals had been preparing an
overwhelming counterforce to oppose Jackson's little army. By the end of the month,
Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks had assembled over 38,0W0" troops on the Maryland
side of the Potomac across from Harper's Ferry. Banks' forces had the general mission
to ensure the security of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, a major suppiy and
transportation route linking Washington with the west, as an integral part of
McClellan's planned strategic offensive against the southerners. Because Winchester
and Strasburg were seen as the keys to securing the railway, the Federal possession
of these towns would be the major objective of Banks' army.' 5
In initial reports to Washington, Banks appeared anxious to begin active operations
against the Confederates. On 23 February he reported to Washington that 'The roads
to Winchester are turnpikes and in tolerable condition. The enemy is weak,
demoralized and depressed.'a" Despite the general tone of this dispatch, however,
the Confederates would prove themselves to be far less demoralized than Banks
2, Clark, 61.
26'0.R., Vol. 5, 48. Official summary report of Maj. Gen. McClellan on operations




suspected and the Federal advance would prove much slower than Washington
officials hoped.
Confederate leaders were well aware of the army being assembled opposite
Jackson. Easy access to northern newspapers, which consistently reported troops
movements, force structures, and planned offensives, provided the Confederates with
basic information about the enemy. Additionally, because of widespread Confederate
sympathy in many parts of Maryland and Washington, the Federals had great
difficulty in concealing any major troop movements or concentrations in that region.
This fact was all too evident to many Federal troops. One Massachusetts soldier
complained that, "So many friends of the Rebels and their cause were still in and
around Washington there could be no movement made by our troops without the
rebels being advised of it. So that we were never able to take them by surprise.""
In fact, Jackson was aware not only of t0 e location and general size of the growing
enemy threat across the Potomac but also deduced their probable intent. During his
command of Harper's Ferry in 1861, Jackson had himself plagued Federal authorities
by closing the railway to Washington. Using his own knowledge of the importance
of that supply route, the Confederate commander logically concluded that the Federals
would have to make some move to protect it against future interruption and that the
road networks leading to Winchester would make it a natural objective. On 24
February he wrote to Gen. Johnston from his own headquarters in Winchester, "I have
"
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reason to believe that the enemy design advancing on this place in large force.a"
This understanding of the enemy's intent rather than just his location or capabilities
would allow Jackson to more effectively plan his next move.
To prepare for the expected enemy advance across the river, the Confederate
commander began alerting his scouts to be especially vigilant in their observation of
the Federal forces. On 25 February, letters were sent to his cavalry commanders
directing them to "keep a sharp lookout to the front" and to report any movement
without delay.2"9 Additionally, Jackson's recently assigned Chief Engineer, 1st Lt.
Boswell, was dispatched to Harper's Ferry to examine the Federal positions there.27"
Jackson was determined not to let the Federals surprise him with any quick thrust
across the Potomac. Careful observation and rapid reporting of the enemy situation
might also allow him to capitalize on any perceived Federal weakness or error.
On 27 February, the northern troops threw a pontoon bridge across the Potomac at
Harper's Ferry and crossed into Virginia. The Federal advance had begun. McClellan
was on hand to personally supervise the crossing because of its importance to the
overall success of the Federal plan. Banks' entire division and two brigades of
Sedgwick's division made the initial move into the enemy's territory.27' Sedgwick's
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third brigade and two other divisions remained on the Maryland side to guard against
any immediate tactical reverse (MAP 4).
Although the preliminary crossing of the infantry went well, problems soon arose
with the movement of artillery and heavy supplies. Because the small pontoon bridge
used by the foot soldiers was too light to allow the passage of heavy equipment,
McClellan had ordered a number of canal barges for the construction of a more
permanent bridge. However, when the barges attempted to pass up the Chesapeake
and Ohio Canal, it was discovered that they were too wide to fit through the canal
locks. No one had ever bothered to measure the barges or the canals! McClellan's
engineers had simply trusted the advice of "...military railroad employees and others
that the lock was large enough, and, the difference being too small to be detected by
the eye, no one had thought of measuring it or suspecting any difficulty."n This
oversight in simple analysis and planning would prevent an immediate push towards
Winchester. While they waited for the assembly of artillery support and ample
supplies, the Federals would satisfy themselves with lesser objectives for the near
term.73"
By the next day, 28 February, the Federal forces had sent a strong reconnaissance
force to Charlestown and, finding that place free of enemy troops, occupied the town
2721bid., 49. In all of his reports on this affair, McClellan continually downplays
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that he was "well satisfied with the results achieved by his force.
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as a potential base for further operations. Lander's and Williams' divisions, which
had crossed the Potomac after the initial push into Harper's Ferry, were advanced to
Martinsburg and then to Bunker Hill.274 When McClellan departed the area to
return to Washington later that day, Banks was again left in immediate operational
command. Banks would delay any advance from Bunker Hill until he felt sufficient
supplies and artillery had been brought up to support a movement by the majority
of his forces on Winchester.
Born in Waltham, Massachusetts, Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, had used great energy
and hard work to rise from humble beginnings to political prominence by mid-
century. Called 'The Bobbin Boy" in a popularized tale of his boyhood labor in a
textile factory, Banks had capitalized on the growing northern interest in the
temperance movement to gain election, in 1853, to the U.S. House of Representatives
where he would serve a total of ten terms. In 1855 he was elected Speaker of the
House after 133 ballots, the longest contest for that position in congressional history.
Leaving the House in 1857, he was serving as the Governor of Massachusetts at the
war's outsetY In July 1861, Lincoln had appointed Banks to the rank of Major
General, being jwai.ýr only to Winfield Scott, John C. Fremont, and George B.
2741Ibid.
2 7 1Congressional Quarterly Service, Guide to the Congess of the United States,
Wshington, D.C.; 1971. Banks served two congressional terms before the war and
eight after the conflict. As a political opportunist, he was also willing to switch party
alliances to capitalize on public opinion. He was a member at various times of five
political parties: Coalition Democrats; American Party; Republicans; Union
Republicans; and Liberal Republicans.
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McClellan on the Army lists. Despite a rather soldierly appearance, however, Banks
had absolutely no military training and about as little natural talent for the profession
of arms. Appointed strictly for political purposes at a time when the north needed
patriots to flock to the colors, Banks would generally prove himself to be both a poor
administrator and operational commander.
Jackson had only about 4,600 men to counter the Federal threat in the Valley while
also having responsibility for securing the left of Johnston's main army on the
Manassas-Centreville line. The cavalry forces under Turner Ashby, which had been
scouting and reporting Banks' advance, were far too few in number to oppose the
enemy in open combat. In reply to Johnston's orders to keep his Valley force
between the Federals and the main Confederate army, Jackson wrote on 3 March that
this task would be difficult owing to the condition of the available road networks and
geography of the region. Jackson did, however, suggest that he might be able to
strike a "painful blow" against the enemy if the Confederates were forced to retreat
up the Valley.276 Rather than strictly adhering to the moves of the main Confederate
army, Jackson intended to retreat up the Valley only if pushed by a sufficient force
of the enemy. Two days later, Johnston ordered all Confederate forces east of the
Blue Ridge to fall back to the line of the Rapidan River.2"
From his base at Martinsburg, Banks sent numerous scouting parties in the
direction of Winchester to help update the enemy picture. The Federal effort,




however, was largely checked by the effective screening operations performed by
Ashby's cavalry who repeatedly drove the Federal patrols back to their base. Those
northern parties which succeeded in gaining information sometimes brought about
false impressions that would hinder the Federal effort. One of the Federal patrols
reported the presence of masked artillery batteries four or five miles in front of
Winchester."'8 Although the report may have been valid in the sighting of some
artillery, it is probable that these masked batteries were, in fact, only the three gun
battery of Chew's horse artillery, part of Ashby's command that, therefore, would
have been well forward of any strong, prepared Confederate positions. The resulting
fear of possible ambush or surprise attack by these concealed guns helped to slow the
ensuing Federal advance on Winchester as pickets and flanking columns were
deployed to meet the supposed threat.
On 5 March, Banks finally began a slow movement up the Valley towards
Winchester from Bunker Hill. Two days later, Federal and Confederate cavalry
skirmished lightly near Winchester but the Union troops were easily rebuffed.
Although the southerners might delay the enemy movement, the Confederate
commander knew that his ability to hold the town was limited. Jackson's chief
quartermaster, Maj. John A. Harman, had begun preparing for a withdrawal from
Winchester in late February. By the 26th he had already removed all clothing stores
2
'Charles H. Boyce, Manuscript. Papers and bound regimental history, 1861-1932.
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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to Strasburg and was in the process of moving all ordnance as well.2" Additionally,
captured supplies and material were also readied for the move south. Pvt. Worsham
stated that "...even the locomotives and cars, that were captured at Martinsburg, were
sent to the rear. Because the valley pike was such an excellent road he could do this...
and they were hauled to Strasburg, a distance of about fifty miles, where they were
put on the Manassas Gap railroad for the use of the Confederacy.'" Regiments that
had been in camps at various sites in the vicinity were repositioned to allow for
quicker concentration and possible movement. A private of Jackson's 2nd Brigade
reported that his unit had been camped on the Berryville road "...until March 7th; at
which time we marched through Winchester, and camped on the Staunton pike....2 ,
the main imp-roved turnpike that led south.
As the Federals continued their slow advance towards Winchester on 6 March,
Jackson again reminded his cavalry commanders of their vital role in tracking enemy
movements and thanked them for their previous efforts in doing so. The Confederate
leader also made arrangements to ensure that his subordinate commanders would
receive timely reports of enemy movements. In addition to the required daily reports
to his own headquarters, Jackson also ordered that a copy of all scouting reports
should be sent to the appropriate infantry brigade commander who was responsible
for that given sector. The cavalry scouts on the Pughtown Road would send reports
":"Harman MS. Letter from Maj. Harman to his brother in which the quartermaster




to Gen. Garnett while the reconnaissance commander on the Berryville Road, Capt.
Scheetz, would forward his reports to Col. Fulkerson.m Accordingly, later that day,
Scheetz informed both Jackson and Fulkerson that the enemy was continuing his slow
advance up the south side of the Shenandoah River and that he would continue to
closely monitor their progress.283 By his personal involvement in this collection
effort, Jackson was emphasizing those elements of information which he, as the
operational commander, considered important to the planning process. Additionally,
by ordering dissemination of information to his subordinates, he had ensured that
tactical commanders would be equally aware of any potential threat approaching their
position.
In contrast to the alert actions of the Confederate cavalry during this period were
the actions of the Federal horsemen. The Federal patrols seemed to lack the
aggressive spirit that had enabled Jackson's men to keep him informed about enemy
movements. Military commanders of the Civil War still relied heavily on the ability
of cavalry to provide them with information regarding the enemy situation. Despite
the advent of new collection assets such as observation balloons, telegraph intercepts,
and widespread reliance on newspapers, the mobility and flexibility of cavalry forces
in operational and tactical collection made them ideal in many situations. Any
weakness in this arm could result in a corresponding weakness in intelligence
'
2 Jackson MS, Letter 153. On orders from Jackson, aide Lt. Junkin sent this order
to Lt. Col. Ashby on 3 March.
'Ibid. 154. Letter from Jackson's headquarters to Lt. Herbert who was destroying
boats at Castleman's Ferry.
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collection. On 7 March, Jackson told Ashby that some scouts had noted the Federal
cavalry on the road between Charlestown and Summit Point to be especially negligent
and that the "...day before yesterday were all asleep on their posts."a" Such
apathetic dereliction of duty would never allow the Federal cavalry to keep Banks
informed in a timely manner and would soon open them to criticism from their own
commanders.
In the hopes that increased numbers would help him resist the slow moving
Federal advance in the Valley, Jackson requested reinforcements from Johnston's main
army."' Johnston, however, was forced to largely ignore the request because of the
worsening situation near Manassas. On 9 March, four days after he had issued orders
for a withdrawal, Johnston pulled his infantry forces from the Manassas line and
withdrew the remaining cavalry screen the following day.2 ' In uncharacteristically
quick response to the Confederate movement, McClellan ordered all Federal forces,
including those in the Valley, to advance."7
Despite the generally poor Federal intelligence collection effort to date, Banks still
had a pretty good picture of the enemy forces waiting at Winchester. A captured
sketch map of the Winchester defenses in the summer of 1861, updated through
various collection means, provided the Federals with a detailed graphic showing
2"Ibid., 157. This information was part of a dispatch to Ashby in which Jackson
authorized the cavalry's destruction of a bridge.





entrenchments, artillery, and camp locations.2" Timely intelligence also became
available on 9 March when Jacob Poisel, an eighteen year old private from the 2nd
Virginia Regiment, deserted his unit and entered the lines of Williams' Division. In
a debriefing that Gen. Williams transcribed and forwarded to Banks' headquarters,
Poisel offered valuable information:
I left Winchester this morning. Jackson's Brigade of 5 Regts of Inft. were there:
that was the whole of his Brigade. The Regts were the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, &
33d Va. Regts - Neither Loring nor Elzey were there. There is no other cavalry
around there except Ashby's. We were camped on the Pughtown side. I came
across town to get out. The troops are encamped round about the town.""9
The deserter further went on to describe the location of various entrenchments around
the town and the camp locations of some units. The 3rd Arkansas and 14th
Tennessee, two regiments that had been part of Loring's command, were reported to
have departed the region about two weeks previous.2' With regard to arms and
equipment, Poisel also stated that his own regiment was armed with outdated
smoothbore muskets and that he estimated Jackson's force as having about twenty
artillery pieces of both smoothbore brass and rifled iron types. While such
information regarding the relative size, armament, and disposition of an enemy force
could prove invaluable to an aggressive commander, Banks would do little to exploit
2"Nathaniel Prentice Banks, Manuscript. Papers, 1841-1911. Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
28'lbid.
2
•lThese two regiments, along with the 7th Tennessee, had left Jackson's command
on 22 February and were transferred east of the Blue Ridge.
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the opportunities offered by this intelligence windfall. In this case, intelligence failed
to influence the cautious and plodding operational planning of the Federal
commander.
By 11 March Banks' advance was forcing Jackson to make more detailed
preparations for a retreat. Ashby's cavalry continued to report the location of the
Federal troops and arrangements were finalized to move up the Valley. To prevent
any rapid Federal push into the town, the 21st Virginia was formed in line of battle
and artillery deployed on Fort Hill on the outskirts of the town. As Pvt Worsham
reports, 'These movements were occasioned by the enemy having crossed the
Potomac, and it being reported that they would advance on Winchester. We marched
through Winchester again, this time to the Martinsburg road, as we heard that the
enemy were advancing on this road, and were not far off.'a9' Despite these various
movements and preparations, Banks was probably still unaware that the Confederates
were ready to evacuate the town. Moreover, reconnaissance that day by a small body
of Federal infantry pressed to within four miles of Winchester but failed to report any
Confederate activity.29 2
During the night of the 11th, Jackson marched his troops out of Winchester,




"Charles Henry Tucky Collis, Manuscript. Volume of morning reports, 1861-1862.
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Entry in company report
book for 11 March states this movement was made by Capt. Collis and 20 selected
men from his Zouaves de Afrique.
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advance and "had no difficulty in keeping his troopers where they could report and
could challenge every Federal move.""'' Although Jackson had intended to launch
an immediate surprise counterattack against Banks, his troops were marched further
than intended before being placed into camp for the night. Consequently, the quick
move back to Winchester envisioned by Jackson was now virtually impossible.
Additionally, at a council of war held that night, Jackson's subordinates rejected any
plans for a blow against the superior Federal numbers. Frustrated in all of his plans,
Jackson angrily vowed "That is the last council of war I will ever hold.'e" The next
day, reconnaissance by Federal cavalry confirmed rumors from civilian sources that
the Confederate infantry had evacuated Winchester.2"5 Banks brought up his troops,
forced Ashby out of the town after a brief skirmish, and occupied his objective while
Jackson continued to move south towards Strasburg.
Throughout the Federal advance on Winchester, Jackson had handled his
intelligence effort capably. Possessing the numerically weaker force, he had foreseen
the need to keep abreast of the enemy situation as a means of recognizing military
opportunities and potentially exploiting enemy weaknesses. To fulfill collection
against his own perceived requirements, Jackson had personally issued instructions
to subordinate commanders and potential intelligence collectors and had also







subordinate commands. Confederate scouts and patrols were aggressively pushed
forward to gain and maintain observation against the enemy allowing for a near-
constant tracking of major Federal elements. For Jackson, the result of these actions
was a clear understanding of Federal intentions, objectives, and disposition of forces
towards achieving those goals.
In contrast, Federal intelligence efforts in the developing campaign were mediocre.
Possessing what he knew to be a numerically superior army, B3anks simply used a
slow, methodical advance towards Winchester in which the overwhelming weight of
his army would overcome any Confederate resistance. Reconnaissance by various
cavalry and infantry units was haphazard. Patrols often returned to camp without
having made contact with the enemy rather than aggressively pushing forward until
they had located a Confederate position. Those scouting reports that reached Banks
were spotty in periodicity and lacked the confirmation offered by more constant
observation. Despite detailed, timely, and confirmatory information offered by
captured documents and deserters, no attempt was made to capitalize on these
potential intelligence windfalls with a rapid drive to-wards the objective.
B. KERNSTOWN
Following the Federal occupation of Wincheste., :,hanges were already underway
to the operational situation. In an effort to concentrate forces east of the Blue Ridge
for what was intended to be the main area of operations, Federal forces in the Valley
were to be withdrawn and moved east. On 14 March, only two days after the Federal
occupation of Winchester, Sedgwick's division left Banks' command and began their
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march east to join McClellan's main army.29' Within the week, Williams' division
also departed the Valley for the east. With their aggressive scouting and patrolling,
Ashby's cavalry consistently noted these enemy movements and reported the
departure of these large bodies of men to Jackson. The Confederate commander,
constantly concerned with operational security even within his own command,
typically listened to these reports with a stoical c'-untenance, thereby revealing none
of the potential importance of the information he had received. A member of the
Stonewall Brigade recalled seeing Jackson receive some of these reports:
I have seen couriers bring dispatches to him which he would read, write out
something, hand it back to them and not open his mouth to speak during the
time. I have seen some of his aides and staff officers ride up to him, when he
was sitting on the 'Old Sorrel' viewing the country, and tell him something
about the lines, or about something of importance, and he would calmly sit
there for a few minutes, then turn his horse and ride slowly away, his staff
following, without his uttering a single word.297
While Federal forces in the Valley were diminishing, Jackson tried to strengthen
his forces both quantitatively and qualitatively. Several Virginia militia regiments
were mustered into Confederate service in Staunton on 17 March and reported to
Jackson's army two days later. By 18 March, the Confederates had reached Mt.




.John 0. Casler, Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade (reprint, Wilmington, North
Carolina: Press of the Morningside Bookshop, 1981) 128. This work, written by a
private soldier who served in the Stonewall Brigade throughout the war, is valuable
for its realistic portrayal of the realities of soldiers' lives and perceptions during the
war.
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Worsham of the 2nd Brigade relates that 'The enemy had followed us slowly, but at
Mt. Jackson stopped, and retired down the valley."" For the next several days
Jackson rested his troops and consolidated the new units into his command. Drill,
resupply, and arming of the new troops made up the regimen of Jackson's staff
during this relative lull in activity.
On the 20th and 21st, the 7,000 Federals of Shields', formerly Landers', division
(TABLE 3A) were falling back towards Winchester from Strasburg2" in preparation
for that unit's planned movement east. Ashby, who had been watching the Federals
at Strasburg, reported the move to Jackson by courier' and then set off in pursuit
of the foe with one cavalry company and his single artillery battery of three guns.3"'
In the wake of Sedgwick's and Williams' departure, the withdrawal of Shield's
division would leave only one division, that of Banks, remaining in the Valley.
Early on the 21st, Jackson had been examining his position at Rude's Hill with his
chief engineer, Lt. Boswell, and had dispatched Boswell to examine the area around
New Market as an alternate defensive site should the Federals push further south.32
When Ashby's courier reached Jackson and informed him of the Federal movement
towards Winchester, the general immediately recognized the opportunity that was
2
.. Worsham, 51.
2" O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 339. Post-battle summary report of Brig. Gen. James Shields.
mIbid., 380. Jackson's general report of actions at Kernstown.
"'Ibid., 385. 26 March after-action report by Ashby.
¶Jedediah Hotchkiss, Make Me a Map of the Valley ed. by Archie P. McDonald
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973) 6.
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presented. If he could fall upon an isolated part of the withdrawing enemy, Jackson
might be able to strike the "painful blow" that he had enthusiastically written
Johnston about.0 3 The troops were placed in readiness for a rapid movement
against the Federals. "On the night of March 21st," relates Pvt. Worsham, "we received
orders to cook three days' rations, and be ready to move at early dawn the next
morning.'4
Jackson's force (TABLE 3B) started after the enemy at a brisk pace early the next
morning, 22 March. "We marched twenty seven miles, stopped near Fisher's Hill and
bivouacked for the night'""5 reported Pvt. Worsham. While the rest of the army was
marching north, Ashby's troopers were closely pressing the withdrawing Federals.
At 2:00 p.m., Maj. Paldi of the 1st Michigan Cavalry reported to Shields the presence
of an unknown enemy force about two miles south of Winchester.' Three hours
later, the Confederates advanced, driving in the enemy's pickets. In response to
Ashby's annoying probes, Shields dispatched a brigade of infantry and two artillery
batteries to the scene. The Confederates were easily driven off in the artillery duel
that ensued although Shields was also wounded in the brief fight. More importantly,
however, Shields had been able to brush aside the Confederates with the deployment






3" O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 355. 27 March report of Col. Thornton Brodhead, Federal
cavalry chief.
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of only two of his infantry regiments in sight of the enemy.` 7 The true size and
location of the Federal main body was still unknown to the southern soldiers.
Following the skirmish that day the Federals simply fell back to Winchester and,
again, Ashby followed. Early that evening the Confederate cavalry was able to push
within a mile of Winchester and learned from a group of civilian informants that the
only Federals present in the town were a rear guard consisting of four infantry
regiments and a small detachment of cavalry and artillery. It was further relayed that
this force had orders to depart for Harper's Ferry in the next several days.3 "8 Ashby
dispatched a courier to Jackson with this new information and then withdrew his
forces back to the site of that day's fighting. Believing that the Confederates would
probably resume some type of hostile action to follow up Ashby's harassment, Shields
used the cove: of darkness later that night to conceal his movement of forces south
of Winchester. Kimball's brigade was moved about three miles up the Valley Pike
with Sullivan's brigade following in support. Tyler's brigade and Brodhead's cavalry
were meanwhile kept in reserve near Winchester.'
Shields' perception of the terrain was the guiding factor in the Federal deployment:
Winchester is approached from the south by three principal roads: The Cedar
Creek road on the west, the Valley turnpike road, leading to Strasburg, in the
center, and the Front Royal road on the east. There is a little village called
Kernstown on the Valley road, about 3 1/2 miles from Winchester. On the west
side of this road, about half a mile north of Kernstown, is a ridge of high




ground, which commands the approach by the turnpike and a part of the
surrounding country. This ridge was the key-point of our position. Here
Colonel Kimball, the senior commander on the field, took his station. Along
this ridge, Lieutenant Colonel Daum, chief of artillery, posted three of his
batteries, keeping one battery in reserve some distance in the rear.31
Early the next morning, Ashby renewed the skirmish of the previous day. Three
companies of the 2d Virginia and one company of the 27th Virginia had been sent
forward by Jackson to act as infantry support for Ashby's guns and these units also
joined in the fight.311 The strength of the Federal position soon became apparent
as Ashby related that "...after firing a few shots and pressing in the direction of
Winchester with cavalry, I learned that the enemy was increasing his force and
intended to make a stand."'312 Although Ashby was aware that the Federal force was
larger than the two regiments he had faced on the 22d, he may not have been
convinced as yet that the information received from the civilians the night before had
been a gross underestimation.
In contrast to Ashby's recognition of growing enemy resistance, by 8:00 a.m. the
Federals were still only aware of the small cavalry force opposing them. Anxious to
determine Confederate intentions, an hour later Shields dispatched Col. John S.
Mason of the 4th Ohio on a personal reconnaissance of the enemy positions. After
a ride around both flanks of the Confederate position as well as a thorough
examination of the center, Mason reported his findings to both Shields and Banks.
3101bid.
31 1Ibid., 389. Report of Capt. J.Q.A. Nadenbousch, 2d Virginia Infantry Regiment.
31 2Ibid., 385.
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The Confederate position was well selected allowing for ample maneuver while also
using the woods and high ground to mask movements. Ashby's troops were still the
only enemy present. Presented with this information, Shields and Banks both
concluded that no major Confederate attack would occur that day.3" Banks departed
for Harper's Ferry where he would await a train to take him to Washington, while
Shields retired to his quarters to recuperate from his wounds of the previous day.
On the morning of 23 March, while Ashby was skirmishing with the Federals,
Jackson's army resumed its march north. Garnett's Stonewall Brigade led the line of
march followed by Fulkerson and Burks.3"4 The 48th Virginia, under Col. Campbell,
was employed as the rear guard and moved well behind the rest of the column. For
junior officers and the men in the ranks the situation was anything but clear.
Jedediah Hotchkiss, an acting adjutant in the Augusta County militia wrote in his
diary - "We have any number of rumors but know nothing.""13 Pvt. Worsham of the
21st Virginia believed the "...march was to find out what they were doing. It was
ascertained that they had made a stand at Kernstown."'31  While on the march,
Jackson received Ashby's courier and the civilian reports from Winchester.3"' Here
313Ibid., 340. Shields and Banks conferred for some time, analyzing Mason's report
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reports submitted by Ashby to be "remarkable in their reliability".
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was information that Jackson wanted to hear. A small body of the enemy was in an
exposed position, isolated from support, and might offer an opportunity for successful
engagement.
Jackson spurred his force onward at an even greater pace. The little army
"...reached Barton's Mill, about noon, having marched about sixteen miles""8 , and
found Ashby already engaged in a slow artillery duel with the enemy.31' From their
halted position on the turnpike, Jackson's troops could easily see Federal batteries on
the ridgeline in the distance. This also meant, however, that the Confederate column
was open to complete observation by the Federals.
Because of the rapidity of the march and the resultant straggling, Jackson's present
forces consisted of only about 3,000 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 30 guns.320 Although
the Confederate commander had initially planned to put his troops into camp to
await the arrival of stragglers and the rear guard, the realization that his column had
arrived in plain sight of the enemy led Jackson to opt for immediate action. The
opportunity offered by what he believed to be an isolated, numerically inferior enemy
could not be ignored. Maj. Jones, of the 2d Virginia, was known to be familiar with
the surrounding area and was therefore dispatched to headquarters to assist Jackson




31 9O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 385.
32
°Ibid., 383. Although Jackson excuses the low number of cavalry as being caused
by hard campaigning, poor discipline may also have contributed to the small cavalry
presence. Jackson places the number of his forces engaged as 2742 infantry, 290
cavalry, and 18 guns.
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his present vantage point, Jackson began to deploy his troops for battle. The ground
on the right appeared to be too open for the necessary deployment of infantry and
Federal artillery commanded that part of the field. Ashby's small force was ordered
to hold the right with elements of Burk's Brigade in support. The 5th Virginia,
Garnett's largest regiment, was retained by Jackson as the general reserve."2 '
The main thrust was to be made on the left (MAP 5). As Garnett's and Fulkerson's
brigades accordingly filed off of the turnpike and move towards the left, the 27th and
21st Virginia were deployed as skirmishers and thrown forward to oppose their
Federal counterparts. Pvt. Worsham of the 21st Virginia reported that as soon as the
skirmishers moved forward, "...we came in sight of the Yankee line of battle near
Kernstown, and a battery posted on a hill a little in the rear. The battery opened on
us at once."'3  To provide some counter-battery fire while his forces got into
position, Jackson dispatched the three batteries attached to Garnett's brigade to the
slight ridgeline on the lefte and placed the 1st Virginia (Irish) Battalion in support
of the guns.3
Due to the arrival and deployment of Jackson's column in full sight of the
Federals, Col. Nathan Kimball, the senior Federal officer on the field, had been able
to respond to the developing threat. Soon after noon he had reported the presence of
3 21Ibid., 381.
'Worsham, 53.
3DO.R.; Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 381.
"
324Ibid., 405. Report of Capt. D.B. Bridgford states that this move was made about
3:00 p.m.
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increased enemy infantry in the woods on his left"2 ' to Shields. Sullivan's brigade
was accordingly moved forward to secure the Federal left."' Capt. Keys'
Pennsylvania cavalry was deployed to secure and observe both Federal flanks."'
Shields also telegraphed Banks at Harper's Ferry of the increased enemy presence,
leading the later to delay his departure to Washington.
The Confederate flanking column on the left moved about half a mile before
deploying into line of battle. 2s Fulkerson's Brigade formed on the left of the 27th
Virginia, which had reformed into regimental line of battle after its deployment as
skirmishers, while Garnett moved his brigade to form the center of the Confederate
line.32' The 21st Virginia remained deployed. as skirmishers forward of the main
southern position. As the Confederates began their advance, they quickly began to
press towarus the Federal artillery posted on the opposite ridge.
Kimball had seen the Confederate deployment on his right, however, and had
already begun to shift forces to repel the enemy advance. Although Lt. Col. Philip
Daum's artillery was delaying the Confederate drive towards the Federal line, it
"
32 5Perhaps the companies of the 2d and 27th Virginias acting as support to Ashby's
guns.
32 60.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 340.
327Ibid., 358. Reports of Capt. John Keys, commanding the Pennsylvania cavalry,
and Capt. A.J. Greenfield, commanding the Washington Cavalry Squadron of Keys'
unit.






would need hifantry support to avoid being overwhelmed. Two regiments of Tyler's
brigade, the 7th Ohio and 7th Indiana, were quickly moved to the scene.' A
couple hours later, at around 4:00 p.m., Tyler's three remaining regiments were also
moved from their position on the Federal left to meet the Confederate threat on the
opposite end of the line.33'
Throughout the developing battle, Kimball had kept Shields, who was still in
Winchester recuperating from his wounds, informed about the situation on the field.
Through the energies of Lt. William W. Rowley, the Federals had established an
effective communications system that allowed for the transmission of information and
orders between Kernstown and Winchester as well as on the battlefield itself. Using
signal flags as the means of communication, Rowley had set up a series of stations
which linked the two wings of the Federal force with Kimball's headquarters near the
center and then further linked the senior commander on the field with Shields, about
three miles away. Rowley also detailed several flagmen to accompany the infantry
brigades as they maneuvered on the field, thereby providing a way to keep Kimball
informed about the progress of his subordinates on the battlefield.332
Initially the Confederate attack seemed to be going well. Kimball's brigade was
33°Ibid., 375. Tyler reports this movement as occurring about 2:00 p.m.
331 bid., 341. In his account of the battle, Shields offers much praise for his
subordinates in flawlessly accomplishing these deployments.
332Ibid., 352. In his official report, Lt. Rowley, an acting signal officer on detached
service from the 28th New York, complains of a general lack of recognition from
senior officers for the services provided by the signalmen and requests to be returned
to his own regiment.
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hard pressed by Garnett's and Fulkerson's advance and one Federal regiment was
even seen in withdrawal by men in the Confederate ranks. As they neared the
military crest of the ridge they had been advancing against, however, the skirmishers
of the 21st Virginia, moving forward of the main battle line, came into full sight of
the enemy's line of battle which now was also advancing. Tyler had arrived on the
scene. Upon seeing the five Federal battle flags, one for each regiment in Tyler's
brigade, advancing against them, the Confederate skirmishers quickly fell back to the
main body which had posted itself behind a low stone wall."33
Although Tyler's brigade had easily driven in the enemy skirmishers, the strength
of the Confederate position now prevented any further advance by the Federals at that
time. With the two sides locked in a tactical stalemate in which neither could
dislodge the other, Kimball now took action to break the deadlock. Leaving Sullivan
with only one regiment, the 39th Illinois, and two artillery pieces to hold the entire
Federal left, Kimball ordered the 5th Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 62d Ohio to reinforce
Tyler's left.3 Additionally, from his own brigade Kimball placed the 14th Indiana,
84th Pennsylvania, and several companies of the 67th Ohio and 8th Ohio regiments
to the right of Tyler's men (MAP 6)."
From his position on a small rise behind the Confederate lines, Jackson could
apparently see nothing of the enemy lines or the massing of troops opposite
'Worsham, 54.
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Fulkerson and Garnett. Additionally, Confederate cavalry under Maj. Funsten, which
had been posted on the extreme left to observe any Federal movement on that side,
had failed to report the enemy concentration to the Confederate general.3" As the
enemy fire facing his center grew increasingly hotter, Jackson ordered one of his aides
forward to reconnoiter the front. Upon his return to the commander the aide reported
an estimated 10,000 Union troops confronting them. To this disquieting news Jackson
reportedly replied with stoic detachment, "Say nothing about it. We are in for it."" 7
Tyler now started his advance against the Confederate lines. Of the 13 Federal
infantry regiments on the field, 12 would be taking part in this main assault against
the enemy's left. At this crucial period in the battle, when the full firepower of the
Confederate line would be needed to resist the enemy, the men of Garnett's brigade
began to run out of ammunition. Southern soldiers began to fall back towards the
rear, first as individuals and then in groups, as the last rounds disappeared from their
cartridge boxes. Seeing little alternative to the terrible reality facing him, Garnett
ordered a withdrawal. The movement of Garnett's brigade in turn left Fulkerson's
right open to enfilading fire from the still advancing Federals and he too was forced
to order his men back.33" When Jackson saw his troops streaming to the rear he was
3MIbid., 387. In his account of the battle, Maj. Funsten also points out that his
troopers had failed to inform even him of the sightings of the Federals on the left.
33 7Clark, 70. This may be a popularized tale since Jackson is purported to have
made a similar statement at Manassas in 1861.
3mO.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 382. Jackson placed most of the blame for the Confederate
withdrawal and defeat on Garnett who, he believed, should have resorted to use of
the bayonet when ammunition ran out.
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furious. He had not ordered a withdrawal. From his detached command post behind
the Confederate line, Jackson was unaware of the actual condition of his units at the
front. He quickly ordered his reserve, the 5th Virginia, to move forward and delay
the Federals and then he too rode forward to investigate the situation himself. While
moving to the rear, however, Garnett encountered Col. Harman, the reserve
commander, and ordered him to form a defensive line where he was.
With the collapse of the entire Confederate left, Ashby and Burks were also forced
to fall back to avoid envelopment by the still advancing Federals. With little pressure
from Sullivan's lone regiment, the Confederate right was able to withdraw in good
order and maintained complete cohesion as an effective combat element. The 42d
Virginia, of Burk's brigade, soon moved to Harman's right and, with Ashby's force
in support, the two infantry regiments were able to finally halt the Federal thrust.33'
As darkness began to fall over the field, the Confederates moved back up the
Valley Pike. Jackson retreated about five miles south before taking up a new position
and bivouacking for the night.3"' Only now did the 48th Virginia rejoin the rest of
the army after its rear guard duty on the march from Mt. Jackson.34' While Jackson
33Ibid., 382. Jackson offered ample praise to the 42d Virginia for their actions
with the rear guard.
"0lbid., 341. Shields further stated that darkness was all that prevented a Federal
pursuit that night.
`'Ibid., 382. The movement of this regiment in rejoining the rest of the army was
probably delayed by their efforts in rounding up the stragglers along the route of
march.
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moved the infantry south, Ashby and his cavalry maintained the rear guard to prevent
further pursuit by the Federals.
Neither Shields nor Kimball, however, were inclined to an immediate pursuit.
Fearing that Jackson was actually on the verge of reinforcement by up to 15,000 fresh
troops', Shields opted for initial caution. He ordered all outlying units and pickets
to assemble near Kernstown and prepared to continue operations against the enemy
at dawn the next day. Additionally, during the course of the battle, Shields had also
wired to Banks in Harper's Ferry requesting the return of Williams' recently departed
division to the Valley. Williams' 1st Brigade arrived on the scene at Kernstown just
as Tyler was forcing the Confederate retreat and the 3rd Brigade reached the
battlefield the following day.343
Following the battle, both commanders tended to over-estimate the size of the
enemy that they had opposed and the damage inflicted upon their opponent. In
initial reports to Banks, Shields estimated the size of Jackson's force as 11,000 -
15,000.• Although the Confederates were less than half this number (TABLE 3B),
the Federal commander's perception of the situation contributed to the cautious
pursuit of the enemy following the battle. Some of this overestimation was due to
the deceptive efforts of Confederate prisoners who consistently inflated their numbers
'Ibid., 341.
3lbid., 378. Taken from abstracts of the "Record of Events" for Williams'
Division, 5th Army Corps.
'"Ibid., 336. In addition to the inflated troop figures, Shields also referred to
Jackson's forces as the "flower of the southern army."
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during questioning by the Federals. Not all of the prisoners' stories were entirely
convincing, though. After questioning Lt. Junkin, an aide on Jackson's staff who had
been captured, Banks related that it was "Reported by rebel jackson's aide that they
were assured of re-enforcements to 30,000, but we don't credit it."3 '5 Additionally,
the Federal division commander showed confusion over which enemy commands he
had engaged. Shields' initial reports indicated that he thought he had defeated forces
under Kirby Smith and James Longstreet, both of whom were still east of the Blue
Ridge, as well as Jackson's comnmand."' In contrast, Jackson seemed to have a closer
approximation of-his foe's size as he believed that about 11,000 Federals were present
at Kernstown and that 8,000 of these were actually engaged against him.34 7 If he was
including the recently arrived troops of Williams' 1st Brigade in his calculations,
Jackson's surmise seems fairly close to the facts (TABLE 3A). Both belligerents,
however, over-estimated the casualties suffered by the enemy. Although the actual
combined casualties for both sides numbered slightly over 1300 (TABLE 4) Shields
estimated the southern loss as 1350318 while Jackson believed that the Federals had






3410bid., 380. Jackson was relying on inforrnation from the citizenry of Winchester
as the primary basis for this estimate.
140
Confederate intelligence at Kernstown had been dismal. Jackson's operational
goals had dominated his assessment of the enemy situation and had caused him to
commit his forces to battle without understanding the reality of the Federal forces
facing him. The initial intelligence gaps that had occurred when Shields began his
retreat from Strasburg back to Winchester had not been resolved by the time the
battle began. Instead of waiting for Ashby to provide a more concrete assessment of
Federal dispositions, Jackson had relied on civilian reports, always of questionable
validity, as the basis for his operational planning. After his arrival on the field,
Jackson had continued this general detachment from operational and tactical reality.
Although he lacked tactical information on the terrain and enemy situation, the
Confederate commander deployed his troops and planned his attack without a prior
reconnaissance by either himself or a trusted subordinate. As combat raged at his
front, Jackson appeared to be out of touch with the battle being fought and never
actually understood the threat developing on his left. Finally, his inflexibility in
meeting the Federal assault revealed a general unwillingness to recognize an enemy
situation that was contrary to his own preconceived operational decisions.
The Federals, on the other hand, had made good use of intelligence at Kernstown.
In the wake of Ashby's pursuit and the skirmishing on the 22d, Shields had correctly
deduced Confederate intentions and, on the night of the 22d, had positioned his forces
to meet a possible increased threat from the south. Although the Federal commander
had concluded early on the 23d that no battle would occur that day, the arrival of
Jackson's force in plain sight of the Federal lines provided concrete details of the
141
enemy's relative size and deployment. LL Rowley's imaginative and energetic
signaling efforts allowed Federal commanders to stay abreast of the tactical situation
at the front of battle and to react accordingly. Additionally, Federal actions illustrated
a flexibility in reacting to and capitalizing on opportunities suggested by the latest
information.
C. THE FEDERAL PURSUIT
At around 8:00 a.m. the day after the fight at Kernstown3', Jackson began his
retreat up the Valley. The pace was "slow and sullen""' as the Confederates
grudgingly moved back over the ground they had rapidly advanced on the day before.
Despite pressure from the enemy on the column's rear, the various brigades were
allowed to halt at midday to cook their rations.3"2 Ashby commanded the rear guard
with typical zeal and fought a delaying action throughout the day, keeping Jackson
informed of the Federal pursuit. So close were the pursuers, however, that little
reporting was needed to know the location of the enemy advance. Even soldiers in
the ranks were clearly aware of the tactical reality - 'The enemy were in hot pursuit,






enemy during the march."' By nightfall the Confederates had reached the area
between Narrow Passage and Woodstock where they went into camp (MAP 7).*3
Although the Federals had initially pressed the retreating Confederates with some
energy on the 24th, the pursuit soon became more measured. By 25 March the
Federals had reached Tom's Brook, four miles south of Strasburg, where they were
again met by Ashby.3" The main body of northern troops would remain here until
1 April, constantly watched and harassed by Ashby's scouts. Although the northern
troops did make some attempts at armed reconnaissance of the area, they never
aggressively sought out their enemy. Typical was a Federal pat-- A to Middleburgh
on 27 March in which a force consisting of Collis' Zouaves, the 11th Indiana, 13th
Massachusetts, a detachment of the 1st Michigan Cfivalry and two pieces of artillery
simply returned to Tom's Brook after failing to make any contact with the
Confederates.3 " Rather than using this intelligence collection effort to aggressively
locate the enemy, Banks was sending Federal patrols to perform reconnaissance of
geographic areas that really weren't important to the Federal operational picture. A
more capable commander might have used this sizeable force to gain and maintain
contact with some element of the enemy. Instead, Jackson was able to remain





"Collis MS. Capt. Collis states in his morning report book that the patrol
objective was only about 6 miles distant from the Federal camp.
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occasionally sent some of his infantry towards Woodstock to rebuff small Federal
advances.3"'
During this respite at Narrow Passage and his subsequent camp at Rude's Hill,
Jackson began the reorganization of the forces under his command as well as the
improvement of his own operational planning. On 1 April, still incensed by what he
considered to be the premature withdrawal of the Stonewall Brigade at Kernstown,
Jackson relieved Gamett from command and replaced him with Brig. Gen. Charles
Winder.' Col. John Campbell of the 48th Virginia was assigned the command of
the 2d Brigade3"' after Col. Burks was forced from active operations by sickness and,
on 13 April, Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro returned to the Valley on orders from
Johnston to assume command of the 3d Brigade.' The regimental assignments to
the various brigades remained as they had been previously and Ashby retained
control of the cavalry arm.
The Confederate commander also sought to improve the assets available for his
own operational planning. One of the most significant steps made towards this end
occurred on 26 March when Jackson summoned a young militia officer, Jedediah
Hotchkiss, to headquarters. After asking Hotchkiss about the topographic work that




'Jackson MS, General Orders, 34.
'S"Jackson MS, General Orders, 36.
mHotchkiss, 10. Diary entry for 13 April.
144
issued orders that would provide an intelligence force multiplier in the months to
come:
I want you to make me a map of the valley, from Harper's Ferry to Lexington,
showing all the points of offense and defense in those places. Mr. Pendleton
will give you orders for whatever outfit you want. Good morning sir.'0 "
'This," relates Hotchkiss, "was the beginning of my career as the Topographic
Engineer" on Jackson's staff.3'2 As late as April, Jackson himself remained confused
over the names of the various gaps that crossed the Blue Ridge but he could now rely
on the knowledge of his assigned topographer in helping to dispel this confusion.'
The engineer not only provided numerous maps which showed the pure geography
of the area but also offered his own valuable assessments and advice regarding the
operational significance of various features throughout the Valley.
Jedediah Hotchkiss had been born and raised in Windsor, New York, the
descendant of an old Connecticut family. Following his graduation from local
academies and a brief job as teacher to miners' children in Pennsylvania, Hotchkiss
took a walking tour of Virginia and decided to settle there at age 19. Serving first as
a private tutor in Augusta County, he was soon named principal of the Mossy Creek
Academy. In the fall of 1859 the enterprising young man established the Loch Willow






various aspects of geology and geography he had encountered during his tours in
New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, Hotchkiss used the valuable leisure time from
his busy teaching schedule to learn the principles of engineering and cartography.
It was the self-taught mastery of these skills that made him such an asset to the
Confederate cause in the years to come.
With the outbreak of the war, Hotchkiss closed his school and offered his services
to the newly formed Confederate army. In July 1861 he began topographic duties
with the southern forces at Rich Mountain in western Virginia. Although that
campaign ended dismally for the south, Hotchkiss produced many maps to replace the
outdated ones previously in existence and provided valuable assistance to the area
commander. Forced home after a bout with typhoid, the engineer had just returned
to duty in mid-March as acting adjutant of the Augusta County militia. Col. W.H.S.
Baylor, Jackson's inspector general, informed his chief of the engineer's presence and
Jackson quickly added Hotchkiss to his staff.
Hotchkiss went to work almost immediately on his assignment. On 27 and 28
March he examined the area around Narrow Passage, where the Confederates had
been camped since the 24th, and reported to the commanding general that it was
undefensible. "My reconnaissance showed that the position could be easily turned
by several roads and that it would be difficult for any army to speedily fall back ....."
if attacked there. 6" By this simply stated assessment Hotchkiss had provided his




the commander's operational planning. Jackson accepted the engineer's assessment
as conclusive and that day ordered the army south to new positions at Mt.
Jackson.'"
As part of his overall mapping project, Hotchkiss continued to visually survey the
area around the army. On 29 March, he enlisted the assistance of a Mr. Hoshour of
Woodstock who acted as guide while examining the country in front of the army from
Massanutten to North Mountain. Although Hotchkiss found the reconnaissance
greatly expedited by a guide familiar with the area and the local inhabitants, he
discovered no defensible position near Woodstock that couldn't be easily turned by
an active enemy." The following day Sgt. S. Howell Brown, a former surveyor
from Jefferson County, joined Hotchkiss in his work of exploration and mapping.
After a thorough examination of the vicinity, Hotchkiss recommended the line of
Stoney Creek as a favorable point of defense. Using a quickly produced sketch map
of the area, the engineer explained the advantages of the position and advised his
chief to make a stand there. Again Jackson acted in accordance with the advice of his
staff officer and ordered Ashby to hold at Stoney Creek."
The final resulting product of Hotchkiss' labors was an outstanding example of a
map designed to meet the needs of an operational commander and his campaign






map was, in fact, a comprehensive representation of the length and breadth of the
Valley. The relief features of valleys, hills, mountains, and vital gaps were clearly
depicted in black contour and accurately labelled to avoid any confusion. The various
rivers, tributaries, and creeks, with their even more critical bridges were also
painstakingly illustrated. The intricate network of horse paths, country roads, and
improved turnpikes, often confusing even to local inhabitants, were examined in
detail and then charted in red with many accompanying comments on road conditions.
Additionally, the locations and names of numerous inhabitants, mills, and furnaces
were provided throughout the map allowing for quick determination of local
directions or reference points."' Armed with this detailed map and the analytic
capabilities of his cartographer, Jackson could now plan his movements to take full
advantage of the natural and man-made geography within his area of operations.
In contrast to the comprehensive map initiated, produced, and used by the
Confederates, the Federals were operating in an area that largely remained a mystery
to them. Military or government produced topographic maps of the region were
virtually non-existent. Commercially available maps were often mere overviews of
the area showing only major towns, improved turnpikes, larger rivers and the general
trace of mountain ranges. Most examples were also long outdated. Federal engineers
were generally restricted in their efforts to explore the Valley for mapping because
of enemy control over the region. While on a mapping expedition in the Valley
3"Jedediah Hotchkiss, Maps, H89. Maps and field books, 1861-1865. Map and
Geography Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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during the spring of 1862, engineer William Luce and his whole surveying party were
captured by Ashby's men. The contents of Luce's 180 page field book, which might
have provided key information to Banks, was turned over to Hotchkiss for inclusion
into his own work.?9 Other Federal sketch maps fell far short of Hotchkiss'
products. Instead of contours, very generalized verbal descriptions were often offered
to depict elevation and slope of the terrain. Although the main Valley turnpike was
well examined, the numerous crossroads were usually only partially labelled and
remained largely unexplored.37" Throughout the campaign, Federal cartography
remained rough, disorganized and ineffective in assisting northern commanders with
an understanding of key military terrain in the Valley.
On 1 April, the slow moving Federal forces succeeded in pushing the Confederate
cavalry through Edenburg. Ashby's commanding position on the high ground at
Stoney Creek and his burning of the bridge over that watercourse prevented any
further advance by his foes."' With some support by various infantry units, Ashby
was able to hold this position against the enemy for the next two weeks despite
almost daily skirmishing. The ever daring Ashby consistently remained in the
forefront of the action at this position, often riding out in front of his own lines to
view the enemy from some vantage point3"2 and passing significant information
36Ibid., H6.





back to Jackson. The Federal lines and positions across from Stoney Creek apparently
remained unconcealed and open to view by the Confederates. The mounted Southern
scouts habitually kept their supporting infantrymen on the line well informed about
the enemy positions and pointed out the Federal scouts and observation posts to their
comrades.3 "3
In early April, Jackson was faced with an additional challenge to his control in the
Valley. A rebellion, centered in McGaheysville, had broken out among pro-Union
elements of the Rockingham County militia. In addition to guarding against any
Federal advance, Jackson also had to dispatch forces to the area around Swift Run
Gap to quell the revolt."' Not until the 14th would the issue be ended with the
capture of the rebel leader.375
While Ashby effectively held the Federals at Stoney Creek, Jackson again moved
his force south from their camp at Rude's Hill. On 10 April the Confederates marched
to a position north of New Market and established camp there.37" To guard against
any possible surprise flanking movement from the Luray Valley to the east, one








help of Hotchkiss, Jackson was becoming well aware of the opportunies and potential
threats offered by the Valley's geography.
Stalled at Stoney Creek since the 1st, Banks was growing increasingly uncertain
about the whereabouts of Jackson's main force. On 15 April, Banks reported to
Washington, "Ashby still here. We have a sleepless eye on him, and are straining
every nerve to advance as quickly as possible.'a The problem with this statement,
of course, was that Ashby's location was largely immaterial so long as the main
Confederate concentration remained unlocated. In their function as a screening force
Ashby's troopers would naturally be visible to the opposing Federals. All that Banks
knew were the positions of Jackson's scouts and screen, not the enemy force with
whom he should have been concerned.
As the comparative stalemate continued in mid-April, the relative inactivity was
contributing to a loss of morale and a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the
Confederate cavalry. The 27 companies of Ashby's cavalry were scattered in isolated
detachments throughout the Valley to maintain a watch on the enemy. These units,
which were already known within Jackson's army for their general lack of military
discipline, became less vigilant when separated from the charismatic and aggressive
leadership of Ashby. Federal forces received information from a group of pro-Union
inhabitants, confirmed by Confederate prisoners, of "...a company of Ashby's cavalry
quartered in a Church at Cross Roads, about 8 miles from Columbia Furnace." The
isolation of this force offered a tempting target to the Federals who were further
3 78 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 78. Dispatch by Banks at 11:00 p.m. 15 April to McClellan.
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assisted by "...a young man, a citizen who corroborated the statement made by the
prisoners and signified his ability and willingness to lead a party through an
unfrequented path ....." that could approach the position unseen.3" On 16 April, a
body of Federal cavalry crossed Stoney Creek at an unguarded ford and moved
against the enemy company at Columbia Furnace. The Federals achieved complete
surprise in this sortie and captured the entire enemy company of 60 men.'
Following the successful cavalry raid at C, lumbia Furnace, Banks resumed his
push against Jackson. At 3:00 a.m. on 17 April, the Federals drove Ashby from the
Stoney Creek line and continued south. Upon notification of the enemy advance,
Jackson dispatched topographer Jedediah Hotchkiss to Mt. Airy to watch the enemy
movement and prepared to defend his position near New Market. Ashby, as the rear
guard commander, continued boldly to oppose the Federal advance. He attempted to
delay the northerners by personally burning the bridge over North River but the
enemy was able to save the small span from destruction.
When informed by Hotchkiss that the entire Federal force of 10,000 men was
moving against him and that a possible flanking column was approaching his
position from west of North River, Jackson decided to retreat south in the hopes of
finding a better position.3 ' The Confederates fell back to New Market and then Big
3
"Boyce MS.
33O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 426. Report from Banks to Secretary of War Stanton.
3'Hotchkiss, 24-25.
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Spring before stopping for the night. Ashby, meanwhile, held the enemy advance at
Sparta.tm
The next day, 18 April, the Confederates continued their retreat. Baggage trains
were sent on the Valley Pike to Staunton while the rest of the army moved to
Harrisonburg and then turned east towards Keezletown.3  Ashby continued his
attempts to delay the enemy advance. He burned the bridges at Mt. Crawford, Maj.
Grattan's, and Bridgewater and then established a holding position northeast of
Harrisonburg while the army moved east. The pursuing Federals occupied New
Market that day but the tempo of their operation was again slowing down.
On the 19th Jackson marched his forces to McGaheysville and established his own
headquarters near Conrad's Store.3"' To safeguard his command from any federal
force moving up the Luray Valley, Jackson sent Hotchkiss to destroy the Red and
Columbia bridges over the South Fork of the Shenandoah. A Federal covering force
from New Market, estimated by the Confederates as about 1,000 men"5 , crossed the
Massanutten via Luray Gap and managed to save the Columbia Bridge but advanced
no further.3' As the next day was Easter Sunday, both armies rested their troops




3"O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 863.
'Hotchkiss, 29.
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army up the Blue Ridge into a protective mountain cove which offered relative
protection for his forces."
Hotchkiss was immediately put to work on maps of the Luray Valley, which
Jackson viewed as vital to planning his next move. On 21 April, the day that Banks'
advance entered Harrisonburg, the Confederate general also dispatched his
topographer to find a concealed route through Swift Run Gap to capture the Federals
operating near Columbia Bridge. Jackson, however, had actually named the wrong
gap. Upon closer questioning Hotchkiss was able to determine that his chief had
actually intended Fisher's Gap as the approach route. Using a Mr. Henry H. Propes
as guide, Hotchkiss moved via the correct gap, reconnoitered and mapped the enemy
camp near Columbia Bridge on the 21st and 22d, and reported his findings to Jackson
the following day.3"'
While Jackson kept his main force relatively concealed within the protective
confines of the Luray Valley, the cavalry actively screened his operations and harassed
the Federals. On 21 April a small Confederate force captured several prisoners near
Winchester."' On the 24th an enemy patrol near McGaheysville was repulsed after






6 miles from Conrad's Store on the 26th.391 In an effort to correct some of the
deficiencies developing in the cavalry arm, Jackson detached all of the cavalry from
Ashby on the 25th and assigned it to the infantry brigades that made up the
command. Ashby would still command the advance but would have to apply to the
brigade commanders for necessary troops. However, faced with the near resignation
of Ashby and the probability of decreased morale and effectiveness by his cavalry,
Jackson detailed all of the cavalry back under Ashby's direct command the following
day.392
Towards the end of the month, Banks' assessment of the situation consistently
emphasized a decreased Confederate threat. By the 27th, Banks had stopped his
advance up the Valley and was increasingly convinced that Jackson's force was
effectively beaten. In a 30 April message to the Secretary of War, Banks provided a
brief summary of his intelligence threat assessment for the Valley:
...Jackson is bound for Richmond. This is the fact, I have no doubt. Jackson
is on half rations, his supplies having been cut off by our advance. There is
nothing to be done in this valley this side of fortifications this side of
Strasburg.313
391 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 868.
"
39Jackson MS, General Orders 41 and 42. Also a detailed description of events
surrounding Ashby's relief and reinstatement to command can be found in Freeman,
338-341.
3930.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 118. In a second report issued that same day to Stanton,
Banks reemphasized his belief that Jackson has left the Valley.
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The Confederates, however, had not left the region and were in much better
condition than the Federals realized. Although he remained in the protective security
offered by the Luray Valley's geography, Jackson was planning for a dramatic
offensive that would effect the military situation far outside of his own district.
Recognizing the various changes that had occurred in the strategic situation since he
had come to the Valley, Jackson would soon attempt to turn the operational
opportunities that he saw in his theater of operations into a campaign of strategic
value for the south.
D. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE DURING THE FEDERAL ADVANCE
Throughout this phase of operations, Jackson had clearly recognized the role of the
intelligence process in the commander's operational planning. As an integral part of
his overall responsibility for managing the Confederate military effort in the Valley,
Jackson had decisively guided the intelligence effort so that it would have a
significant impact on the development of operational plans. By identifying those
specific pieces of information that he, as the operational planner and commander,
needed, Jackson had narrowed the intelligence collection effort to meet his own
operational needs. The general disposition, including size, location, and action, of the
enemy was his primary concern and this was reflected in the orders and directions
issued to his various scouts and subordinates. Further, the emphasis placed by the
Confederate commander on understanding the important elements of geography
within his area of responsibility was revealed in his taskings to Hotchkiss and other
engineers of the staff. At a time when intelligence and operations functions were
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primarily conducted by the commander rather than compartmented staff officers, this
understanding of geography was a necessary preparation for the development of
effective campaign plans.
In its execution, intelligence collection had also been well handled by the
Confederates. The near constant observation of the enemy, which Jackson demanded,
helped to limit those inherent gaps caused by less frequent periodicity. By using his
cavalry as a means of maintaining contact with the enemy he sought to keep a
constant and accurate track of enemy movements.
Jackson's willingness to use various means of collection against the enemy allowed
him to fuse the reports from various sources into a more coherent assessment.
Although Jackson traditionally relied on his light cavalry forces to track enemy
movements, he also incorporated reports from the civilian population, enemy
prisoners, engineers, staff officers, subordinates, higher headquarters and the open
press into his understanding of the operational situation. Such a wide collection base
provided the Confederate commander with, not only the potential for more reporting
but, reporting that could be corroborated or disproved when compared with an
alternate source.
Associated with this willingness to draw upon all available collection assets was
an equally important understanding of the potential weaknesses and limitations of
those assets. Civilian sources, always somewhat suspect in their reliability, were even
more questionable in the context of a civil war. This was primarily due to the fact
that, in addition to the usual concerns over the accuracy of information reported by
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civilians, the problems of determining loyalties were more pronounced. While
Jackson was willing to accept information from the Valley's inhabitants, he also
sought to confirm their reports through other sources and, as a counter intelligence
measure of general operational security, restricted their ability to provide information
to the enemy. His orders prohibiting the movement of civilians outside his lines and
the arrest of known or suspected Federal sympathizers were concrete example of this
attempl Additionally, Jackson's recognition of passivist religious sects within the
Valley and his subsequent use of them in military non-combatant roles illustrated his
attempts to ensure continued loyalty to the Confederate cause.
Recognition of the developing faults in his cavalry's reporting had resulted in his
administrative reorganization of that arm in an attempt to revitalize its usefulness.
Because of his heavy dependency on cavalry reports, Jackson had to correct these
deficiencies before they worsened. When he realized that his relief of Ashby might
be more harmful than beneficial, the Confederate commander had shown flexibility
in restoring Ashby to command and simply relying on his subordinate's promise to
improve that arm's performance.
Throughout most of the operations to date, Jackson had been able to use his own
understanding of military operational art to deduce the actions and intentions of his
enemy. The Federal occupation of Winchester, reinforcement following Kernstown,
and slow pursuit up the Valley had all been anticipated by the Confederate
commander because he was able to balance his own knowledge about tactics, military
objectives, and his opponent with the indicators provided by his intelligence assets.
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In those areas where Jackson's own knowledge was found lacking he quickly relied
on the expertise of others to interpret the importance and meaning of individual facts.
This became especially true in his use of engineers to examine the potential
opportunities offered by control of key terrain in the Valley.
The major Confederate intelligence failure at Kernstown had been the cumulative
product of several contributing factors. What made these mistakes so critical was that
they had occurred at the most important phase of the operation - the battle. The loss
of enemy contact during the Federal retreat from Strasburg created a gap in
knowledge about the enemy size and disposition. In turn, the failure to properly
weigh and verify the civilian reports regarding the size of the Federal force at
Winchester led Jackson to commit his force against a numerically superior enemy.
The poor coordination and timing of the march on the 23rd brought the army into full
sight of the enemy lines thereby revealing his force size and tactical deployment.
Further, Jackson's general lack of knowledge about the area's geography and his
failure to make an immediate forward reconnaissance prevented him from making
best use of the available terrain. Finally, as the battle developed, Jackson had shown
a certain inflexibility in linking information provided by the tactical realities of the
battle with his own operational goal of defeating an inferior enemy.
In comparison, the relative Federal intelligence success at Kernstown had been the
only bright spot in their intelligence effort thus far. Because the information
provided at Kernstown was of more value to the tactical nature of intelligence during
the battle, its effect on the overall operational intelligence picture was minimal.
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Banks never assumed an active role in the intelligence process by clearly identifying
those things that he needed to know about the enemy and also failed to use his forces
aggressively enough to find out the necessary information. Finally, his own analytical
abilities were proven faulty in his inability to assess the intentions, combat
effectiveness, or even location of the Confederates under Jackson.
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Shields' Division - Brig. Gen. James Shields
First Brigade - Col. Nathan Kimball
14th Indiana - Lt. Col. William Harrow
8th Ohio - Col. Samuel S. Carroll
67th Ohio - Lt. Col. Alvin C. Voris
84th Pennsylvania - Col. William G. Murray
Second Brigade - Col. Jeremiah C. Sullivan
39th Illinois - Col. Thomas 0. Osborn
13th Indiana - Lt. Col. Robert S. Foster
5th Ohio - Lt. Col. John H. Patrick
62nd Ohio - Col. Francis B. Pond
Third Brigade - Col. Erastus B. Tyler
7th Indiana - Lt. Col. John F. Cheek
7th Ohio - Lt. Col. William R. Creighton
29th Ohio - Col. Lewis P. Buckley
110th Pennsylvania - Col. William D. Lewis Jr.
1st West Virginia - Col. Joseph Thoburn
Cavalry - Col. Thornton F. Brodhead
1st Squadron Pennsylvania - Capt. John Keys
Maryland Ind. Company - Capt. Henry A. Cole
Maryland Ind. Company - Capt. William Firey
Maryland Ind. Company - Capt. John Homer
1st West Virginia (Battalion) - Maj. B. F. Chamberlain
1st Ohio (Co's A and C) - Capt. Nathan Menken
1st Michigan (Battalion) - Lt. Col. Joseph T. Copeland
Artillery - Lt. Col. Philip Daum
Batteries A and B, West Virginia - Capt. John Jenks
Battery H, 1st Ohio - Capt. James F. Huntington
Battery L, 1st Ohio - Capt. Lucius N. Robinson
Battery E, 4th U.S. - Capt. Joseph C. Clark Jr.
"'
4Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, ed., Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War Vol. 2, The Struggle Intensifies (The Century Company, 1883.
reprint, Secaucus, New Jersey: Castle, 1980) 298.
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Valley District - Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson
Garnett's Brigade - Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett
2nd Virginia - Col. J.W. Allen
4th Virginia - Lt. Col. Charles A. Ronald
5th Virginia - Col. William H. Harman
27th Virginia - Col. John Echols
33rd Virginia - Col. Arthur C. Cummings
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery - Capt. William McLaughlin
West Augusta (Virginia) Artillery - Capt. James H. Waters
Carpenter's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. Joseph Carpenter
Burks's Brigade - Col. Jesse S. Burks
21st Virginia - Lt. Col. John M. Patton
42nd Virginia - Lt. Col. D.A. Langhorne
1st Virginia (Irish) Battalion - Capt. D.B. Bridgford
Pleasant's (Virginia) Battery - Lt. James Pleasants
Fulkerson's Brigade - Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson
23rd Virginia - Lt. Col. Alex G. Taliaferro
37th Virginia - Lt. Col. R.P. Carson
Danville (Virginia) Artillery - Lt. A.C. Lanier
Cavalry - Lt. Col. Turner Ashby
7th Virginia - Lt. Col. Turner Ashby








Command Killed Wounded Captured Total
or Missing
1st Brigade 45 200 1 246
2nd Brigade 23 69 - 92
3rd Brigade 43 171 21 235
Cavalry 3 6 9
Artillery 4 2 6
TOTAL 118 448 22 588
Confederate Forces39"
(Jackson's Division)
Command Killed Wounded Captured Total
or Missing
Garnett's Brigade 40 168 153 361
Burks' Brigade 24 114 39 177
Fulkerson's Brigade 15 76 71 162
Cavalry 1 17 - 18
TOTAL 80 375 263 718
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IV. JACKSON BEGINS HIS OFFENSIVE
A. THE ROAD TO MCDOWELL
On the morning of 30 April, Jackson began the opening movement of his planned
offensive. From his base neaL Conrad's Store, where the army had been encamped
since 19 April, the Confederate commander started south through the Luray Valley
(MAP 8). Heavy rains and mountain snow had turned "the ordinary country road",
the area's main thoroughfare on which the army now found itself, into a virtual
quagmire, however, and progress was painfully slow.39 ' Many of the troops, and
even members of Jackson's personal staff, assisted in the movement of the supply
wagons and artillery which often sank to their axles in the deep mu~d that now
characterized the road. During that first day's march, the army advanced a distance
of only about 5 miles, to within 2 miles of Lewiston.3" The next day, in an effort
to speed the army's movement, trees along the route were felled, split, and placed
across the road as planking for a corduroy road.4"* Even with this engineering
effort, the Confederates still only made about 5 miles on 1 May By the end of the






of the most severe marches we had undergone,"'" the Confederate column reached
Port Republic and moved into camp at the entrance to Brown's Gap.
While Jackson's column was moving south, Ewell's division had occupied the
Valley Army's vacated camp near Conrad's Store. As he entered this new operating
area, Ewell had little information regarding either the enemy or the important
geography of the region. As was all too common during Civil War operations,
Jackson had apparently provided an inadequate intelligence update to his
geographical relief. Although Jedediah Hotchkiss had provided Ewell with a brief
summary of enemy sightings made from an observation post at the Masanutten on 30
April,4" this information was of a tactical nature and far from the comprehensive
assessment that Ewell really needed. In an attempt to become more familiar with the
area and the existing enemy situation, Ewell wrote to Jackson and asked what sources
the latter had been using to gain intelligence about the enemy. "I have been relying
on spies for my information from the enemy", Jackson replied."3
Although reliance on spies alone would hardly fill all of the intelligence gaps that
faced Ewell, the relative availability of potential spies in areas close to or under
Federal occupation could not be overlooked. Indeed, Confederate spies, acting both
in organized networks and simply as opportunities arose, were quite active against
the Federals during this period. Through these spies and various local informants,
"
0 1Worsham, 61.
402Hotchkiss, 34. Diary entry for 30 April.
4 030.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 878. Jackson to Ewell from headquarters at Brown's Gap, 3
May 1862.
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Ewell would become familiar with the area of operations and remain apprised of
Federal troop locations and movements. John Anderson, a sergeant of the Union's 2d
Massachusetts, related that while his regiment was in camp at Columbia Bridge in the
Luray Valley, they were visited by an old man who claimed to be a former resident
of Massachusetts. Singing songs with the Northern soldiers and relating various
anecdotes about his life in Massachusetts, the visitor spent the night gathering
information about the Federal troops. "Passing through the Regiments of our camp
and learning the exact strength of our command he was prepared the next morning
to give Genl. Stonewall Jackson the information that could only be found out by a
spy. We afterwards learned that this was the old man Lawrence of Harper's-ferry that
cursed us when our regiment first took possession of that town.'U•4
In addition to the number of spies that could be employed to observe the enemy,
Ewell would rely on Confederate cavalry to track the movements of the Federal forces.
Jackson had left the capable Col. Turner Ashby to watch Banks and to act as a screen
for Jackson's own movements. Two Confederate cavalry regiments, Col. Thomas
Munford's 2d Virginia and Col. Thomas Flournoy's 6th Virginia, had also
accompanied Ewell across the Blue Ridge and would now be used to augment other
intelligence collection assets in the region.
On 3 May, in a surprising move to many of the Confederate soldiers, Jackson left
Ewell's division at Conrad's Store and marched the Army of the Valley east, through
Brown's Gap. As Jackson's troops "...marched across the Blue Ridge to the Central
'Anderson MS.
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Railroad near Meechum's Depot,' many of the soldiers assumed that they were
leaving the Valley for good. A movement to reinforce Johnston's besieged army at
Richmond had long been rumored and, with the relief by Ewell's division and the
crossing of the Blue Ridge, this now seemed like the logical objective of the present
operation.
This eastward march, however, was actually part of a major deception by Jackson.
Although the Confederate commander had made great use of local inhabitants as
spies and informants, Jackson also realized that not all of the Valley's civilian
population were friendly to the Southern cause. Some Unionist elements were
continually passing information to the Federals despite the restrictive measures
Jackson had placed on the movements and daily activities of civilians in the region.
Additionally, despite Ashby's extensive cavalry screen, some Northern scouts might
still be able to breach Confederate security measures for reconnaissance against the
Army of the Valley. Although Jackson, as an extreme disciple of operational security,
had maintained strict silence about his true intentions, he now used the open
movement of his force as a means of deceiving the enemy. Jackson believed that
news of his departure from the Valley would surely reach Banks and the Union
commander would logically presume that the Confederates had moved towvards
Richmond for the contest against Gen. McClellan's Federal Army of the Potomac.
On the morning of the 4th, the Southern troops began boarding the trains which
had been. waiting at the depot. However, to the amazement of most of the
41SWorsham, 63.
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Confederates, the trains moved west across the Blue Ridge and back towards the
Shenandoah Valley. Staunton, not Richmond, was the destination of the Confederate
force. Only now did Jackson's army, including most of his staff, realize that the
previous day's march had been a ruse to mislead the enemy. When the Southern
advance reached Staunton at around 11:00 a.m., the town's inhabitants were elatedly
shocked.'0" Word had already reached them of the Confederate evacuation of the
Valley the previous day and, in keeping with Jackson's deceptive intentions, the
civilians had surmised that the town was being abandoned to sure occupation by the
Federals. If the Union military commanders could be deceived as easily, Jackson
would increase his chance of surprising the enemy. As the first load of Confederates
debarked at the station in Staunton, the trains were rapidly turned around to pick up
the rest of the army, which had begun the westward movement on foot. Winder's
Stonewall Brigade boarded the cars at Afton and finally arrived in Staunton by about
5:00 p.m. that afternoon."°7 While his brigades were being shuttled to the town,
Jackson established his headquarters in the Virginia Hotel and began conferring with
Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson, commander of the Army of the Northwest."'" Johnson
reported that the Federal forces opposing him were continuing an eastward advance







information was in turn passed to Gen. Ewell with the guidance to "...prevent Banks
giving assistance to the forces in front of Johnson."
Gen. Banks, whose Federal force was still in Harrisonburg, had been receiving
various information regarding the probable intentions of the Confederate enemy. On
1 May, Gen. Williams, the commander of Banks' 1st Division, stated that citizens of
Harrisonburg had reported that Southern forces under Johnson were planning to
attack the Federal right flank while Jackson assailed their front. Although Williams
admitted that he placed little confidence in the accuracy of these reports, he felt that
some enemy action was afoot."' At Columbia Bridge in the Luray Valley, Col.
Sullivan, the local Union commander, informed Banks that refugees believed Jackson
had no intention of attacking the Federals at all unless Banks attempted to divide his
command or move east to reinforce Gen. McDowell.4 "
Despite these conflicting assessments by his subordinates, Banks had been able to
successfully track some of Jackson's initial movements. From his headquarters at
New Market, Banks wrote to both the War Department in Washington and to Gen.
Fremont in the neighboring Mountain Department on 2 May that Jackson had moved
south from Conrad's Store and had probably reached Port Republic on the 1st. "His
destination either Waynesboro or Staunton. If latter place, possibly to join Johnson
4
" O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 879. Jackson to Ewell from White Hall 4 May.
'
1
°Banks MS. Letter of 1 May from 1st Division Headquarters in Harrisonburg to
Banks.
4
.. Ibid. 1 May message from Col. Sullivan to Banks.
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and attack Milroy."u' However, after Jackson's crossing of the Blue Ridge on the
3d, Banks remained generally confused as to the Confederates' whereabouts and
intentions. On the 4th, Banks was still "...confident that Jackson's force is near Port
Republic, and Ewell's division at Elk Run Church...., 13  By 6 May, Banks now
surmised that "Ewell's division seems intended to replace Jackson's force, which is
greatly demoralized and broken."4"'
Ashby's cavalry was acting as an effective screen to Jackson's movements and
contributed to Federal confusion over Jackson's intentions. While the location of
Jackson's main body thus eluded Federal detection, the presence of Confederate
cavalry and scouts plagued the Union commanders. From Harrisonburg, Lt. Galwey
of the 8th Ohio noted the near constant Confederate cavalry presence and wrote that
"Alarms are sounded every night. Jackson is moving somewhere all the time he is as
lively as a flea."'"• In the wake of a skirmish between the 5th New York Cavalry
and Ashby's mounted Confederates on 7 May, Banks wrote that "The enemy does not
show himself except by cavalry. We shall make most vigorous efforts to discover his
position. His chief object will doubtless be to prevent a junction of forces on this
412 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 126. Information to this effect had been reported to Banks
in letters of 1 May from Col. Sullivan at Columbia Bridge and from cavalry
headquarters at Harrisonburg on the 2d. these original letters are found in Banks MS.
413Ibid, 132.
'
14Ibid. 136 -137. 6 May message from Banks to Stanton.
4
•sThomas Francis Galwey, Manuscript. Memoir, 1861-1864. Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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line with General McDowell.""' From the Federal outpost at Columbia Bridge, Col.
Sullivan complained that Jackson's scouts were "...becoming bolder and ever
venturesome..."'4 while Col. Geary, the Federal commander at Rectortown, noted the
absence of any identifiable enemy units in the area but added that "Guerillas however
still hover about the neighborhood.""18
Gen. Fremont passed Banks' warning of 2 May to Brig. Gen. Milroy, whose Federal
brigade was in the vicinity of Monterey. Advising Milroy to remain vigilant, Fremont
told his subordinate to "...keep your scouts and reconnoitering parties actively
engaged."41' Milroy, however, remained generally confident about his prospects for
continuing on the offensive. His brigade had been able to slowly but consistently
push the Confederates of Edward Johnson's Army of the Northwest back towards
Staunton and Milroy saw the capture of this town as increasingly attainable. During
the last week of April, the Federal brigade commander had sent a single cavalry
company and six infantry companies on a reconnaissance towards Westview and
believed that this small force had almost been able to cause Johnson to retreat
towards Staunton. On 1 May, Milroy confidently wrote that "Information received
from scouts, deserters, and refugees is that Johnson's force is at Westview, 6 miles
west of Staunton, ready to retreat upon any advance by us and rapidly gathering all
"416O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 456.
417Banks MS. 1 May mess.. ! from Col. Sulli,:an, commanding at Columbia
Bridge, to Banks.
"'
8Ibid. 1 May message from Geary to Banks.
4190.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 133.
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the militia, subsistence, forage, and transportation he can and sending it east."'
Had Milroy known of Jackson s arrival in Staunton on the 4th, he might have changed
his optimistic assessment.
The day after his meeting with Johnson, Jackson began active intelligence
collection operations in the area to determine the true nature of the enemy situation.
On 5 May, Jedediah Hotchkiss was sent to Johnson's headquarters for an initial
briefing and then, because of the topographer's general familiarity with the region,
was dispatched on a reconnaissance to discern the enemy's location and disposition.
Hotchkiss travelled to Dry Branch Gap in Big North Mountain and then moved
northeast along Crawford Mountain. From the later position, he was able to view a
Union outpost located near Cross' and, after making appropriate notes on the
situation, reported this information back to Johnson's headquarters." On the 6th,
Hotchkiss and Col. Williamson of the engineer corps, again went to observe the
enemy camp at Cross' but found that the Federals had departed. The information
from this two day reconnaissance was related to Jackson upon the engineers' return
to Staunton later that day.?22
In addition to the news from Hotchkiss and Williams, Jackson was apparently
receiving other reports concerning the status of the various Federal forces throughout
the district. Because of the relative proximity of Banks' and Fremont's forces to one
'
0Ibid, 123. Milroy's official report of events before the Battle of McDowell.
42Hotchkiss, 37. Diary entry for 5 May.
'Ibid. Diary entry for 6 May.
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another and to Jackson, the Confederate commander had to remain intimately aware
of the status of all enemy forces in the region. On 5 May Jackson wrote to Ewell,
whose troops were still in the Luray Valley, that Banks' Federal troops had left
Harrisonburg and might be on their way towards the town of Warm Springs for a
possible rendezvous with Milroy's Federal brigade. Capt. Winfield of the Southern
cavalry was dispatched to determine the enemy's movements with instructions to
inform both Jackson and Ewell of the results.' The following day, Jackson sent
another message to Ewell in which he confirmed the Federal evacuation of
Harrisonburg but now related that, according to a civilian source that had been in the
town, this enemy force was withdrawing towards Strasburg. The Confederate chief
advised Ewell to watch Banks' division closely and to keep him informed of its
movementsY. In a letter to Ewell on the 7th, Jackson also asked the junior general
if the enemy had left the area around Columbia Bridge and urged Ewell to determine,
by closely following Banks down the Valley, whether the Federals planned to cross
the Blue Ridge for the east. To aid Ewell in discerning Union intentions, Jackson
introduced Ewell to "...a spy named McVicar, whom you can send to Front Royal to
ascertain whether the enemy leave the Valley."" As a further reminder, Jackson





enjoined Ewell not to "...leave the Valley so long as Banks is in it, and I am on the
expedition of which I spoke to you.'42
While both belligerents employed various means to dispel the inherent fog of war
and to determine enemy intentions, Jackson continued overt preparations for his
advance against the Federals. On the 5th, the Corps of Cadets from the Virginia
Military Institute joined the rest of Jackson's army in Staunton. Although Jackson
planned to use the cadets only as part of his reserve, their inclusion in active field
operations underscored the importance that the Southern commander placed on the
upcoming contest and on his attempts to concentrate a superior force against the
enemy 7 While in Staunton, many of the soldiers were also issued supplies and
reequipped for the upcoming advance. Even Jackson himself received a new uniform
to replace the faded VMI professor's garb that he had habitually worn in the field.'
The Army of the Valley marched west from Staunton on the 6th and linked up
with Johnson's Army of the Northwest about noon that day at Westview.? The
combined Confederate force now numbered about 9,000 men. While Johnson
maintained an advance to the west, the majority of the troops were placed into camp
near Buffalo Gap for the night.
42Jackson MS, Letters, 223. Also O.R., Vol.12, Pt. 3, 882.
47Ibid, 222.
42Hotchkiss, 37. Diary entry for 5 May.
42Worsham, 63.
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"On the morning of 7 May General Johnson, whose familiarity with that mountain
region and whose high qualities as a soldier admirably fitted him for the advance,
moved with his command in the direction of the enemy...."' The Southern forces
encountered several small Federal outposts near the intersection of the Harrisonburg
and Parkersburg turnpikes, but these were easily driven off." The Federals at each
of these outposts had fled so quickly that they abandoned baggage and equipment
which Jackson felt would have been "...about enough for a regiment."'4 3 In the wake
of these skirmishes, the Confederates could see the Federals retreating towards the
crest of "...Shenandoah Mountain where Fort Johnson had been erected and occupied
by the Confederates during the preceding winter."u3 Suspecting that the Union
troops might use this position as a likely point of defense, Jackson quickly dispatched
two of his trusted staff members to perform a hasty reconnaissance of the mountain's
crest. Jedediah Hotchkiss was sent up a spur on the right while Col. Williamson led
a small group of scouts along the left flank. After reaching the crest, both
reconnaissance parties converged on the former Confederate earthworks and the gap
through which the turnpike passed over the mountain. The Union troops were gone,
however, and the Confederate advance continued after Hotchkiss had signalled back
43O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 471. Jackson official report of actions before McDowell.
"°
1 R.L. Dabney,Life and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas 1. Jackson (Stonewall
Jackson) (reprint, Harrisonburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1983) 341.
320.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 884. Jackson to Ewell, 5:10 a.m. 8 May.
'
3Jedediah Hotchkiss, Manuscript. Papers, 1838-1908. Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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to Jackson that the route was clear."4 As the Confederates crossed Shenandoah
Mountain, soldiers in the Southern ranks "...could see a long line of the enemy in
position on the opposite mountain,' Shaw's Ridge.
The local Federal commander, Brig. Gen. Milroy, had not been idle during the
Southern advance. Earlier on the 6th, the Union brigadier had sent large detachments
from the 3d West Virginia, 32d Ohio and 75th Ohio to Shaw's Ridge to protect the
reconnaissance and forage parties operating in that area." On the morning of the
7th, Federal scouts confirmed rumors that Jackson had, in fact, joined forces with
Johnson and that the combined Confederate army was advancing towards McDowell.
Accordingly, Milroy issued orders for all Federal units to concentrate at McDowell
and began making preparations to defend that place. As Southern troops crossed
Shenandoah Mountain in pursuit of Union pickets on the afternoon of the 7th,
Federal observers on Shaw's Ridge reported the enemy's location to Milroy who then
sent a section of Capt. Henry Hyman's 9th Ohio Battery to shell the Confederates.
Despite some light resistance by Federal artillery, the Confederate advance up
Shaw's Ridge was reminiscent of the movement against Shenandoah Mountain.
Hotchkiss and Williamson again "...rendered valuable service""" by leading
reconnaissance scouts against the enemy flanks. Faced with this two-pronged probe,
'Hotchkiss, 38.
"°'Worsham, 64.
"'O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 465. Milroy's official report of actions before McDowell.
"'
7Ibid, 473. Jackson's official report.
180
the Federals again withdrew before the Southerners reached the summit. After
Hotchkiss had signalled that the position was clear, Johnson's advance force moved
to Shaw's Fork while the rest of the Confederate troops went into camp for the night
at the eastern base of Shaw's Ridge.'38
Early on the morning of 8 May, the Confederates resumed their advance. The main
Southern column moved unopposed up Shaw's Ridge"' in the same marching order
as the day before. The Army of the Northwest, with the 2d Brigade in advance and
the 1st Brigade immediately behind"4 ', led the line of march followed by Jackson's
2d Brigade, 3d Brigade, the VMI cadet corps, and the Stonewall Brigade."' To
ensure proper warning of any potential contact with the retreating Federals, Hotchkiss
was sent forward on a route reconnaissance of the turnpike. During the winding
climb up Bull Pasture Mountain, the topographer "...signaled back from each turn in
the road and the head of the army advanced more rapidly than up the direct courses
of the road in crossing the other ridges."'"
Upon reaching the top of Bull Pasture Mountain, the main body of the Confederate
force was halted."3 Because of his general familiarity with the region and some
'Hotchkiss, 39. Diary entry of 7 May.
"
09Ibid. Diary entry of 8 May.
"441O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 486.
"441Worsham, 64.
"42 Hotchkiss MS.
4 3O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 471. Jackson's report.
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topographic work performed near McDowell in 1861, Hotchkiss was summoned by
Jackson to provide information about the area's terrain."' The topographer led his
commander to a vantage point which offered a good view of the area and briefed
Jackson on some of the more important aspects of the military geography. This
information was then supplemented with a detailed sketch map which the staff
officer produced on the spot. Armed with this initial information, Generals Jackson
and Johnson, along with selected members of their staffs and about 30 infantrymen
to act as security, then continued onward about another 2 miles to perform a
commanders' reconnaissance of the enemy position at McDowell."' From the
heights of Sitlington's Hill, an independent western spur off of Bull Pasture
Mountain, the Confederates had a clear view of the Federal positions. Two Union
infantry regiments were noted in line of battle on Phoenix Hull's Hill, across the
turnpike from the Confederate observers,4" and a "considerable force of infantry"
was seen in the small valley around the town itself.'47 Additionally, an enemy
artillery battery, with supporting infantry, was observed on a ridge about 1 mile to
the front. A small group of Federal skirmishers soon noted the Confederate leaders
and their staffs, however, and fired upon the Southern party.4"s The Federals,
".'Hotchkiss MS. Detailed post-war account of his participation in the McDowell
operation written for Col. Henderson's book on Jackson.
"4450.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 483. Gen. Edward Johnson's official battle report.
"446Hotchkiss, 40.
"4470.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 471. Jackson.
"44'Hotchkiss, 39.
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though, were easily driven off by the Confederate infantrymen who had accompanied
the Southern generals.
Following this reconnaissance of the Union position, the Confederate commander
decided to wait until the following morning to initiate an attack on Milroy's force.
Jackson had recognized that the Federal positions commanded the road along which
Southern artillery would have to be moved for any immediate attack on
McDowell."' Therefore, Jackson had decided to occupy and hold the favorable
position on Sitlington's Hill, construct a passable route for the movement of artillery
up the hill, and open his attack at dawn on the 9th."0 Although some light
skirmishing with the Federals might be expected throughout the 8th, a general
engagement would be reserved for the following day. In preparation for the next day's
battle, Johnson's brigades were ordered forward to occupy Sitlington's Hill.451
Additionally, Jedediah Hotchkiss was tasked with finding a suitable route for the
movement of artillery from the turnpike to the crest of the hill.45 2 The remainder
of the Confederate units were to be placed in camp for the night along the turnpike
and moved forward before dawn. Although Jackson himself remained at the base of
"4490.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 473. Jackson.




the hill to confer with Gen. Johnson, his staff then retired to Wilson's, about 2 miles
from Sitlington's Hill, where headquarters was established."
During the Confederate movement towards McDowell, Jackson had clearly
demonstrated competent use and management of his intelligence effort. As the chief
operational commander and planner, Jackson had focused his intelligence collection
only on those things that were important to the successful completion of the
operation. The location and disposition of Milroy's force had been the primary
concern for Jackson and he had consistently used scouts and staff officers in a
reconnaissance role to discern this information. Jackson had also remained well
aware of the potential threat offered by Banks' presence in Harrisonburg. If Banks
was "...bold enough he could readily move forward to Staunton, as he was nearer to
that point than Jackson himself ..... , 4 Accordingly, the Confederate commander had
maintained good communications to subordinates such as Gen. Ewell, who had been
placed on Banks' flank to threaten and watch the Federals from the east, and Col.
Ashby, whose heavy cavalry screen between Harrisonburg and Staunton would
prevent the Federals from knowing the true whereabouts of Jackson's command and
would provide ample warning of any Federal advance to the south.
Jackson's recognition of the potential impact of intelligence on an operational
commander's planning had led him to undertake the major deception effort offered
"'
3Hotchkiss MS.
"`Ibid. Postwar transcript (1 April 1882) of statement by Capt. H.M. Bell,
Confederate Post Quartermaster at Staunton.
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by the eastward march across the Blue Ridge. The difficulty of the march, the
apparent logic of an eastward move, and the subsequent geographic screening offered
by the Blue Ridge all helped to reinforce the misleading picture that Jackson created
for Federal consumption. While the inherent uncertainty of war always served to
mystify an opponent, well-conceived and executed deception could lead an enemy
commander to a firmly held, but incorrect, conclusion.
To fulfill the various intelligence requirements that developed during the
movement towards McDowell, the Confederate commander had maintained
centralized control over the various intelligence assets that were available. Although
Johnson, Ewell, and Ashby all had their own intelligence collection capabilities and
priorities, Jackson had consistently issued guidance that kept these assets focused
towards the same operational goal. Rather than allowing a diffusion of collection and
analysis, Jackson had been the driving force in the direction of the intelligence effort
towards a unified and coherent picture of the operational enemy situation through the
fusion of all available reporting. and had then disseminated this assessment to his
subordinates.
Conversely, Union intelligence had lacked the centralized focus and control that
had characterized the Confederate effort. Because the forces under Banks and
Fremont were operating independently, under different operational assumptions, and
with potentially different operational objectives, the intelligence effort of the Union
forces had also remained decentralized and uncoordinated. Additionally, the lack of
cleariy and energetically stated operational objectives and intelligence collection goals
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by the Federal commanders had led to lackluster analysis and incorrect conclusions
regarding Confederate whereabouts and intentions. Although some warning had been
provided to Fremont of a possible westward movement by Jackson, the Federal
commander of the Mountain Department had failed to focus any intelligence efforts
towards determining the validity of this assessment. Milroy, the local Union
commander, had capably responded to tactical reports of the enemy's presence in his
front by increasing his own reconnaissance efforts but his ability to resist the
Confederate advance had been minimal owing to the scattered nature of his force.
B. THE BAITLE OF MCDOWELL
The eighth of May would see far more action than the simple skirmishing
predicted by Jackson. As the Army of the Northwest's 2d Brigade, under Col. Scott,
arrived at Sitlington's Hill, Johnson quickly assigned his regiments into position. "On
the top of that hill there was a crest or ridge, running from north to south, except
about midway, where the ground was not above the ordinary level of the hill.''5"
The 52d Virginia, the first regiment to arrive on the scene, was placed on the extreme
left and deployed as skirmishers."° The 58th Virginia was placed on the right while
the 44th Virginia was ordered to hold the center."' Almost as soon as they arrived
4 5O0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 485. Col. Scott's report.
"41 Ibid, 483. Report of Gen. Johnson. Also 471 Jackson. Because Jackson remained
absent from the field during the battle, the senior Confederate commander was forced
to base those portions of his report which were concerned with the combat of 8 May
largely upon the input of subordinates. While Jackson's and Johnson's reports
parallel one another, only one reference will be given for specific details.
"45'Ibid, 485. Scott.
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on the scene, the Confederate troops received fire from enemy skirmishers and
artillery. In order to protect his men against the Federal artillery fire and to take full
advantage of the available terrain, Col. Scott deployed the soldiers of his brigade in
pairs of skirmishers with about 5 yards between each pair of men (MAP 9).""
Milroy, the Federal commander at McDowell, had become aware of the growing
Confederate presence on Sitlington's Hill as soon as the initial Southern
reconnaissance party had been sighted by his skirmishers.4"' To harass the
Confederate position, Milroy had ordered a section of the 9th Ohio Battery to begin
shelling the hill and dispatched a small group of skirmishers to assail the enemy's left
and determine the size of the Confederate force. Although the Union guns would
continue to shell the Southern position throughout most of the day, the high angle of
fire and the shelter provided by the hill's geography prevented any serious effect.4'"
The 12th Georgia, as the first regiment of Johnson's 1st Brigade to arrive on the
scene, was now placed in the center of the Confederate line, on the crest of the hill,
directly facing the main Federal position. The 58th Virginia was moved to the left,
supporting the skirmishers of the 52d Virginia, and the 44th Virginia was moved to
the edge of a slight ravine, as the anchor of the Confederate right."'l
"48Ibid.




At around 10:00 a.m., Federal reinforcements arrived at McDowell."62 After
receiving word on the 7th that Milroy was being pressed by the combined
Confederate force, Brig. Gen. Schenck had left his cumbersome supply wagons with
a small guard force and had marched his brigade 34 miles in 23 hours to reach
McDowell.4"3 With only about 1550 men in his brigade, Schenck realized that he
brought relatively little additional strength to the Federal position (TABLE 5A). Upon
his arrival, Schenck found Milroy's "...regiments of infantry partly in line of battle in
the plain at McDowell, covering some of the various approaches from the mountain,
and partly disposed as skirmishers on the heights in front, and his batteries in
position, expecting momentarily that the enemy would attempt to descend into the
valley to attack him under cover of artillery that might be brought forward to
command the place from different points."'" The newly arrived Union general's
initial observations were enough to convince him that McDowell was "...indefensible
altogether, by the unanimous agreement of officers, in our present conditions and
with our relative forces.""" Although Schenck, using the available intelligence
about the enemy and the surrounding geography, had decided on a withdrawal as the
best course of action, he also thought that some type of preemptive attack might help
to break contact with the enemy and delay any Confederate pursuit. As the senior
'6lbid, 465. Milroy.




51bid, 461. Message from Schenck to Fremont at 11:30 p.m. 8 May.
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Union Brig. Gen. on the scene, Schenck now had overall responsibility for future
Federal actions. Owing to Milroy's greater familiarity with the area, however, and the
previous disposition of Federal forces, Schenck decided to allow Milroy to retain
command of any forces that might be actively engaged on the field while Schenck
himself would exercise control over the general course of Federal actions.
Throughout the rest of the morning, the Federals continued light shelling and
skirmishing against the Confederates on Sitlington's Hill. Maj. Long, of the 75th
Ohio, was dispatched with a group of skirmishers to probe the Confederate position
and determine the location and strength of the enemy line.' Information provided
by Long would allow the Union generals to make a better decision as to when and
where any attack might be launched. Although the Federal skirillishers acted to
harass the Southerners, Johnson's ability to hold the hill was never in question
throughout the morning.
At around 2:00 p.m., the Federals increased their pressure against the Confederates.
Col. Nathaniel C. MacLean formned seven companies of the 75th Ohio and nine
companies of the 25th Ohio at the base of the hill and began to advance against the
Confederate right.467  With the men of the 25th Ohio deployed forward as
skirmishers and the 75th Ohio following in line of battle, the Union soldiers advanced
over ground that was "...entirely destitute of protection either from trees or rocks, and
so steep that the men were at times compelled to march either to one side or the other
"'Ibid, 465. Milroy.
"'Ibid, 468. MacLean's post-battle report.
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in order to make the ascent.'"'8 The terrain of the hill, with its steep convex slope
and generally circular shape, often concealed the opposing lines until they were
relatively close to one another.4" Although the fire from the Confederate line
initially stalled the Federal advance, the two Ohiu regiments continued to deliver a
heavy fire against the Southerners and forced them back from the military crest of the
hill. MacLean's men moved forward to the former Confederate position but were
again halted by the Southerners who had fallen back to a secondary line near the
hill's geographic crest.
With the pressure against his right increasing, Johnson called the remaining two
regiments of the Army of the Northwest to the scene of the fighting (TABLE 5B).
Both the 25th Virginia and the 31st Virginia, which had been posted near the turnpike
at the bottom of the hill, were brought to the top of Sitlington's Hill and posted on
the threatened right.47" Additionally, upon hearing the increased fire from the
battlefield, Brig. Gen. Taliaferro moved his brigade down the turnpike to a closer
supporting position from which he could move to Johnson's aid if needed."71 With
the addition of fresh troops and the inherent natural strength of their secondary
position, the Confederates easily stabilized their line. Col. MacLean noted that "The
""Ibid.
"4Ibid. Also 471 Jackson. In the reports of various commanders, reference is made





enemy were in position on top of the mountain entirely screened from our view, and
the conformation of the ridge permitted them to deliver their fire with only the
exposure of a small portion of their bodies, and in reloading they were entirely
protected from our fire by the crest of the hill."''r Still, the two Federal regiments
continued to slug it out with the Confederate line for about an hour and a half with
neither side making any substantial headway towards dislodging the other.
At around 3:00 p.m., Capt. George R. Latham, of the 2d West Virginia, reported to
Milroy that the Confederates were attempting to place an artillery battery on a
commanding position atop the hill."' Although there is little evidence to support
the truth of Latham's assertion, his report influenced Milroy's next decision. Other
Federal scouts had reported enemy reinforcements, probably Johnson's remaining two
regiments, arriving at the wooded area on the right of the Confederate position.47'
To further determine Confederate intentions, Milroy now requested permission to
make a reconnaissance in force--actually an attack--against the Southern line.4"
Schenck approved the junior brigadier's proposal and assigned three additional
regiments to assist the two Ohio uLnits already engaged. The 82d Ohio, 32d Ohio, and
3d West Virginia were detailed to Milroy for this work. Additionally, one 6-pounder






Federal left to assist in the attack. Although two more-powerful 12-pounder guns
were also detailed to support this offensive push, delays in moving them into position
prevented their effective use.""
Gen. Johnson was on a personal reconnaissance near a slight hill to the right of the
44th Virginia, the unit anchoring the Confederate right flank, when the Union troops
opened their attack at 4:30 p.m. against the Southern right and center. 17 The
opposing lines delivered a heavy volume of fire into each other as the Federals moved
up the steep slope. The sounds of the battle were heard for miles around.
Topographic engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss, 2 miles away at army headquarters, clearly
heard the opening of the Federal attack and quickly rode to rejoin Jackson onl the
tuinpike near the base of the hill.'"' At Crab Orchard, 15 miles from McDowell, on
the eastern slope of Cheat Mountain, one Federal soldier on picket duty noted in his
diary that the sounds of battle could easily be heard from his distant position."79
As the sounds of battle became general and more intense, Jackson dispatched
Hotchkiss to the hilltop to determine the status of the now raging battle.'8 ° Jackson
47 'lbid.
'Ibid, 483. Johnson.
4 7 8Hotchkiss MS.
479Thomas Evans, Manuscript. Transcript diary, 1862-1863. Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Diary entry of 8 May. Evans, who was a
member of the lone company of the 25th Ohio not present at the battle, further stated
that the officer in charge of the unit declined suggestions to march towards the sound




also ordered Taliaferre's brigade to reinforce Johnson's position atop Sitlington's
Hill." 1
Upon their arrival, Taliaferro's regiments were quickly thrown into the Confederate
line to repel the Federal assault."2 To support Johnson's 25th Virginia, which was
running low on ammunition, the 23d Virginia was deployed for-ward along the crest
of the hill. The 37th Virginia was sent to the extreme right flank and immediately
charged heaculong down the slope in an effort to break up the attacking Union
formation that was threatening to collapse the Confederate flank. The 10th Virginia
was divided into two formations to provide support to different areas along the line.
Four companies were dispatched to support the Confederate center between the 5.d
Virginia and the 12th Georgia. Accompanied by elements of the 52d, these four
companies moved down the hill a short distance and delivered a withering enfilade
fire into the right flank of the attacking Union troops. The remaining six companies
of the 10th Virginia moved to the right of the recently arrived 23d Virginia.
Taliaferro's fresh troops were enough to repel the initial Union assault and steady the
Southern lines (MAP 10).
As Johnson realized that the immediate threat caused by the Federal attack had
diminished, Taliaferro's regiments were moved into more advantageous positions.
The 23d Virginia was now sent to support the 12th Georgia in the Confederate center.
Following their successful charge against the Federals and return back up the hill, the




37th Virginia was positioned in the void left by the 23d Virginia. The four companies
of the 10th Virginia which had been sent to aid the 12th Georgia now rejoined their
regiment which was posted on a small eminence protecting the right and rear of the
Southern line.""
Although the initial Union assault had been repulsed, the fighting continued to be
heavy along the opposing lines. Around 6:30 p.m."" Jackson ordered the regiments
of Campbell's brigade to support Johnson. The 1st Virginia (Irish) Bn. led Campbell's
line of march, followed by the 48th Virginia and 21st Virginia, while the 42d Virginia
brought up the rear."S As the column moved along the turnpike towards the path
leading up the hill, the Southern troops came under fire by Federal skirmishers. After
the commanding officer of the 4Sth Virginia was wounded and the two senior
captains declined the position, the adjutant, Lt. Hale, assumed command of the
regiment. Hale then led the unit up the hill and formed to the left of the 12th
Georgia and in front of the 58th Virginia, which was running low on ammunition.
The 1st Virginia (Irish) Bn. also moved to support the 58th. To guard the point where
the path leading up Sitlington's Hill met the turnpike, the best route for retreat in
case of a Confederate reversal, the 21st Virginia was formed in line of battle across
"483lbid.
"4"Ibid, 480. Report of Capt. Leigh, commanding the 1st Virginia (Irish) Bn.
Although some of Campbell's subordinates disagree as to the exact time the
movement began, 6:30 p.m. would keep this movement in a logical chronology with
the rest of the action taking place.
"481lbid, 478. Report of Lt. Hale, adjutant and acting commander of the 48th
Virginia.
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the road.'" Finally, the 42d Virginia was positioned to the right of the 44th Virginia
and, therefore, now formed the extreme right of the Confederate position.4"7
As darkness began to fall, the level of firing began to diminish. Union forces
continued their attempts to advance against the Confederate left, however, and around
twilight one Federal unit was able to use the diminishing light to advance to within
50 yards of the 58th Virginia before being discovered and repulsed.`" Although the
moon was shining that night, the light was still insufficient for accurate firing."8 9
Instead, the opposing soldiers were often guided in their firing simply by the muzzle
flashes from enemy rifles.
At around 8:00 p.m., Brig. Gen. Johnson was wounded in the leg by Federal rifle
fire.4' Because Jackson had remained with those units posted along the turn-)ike
throughout the day, Johnson had been the senior Confederate comma nder on the field
during the battle. With his wound rendering him unfit for further service on the
field, Johnson passed command to Taliaferro.
After four hours of combat, most of the Federal regiments were beginning to run
low on ammunition. Although Schenck dispatched three ordnance wagons to
resupply Milroy's troops, the difficulties of passing the ammunition up the steep hill
"4"Worsham, 64.
"
70.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 477. Report of Maj. Lane, commanding the 42d Virginia.
4" Ibid, 486. Scott.
"
4Ibid, 469. MacLean.
49 Ibid, 483. Johnson.
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from the wagons slowed this effort.49" Presented with the problem of ammunition
resupply and the obvious lack of Federal offensive progress, Milroy decided to break
off the attack."92 Shortly after 9:00 p.m., the four Federal regiments that had taken
part in the attack reformed on the road at the base of the hill and marched back to
McDowell. Schenck deployed the 5th West Virginia to support the other Union units
during the withdrawal but no Confederate counterattack developed."'
For the next several hours, the Confederates on Sitlington's Hill remained in
position ready to repel any further Federal attacks. Although the Northerners' fire
had ceased, it remained unclear if they were preparing for another attack or had
withdrawn from the field. Evidence of a Federal withdrawal became evident,
however, when the Confederates observed "...extensive camp fires beyond the river
and [Federal] artillery was heard moving off toward their rear."'"' As the night
continued, Southern soldiers could also see the enemy burning some supplies in the
town."95 At 2:00 a.m. on the 9th, the Federal infantry began its withdrawal from the
town. Because this movement remained unchallenged by the Confederates, the










Schenck was forced to abandon some arms and ordnance which could not be
transported, the majority of Federal supplies were also successfully removed."
Most of the Confederate units remained on Sitlington's Hill throughout the night
with neither rations nor fires.497 At 11:30 p.m., realizing that the threat of a renewed
Federal attack had faded, Jackson ordered Taliaferro's brigade back to its wagons for
provisions.' The Army of the Northwest and Col. Campbell's 2d Brigade remained
on the hill until the next morning when they too were finally marched back to their
wagons for the issuance of rations."99
The battle itself had beer' - confusing, and poorly orchestrated fight for both sides.
While Jackson and Schenck, the senior commanders of the respective armies, exercised
general control over their forces, they played almost no role in determining the
outcome of the battle itself. Instead, both senior commanders had left the leadership
of forces engaged on the field of battle to subordinate offi.- Both the Federals and
Confederates had also failed to effectively concentrate their forces for any decisive
engagement. In each case, less than half of the available manpower was used for the
actual fighting. This lack of concentration had, in turn, been supplemented by a
general lack of coordination in bringing units into action.






In a general evaluation of the battle performance of each army, the Federals would
arguably have to be rated higher. By unexpectedly launching a preemptive spoiling
attack against the Confederates on Sitlington's Hill, the Northern commanders had
seized the tactical initiative and retained it throughout the battle. Further, by
maintaining this offensive spirit during the fight, the Union commanders had forced
Johnson to react to their own moves rather than allowing the Confederates to dictate
the terms of the clash. When the benefits of the attack were determined to be
diminishing, the Federals had successfully broken contact with the Southern enemy
and had begun their withdrawal unbothered by any immediate pursuit. Finally,
perhaps the best illustration of superior Federal performance on the tactical level was
the casualty list of the battle (TABLE 6). Although the Union troops had numbered
only about 6,000 compared to Jackson's force of 9,000, the Northern soldiers had
inflicted twice the number of casualties as they had suffered. Maj. Harman, Jackson's
ever critical quartermaster, provided a scathing assessment of the Southern
performance in a letter to his brother in which he charged that:
Wt have been worsted by miss-management. I am more than ever satisfied of
Jackson's incompetency...We have the battle-field but no victory. Our loss has
been severe and heavy.;0
Despite this tactical superiority by the Union force, the battle remained an
operational victory for the Confederates. While the Federals retreated northward, the
Confederates were left in possession of the field and remained generally unchecked
'Harman MS. Letter of 9 May to Maj. A.W. Harman, Comnandant of the
Confederate post at Staunton.
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in their advance against Fremont's scattered units. Jackson had successfully regained
the operational offensive and had brought his combined force into action against an
isolated, numerically inferior Federal unit.
Confederate intelligence efforts during the battle, like the course of the fighting
itself, had been generally inadequate. The most glaring shortcoming of course had
been Jackson's failure to recognize the possibility of a preemptive Union attack
against Sitlington's Hill. This failure to discern the enemy's intent had perhaps been
the major factor behind the Confederates' lack of force concentration and poor
coordination in bringing additional forces to the scene of the battle. Despite the
initial view of enemy dispositions from the vantage point on Sitlington's Hill and the
subsequent Federal skirmisher probes, Jackson had ignored the indications of a Union
attack and had instead concentrated on his plan for an attack against McDowell the
following day.
This shortcoming had been exacerbated by Jackson's detachment from the field of
battle throughout the fight. Although Brig. Gen. Johnson had capably deployed his
available units to meet each Federal threat, Jackson's immediate presence on the hill
would have allowed the senior Confederate commander to remain more attuned to the
tactical situation and to exploit potential opportunities by more efficient use of the
combined Confederate force. While the use of staff officers had helped to keep
Jackson informed about the general course of the battle, the Confederate commander
failed to keep himself in a position where his use of available intelligence would
have allowed him to positively influt.- :,,e course of the battle.
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Overall, the Confederates had failed to initiate any active tactical intelligence
during the battle. Instead of ordering skirmisher elements or reconnaissance parties
forward to locate any potential weaknesses in the disposition of the attacking Federal
formations, Johnson had assumed a static defensive position in which he merely
reacted to the Union assaults and moved his subordinate units to meet each new
threat. Thus, the Southerners relied almost exclusively on the reaction to unevaluated
tactical information rather than an overt effort to identify tactical opportunities
through the use of combat intelligence.
In contrast, Federal intelligence during the battle had been competently planned
and executed. The general intelligence assessment of the enemy situation and the
region's terrain had been the foundation for Schenck's decisions to withdrawal from
the area and to make a preemptive attack on the Confederate position. Skirmisher
parties and scouts had been specifically engaged to determine potential weak points
in the Confederate defense and information provided by these tactical reconnaissance
efforts had then provided the basis for decisions on when and where to attack the
enemy lines. Milroy had used intelligence provided by tactical observers as the basis
for his decisions to assault the Confederate position at 4:30 p.m. when it appeared that
the enemy threat might be growing and later to withdraw his forces from the hill
when it appeared that little progress was to be made by prolonging the attack.
Although Schenck had remained detached from the actual field of combat, the
communications between he and Milroy had been sufficient for the Federals to use
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their available forces to act upon opportunities and requirements suggested by tactical
intelligence.
C. THE PURSUIT TO FRANKLIN
The Federal retreat from McDowell remained organized and well-disciplined in the
wake of the battle. Brig. Gen. Schenck maintained effective control over his force and
began moving north for a junction with the rest of Fremont's army (MAP 11). "From
McDowell", Schenck stated, "I fell back by easy marches...the eneemy cautiously
pursuing.""' On the 9th, Schenck halted his command and prepared for battle on
a "commanding ridge" near the intersection of the McDowell and Monterey roads but
then continued his retrograde movement when no sizeable enemy force appeared in
his rear. Although most of the Confederate forces were still near McDowell, Jackson
had ordered cavalry under Capt. Sheetz to begin the pursuit.502 Later that day,
Confederate horsemen captured six Federal soldiers of the 55th Ohio who had been
left as rear guard pickets near the road intersection."3 Fear that 'The rebel cavalry
must soon be on us" helped to hasten the movements of other Federal pickets in
rejoining the main body of retreating Northern soldiers."4
501O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 464. Schenck.
'Ibid, 473. Jackson.
_W3Ibid, 491. Skirmish report of Col. John C. Lee, commander of the 55th Ohio.
The Federal picket had consisted of just 20 men under the command of Lt. R.F.
Patrick.
'"Evans MS. Diary entry for 9 May.
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In accordance with orders issued the previous evening by Jackson, jedediah
Hotchkiss set out at 3:00 i.m. on the 9th to determine whether the Federals had, in
fact, evacuated McDowell and, if not, to find an appropriate route for the movement
of artillery up Bull Pasture Mountain so that the battle could be resumed with a
Southern advantage."' 5 The infantry pickets who accompanied the staff officer soon
reported the enemy gone and this word was, in turn, relayed to Jackson. Hotchkiss
immediately began mapping the battlefield of the previous day and the area around
the Federal camp.' The topographer also accompanied Col. Crutchfield, Jackson's
Chief of Artillery, on a survey of the abandoned Federal equipment and ordnance at
McDowell.
Following the tough and poorly orchestrated little fight of the day before, the
Confederate commander allowed his troops a day of rest before beginning the pursuit
of the enemy.*' Sheetz' cavalry could harass, and hopefully delay, the Federals
until the Confederate infantry was ready to resume the march. On the morning of the
10th, the Confederates began their pursuit at an early hour, proceeding up the






towards the town of Franklin."'8 The VMI cadets and a small body of cavalry were
left behind to guard and transport the few Federal prisoners back to Staunton."
While Jackson began his pursuit of Schenck and Milroy, he remained well aware
of the potential threat offered by Banks' substantial force in the Valley. With only
Ashby's Confederate cavalry opposing him to the south, Banks might easily drive
towards Staunton and cut off Jackson's main supply and retreat routes. Alternatively,
Banks might seek to reinforce the fleeing Federals through any of the three passes
that linked the Valley with the area near Franklin. Jackson had issued strict orders
to the post quartermaster in Staunton for the withdrawal of supplies if Banks should
attempt a southward advance. However, Jackson did "...not think Banks will go to
Staunton...."" Although Banks clearly had the capability to seize Staunton, Jackson
had correctly deduced that this was not the Union commander's intent. Sometime
during the afternoon of the 10th, Jackson also took concrete action 'To prevent Banks
from re-enforcing Milroy ....." through any of the three mountain gaps which led from
the Alleghennies to the Shenandoah Valley.5" The Confederate general beckoned
to his trusted topographer Jedediah Hotchkiss and then led the staff officer a short
distance from the road on which the rest of the army was marching. In a hushed tone
Jackson tersely stated:
'lbid. Diary entry for 10 Mav.
5'O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 473. Jackson.
"
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'Harman MS. Letter of 9 May.
5110.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 472. Jackson.
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General Banks is in Harrisonburg, General Fremont is at Franklin, there is a
good road between them. Geii. Fremont ought to march to Gen. Banks but I
don't think he will do it, I want the road between them ... blockaded by
daylight tomorrow .... 5"
Hotchkiss was to "...blockade the roads through North River and Dry River Gaps,
while a detachment of cavalry obstructed the road through Brock's Gap."'13
Additionally, in order to keep Jackson informed about any enemy sightings and the
progress of the expedition, Hotchkiss was ordered to send couriers back to Jackson
hourly."1 •
By the morning of the 11th, the Confederate parties had successfully blocked the
assigned routes. The tangled obstacles which Hotchkiss created across the narrow
country roads would be difficult for any military force to remove quickly. As Gen.
Fremont later attempted to make the crossing he complained that "Bridges and
culverts had been destroyed, rocks rolled down, and in one instance trees felled across
the way for the distance of nearly a mile.""5 ' As part of his general scouting duties,
Hotchkiss had also sent word to Jackson of the presence of Federal cavalry in
Harrisonburg and near Muddy Creek on the Rawley Springs road.5"
"
5 Hotchkiss MS. Well written post-war recollection of Hotchkiss' service at
McDowell and during the subsequent pursuit.
1130.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 472. Jackson.
514Hotchkiss, 44. Diary entry for 10 May.




Also on the 11th, while the Confederates were engaged in the obstruction of the
passes, the retreating Federals had reached the vicinity of Franklin. Here Schenck
halted to await the arrival of reinforcements under Maj. Gen. Fremont and established
a strong blocking position in a "...narrow valley between the mountain hills .... 115 7
The heavily wooded hills on both sides of the town offered good protection along the
Federal flanks while the narrow valley in which the road was situated allowed tie
Federals to concentrate their defense. As an added protective measure, the Union
forces had also set fire to the woods on either side of their blocking position. The
arrival of Confederate forces near Franklin that afternoon was promptly reported to
Schenck by Federal scouts who had been posted about 2 miles forward of the
blocking position."ls The strength of the Federal position, combined with the effects
of the fire and smoke, prevented Jackson's force from continuing its advance. Union
artillery batteries, concealed from enemy observation by the heavy forest as well as
the effects of fire and smoke, occasionally shelled the Confederates, thereby forcing
the Southerners to maintain their distance from the Federal forces. Despite repeated
attempts by Confederate scouts and skirmishers to locate the enemy artillery









Although his pursuit of the Federals had been halted, Jackson did not immediately
break off his contact with the enemy forces near Franklin. Throughout 12 May the
Southerners remained in front of the Federal units. Jackson knew that Federal
reinforcements were on their way and decided to reconnoiter the enemy position
himself before continuing any offensive moves."2 0 Following this reconnaissance,
Jackson reasoned that:
The junction between Banks anid Milroy having been prevented, and becoming
satisfied of the impracticability of capturing the defeated enemy, owing to the
mountainous character of the country being favorable for a retreating army to
make its escape, I determined, as the enemy had made another stand at
Franklin, with a prospect of soon being re-enforced, that I would not attempt
to press farther, b- would return to the open country of the Shenandoah
Valley, hoping, through the blessing of Providence, to defeat Banks before he
should receive re-enforcements.!2 '
Because Sunday religious services had been omitted the previous day, Jackson ordered
divine services to be held throughout his command that afternoon.'-' Later that day,
Jackson also issued a letter of congratulations to his command for their victory at
McDowell." The soldiers were rested and supplies were reissued to the brigades.
'
200.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 887. Jackson to Ewell, 12 May.
"
52 1O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 473. Jackson.
'
22Hotchkiss, 45. Diary entry of 12 May.
"sJackson MS, Letters, 225.
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Aware that Fremont was now nearby with at least "seven dutch regiments",5 24
Jackson abandoned his position opposite Franklin on the morning of the i3th and
began "...falling back towards McDoweli.' 2- 5 At 10:00 a.m., Union Gen. Fremont,
who had "...anticipated while at New Creek...a movement of the enemy in this
direction ......, finally arrived in Franklin with his advance brigade. Yb Fremont had
departed New Creek on the 5th but had delayed any rapid movement towards
Franklin because of his own perceptions of the unpreparedness of his troops for
combat5 27 and such unnecessary proceedings as a general review of troops in
Petersburg on the 11th.i2  Despite the issuance on the 13th of Jackson's famous
marching orders,529 the Confederate troops only marched about 11 miles before
12 Harman MS. Letter dated 15 May 1863. The "dutch regiments" referred to were
probably Blenker's recently arrived regiments which contained large numbers of
German immigrants.
525Ibid.
5260.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 461. 16 May message of Fremont to Stanton.
12 Ibid, 8. Fremont's general report of operations in Virginia from March to June,
1862.
5'Jacob J. Frank, Manuscript. Diary, 1862. Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. Diary entry of 11 May by Jac-ib J. Frank, a soldier in the
41st New York.
529Jackson MS, Letters, 227. Although Jackson's orders were not unique in their
prescriptions for times and rates of movement or for the disposition of troops during
the march, Jackson's strict implementation of these orders helped to bring notoriet)
to his infantry as "foot cavalry" because of their ability to move quickly over great
distances.
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bivouacking for the night.53" On the 14th, Jackson's army reached the area around
McDowell." 1
With Taliaferro's brigade now forming the Confederate advance, Jackson moved
east from McDowell and towards Staunton on the 15th. The army passed through
Jenning's Gap and Stribling Springs before establishing camp at Lebanon Springs.53 2
In accordance with an executive proclamation issued by Confederate President Davis,
Jackson's troops observed "...a day of humiliation and prayer for the pardon of
sins....,5 33 en the 16th in which all active field operations were suspended. The
Confederate army again resumed its march on the following day with Taliaferro's
advance reaching the vicinity of Bridgewater before establishing camp while the rear
elements and Jackson's own staff bivouacked near Mt. Solon.5 34
Throughout Jackson's pursuit of Schenck and subsequent movement back towards
the Valley, the Confederate commander had remained in habitual communication
with Gen. Ewell concerning the status of the Federal forces under Banks. In letters
on the 9th and 10th Jackson had reiterated the importance of Ewell's watch over
Banks. As he began his northward movement towards Franklin on the 10th, Jackson
had suggested that he would attempt to get in Banks' rear and requested that Ewell
'Worsham, 66.
S31Hotchkiss, 45. Diary entry of 14 May.
"
532Ibid. Diary entry of 15 May.
'"Jackson MS, General Orders, 46.
53Hotchkiss, 46. Diary entry of 17 May.
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press the Federals if they should begin to fall back. Attached to this message had
been an inquiry whether Ewell could use his own cavalry regiments to watch Banks
and dispatch Ashby to assist in the pursuit of Schenck."5  Although Ewell met
personally with Ashby on the 11th to discuss the enemy situation and the possibility
of sending Ashby to Jackson's aid, new intelligence suggested that a move by Banks'
Federals was imminent and, therefore, Ashby's departure was suspended.
On the afternoon of 11 May, Ewell received valuable intelligence of Federal
intentions in the Valley. From a Federal deserter it was learned that Shields' Division
was again preparing to leave the Valley to join the Union armies operating east of the
Blue Ridge.53' The presence of three days' rations on two Federal prisoners further
confirmed Union preparations for movement. In fact, Shields' Federal division had
been ordered on 1 May to join Gen. McDowell's force near Fredericksburg and the
movement for this junction was about to begin."37 On the night of the 11th, Ewell
personally briefed Col. Munford, commanider of the 2d Virginia Cavalry, on the
suspected location and destination of Shields' force and ordered the Southern
horseman to track the Federal movements.5








The next morning Munford's regiment departed Conrad's Store to watch and harass
Shields' division. On the 13th, Gen. Ewell received word of a body of Federals
moving across the Masanutten from New Market tolards Port Royal. Although Ewell
passed this information to Jackson, the senior Confederate commander responded
that, in his opinion, Banks had no intention of leaving the Valley but was attempting
to place his forces so as to cover Winchester and also cooperate with Fremont.
Jackson then suggested that Ewell use the spy, McVicar, to help determine if the
Federals were, in fact, planning a move towards Fredericksburg."'9 By the 16th,
however, Col. Munford confirmed that Shields' force, which the Confederates noted
as being "...about 7,000 strong, with thirty-six pieces of artillery and two companies
of cavalry ....,.. 0 had crossed the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap and was now headed
towards Warrenton for a junction with Gen. McDowell.' 1
While Ewell had been concerned with the tracking of Shields' force and the
determination of Federal intentions, he had also been plagued by a complex and
confusing military chain of command which inhibited his ability to follow superiors'
orders. With the movement of his division into the Valley District, Ewell had, of
course, become subordinated to Jackson. However, Gen. Joseph Johnston, commander
of the Army of the Peninsula and senior commander of all Confederate field forces
in Virginia, also exercised command authority over both Jackson and Ewell. Finally,
539 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 887-888. Letters of Jackson to Ewell, 12 and 13 May.
"
0 Ibid, 892. Gen. Lee to Jackson, 16 May.
"Ibid, 894. Gen. Lee to Gen. Johnston.
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Gen. Robert E. Lee, although devoid of any real command authority in his capacity
as senior military advisor to President Davis, occasionally issued suggestions or orders
from the President directly to commanders in the field.
Ever since Jackson had begun the expedition against Fremont's forces, conflicting
messages and orders had been arriving at Ewell's headquarters near Conrad's Store.
Throughout the campaign, Jackson had stressed the need for Ewell to keep a close
watch on Banks and to threaten the Federal commander's flank from the Luray Valley.
Banks' retreat from Harrisonburg had led Jackson to recognize the potential for a
combined offensive against the Federals in the Valley and he had alluded to this
possibility in a 10 May letter to Ewell. Despite evidence of Shields' departure from
the Valley, Jackson still believed that Bank's main body was not preparing to move
east. On 14 May Jackson had ordered Ewell to follow the Federals down the Valley,
using Ashby and any other cavalry to harass the Union column and to disrupt the
Manassas Gap Railroad.5" By the 17th, Jackson was firmly convinced that a
combined attack against Banks would offer the chance of success with strategic
implications and ordered Ewell to be prepared to join him near New Market on the
21st.50
Although Jackson had consistently urged Ewell to remain in the Luray Valley to
watch and threaten Banks, Lee had written on 6 May that there was little need for
"wO.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 889. Jackson to Ewell, 7:20 a.m., 14 May.
54 1bid, 894.
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Ewell to remain in that position if the Federals had retreated from Harrisonburg.'
Suspecting that Banks might attempt to reinforce Gen. McDowell, Lee had suggested
on 8 May that Ewell should attack Banks on the march if the Federals moved from the
Valley."s Although Lee continued to stress the desirability of preventing Banks
from moving east,5" by the 14th he too had revised his operational assessment and
now suggested a combined offensive by Ewell and Jackson against Banks.5Y
On the 13th, Ewell had received orders from Gen. Johnston which also promoted
a combined attack against Banks when Jackson returned to the Valley. However,
Johnston also ordered that, if Banks crossed the Blue Ridge, then both Ewell and
Jackson should do the same.5"' The movement of Shields' division, which had been
a major subordinate element of Banks' command, was seen by Johnston as ample
justification for a similar movement by the Confederates and, on 17 May, Johnston
issued orders requiring Ewell to move east of the Blue Ridge. Although Jackson had
previously suggested the plausibility of a combined Confederate attack in the Valley,
Johnston now believed that any attack against Banks' fortifications would be too
costly. Instead, Johnston thought that Jackson could simply observe Banks while





"'Ibid, 892. 16 May letter fromi Lee.
"'Ibid, 889. 14 May message from Lee to Jackson and Ewell.
"4Ibid, 888. Johnston to Ewell from headquarters in New Kent County, 13 May.
212
importance of the contest before Richmond - "We want troops here; none therefore,
must keep away, unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy."5 "4 After
reading the orders himself, Ewell was directed to forward them to Jackson for the
latter's written endorsement.
These most recent orders from Johnston were the final straw for the volatile Ewell.
Although he had consistently been able to modify his own operational plans to meet
the intentions of superiors, Ewell now believed that a prime opportunity would be
lost if his division left the Valley District. The combative division commander clearly
understood the potential benefits of a combined attack against Banks. Johnston's
orders, however, would negate any chance for success in the Valley. Rather than
simply forwarding the orders to Jackson, Ewell decided to deliver them himself. On
the evening of the 17th, Ewell rode to confer with Jackson at Mt. Solon and arrived
in the town the following morning."'0
After presenting Jackson with a copy of Johnston's orders, Ewell explained the
obvious dilemma now facing him. Although Ewell recognized the strategic potential
of a continued offensive in the Valley, he could not blatantly ignore orders from his
superior. After some thought, Jackson arrived at a temporary solution. In his written
endorsement to Johnston's orders, Jackson directed Ewell to suspended their
execution.5 ' The senior major general then sent a telegraph message to Gen. Lee
"54Ibid, 896.
'"
0Hotchkiss, 46. Diary entry of 18 May.
"ssIO.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 897.
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in which he asked Lee to help persuade Johnston to approve the plan for a combined
offensive against Banks. Jackson would not await a formal reply from superiors
before making his next move, however. To Ewell, Jackson now issued the following
order.
HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
Mount Solon, May 18, 1862.
Maj. Gen. R.S. EWELL,
Commanding Third Division, Army of the Peninsula:
GENERAL: Your letter of this date, in which you state that you have
received letters from Generals Lee, Johnston, and myself requiring somewhat
different movements, and desiring my views respecting your position, has been
received. In reply I would state that as you are in the Valley District you
constitute part of my command. Should you receive orders different from those
sent from these headquarters, please advise me of the same at as early a period
as is practicable.
You will please move your command so as to encamp between New Market
and Mount Jackson on next Wednesday night, unless you receive orders from
a superior officer and of a date subsequent to the 16th instant.
I am, general, your obedient servant,
T.J. JACKSON,
Major-GeneralsS 2
As a subordinate, legally acting under orders from a superior, Ewell could no longer
be held accountable for disobedience of Johnston's 17 May order. Jackson had
willingly accepted full responsibility for retaining Ewell's division ill the Valley and
for the plan to use that force against Banks. Their conference over and satisfied with
the meeting's outcome, Ewell left Jackson's camp at Mt. Solon that afternoon and
returned to his own brigades in the Luray Valley. Jackson and Ewell planned to unite
"
5520.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 3, 897.
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their forces near New Market on 21 May. The stage was now set for the next act in
Jackson's offensive.
D. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE EXPEDITION TO MCDOWELL
Confederate intelligence during this phase of Jackson's offensive had been
skillfully managed. The Confederate commander, acting as his own operational
planner, had kept the intelligence effort focused on those key subjects which were of
significance to his operational plan. The successful engagement of those elements of
Fremont's army which had been opposing Gen. Johnson remained the main
operational objective throughout the period and Jackson had used his intelligence
assets as a primary means of det.rinining when and where to strike at the Federal
forces in the Alleghennies. General situational data provided by Johnson, geographic
information provided by Hotchkiss and his maps, and reconnaissance reporting from
tactical units and scouts had all supported the Confederate commander's efforts to
locate the Federals and determine their size and general disposition. Additionally,
because the movements and activities of Banks' Union force could have a profound
effect on Jackson's operational plan, the Confederate chief had also taken measures
to ensure that any changes in the enemy situation near Harrison burg would be
detected and reported in a timely manner. Jackson's operational control over Ashby
and Ewell had allowed him to task these subordinate commanders with intelligence
collection tasks that would help to ensure the success of his operation in the west.
Rather than relying on these commanders to determine those elements of information
which might be of significance to Jackson, the senior Southern general had issued
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detailed instructions and questions to these subordinates to guide them in their
intelligence collection efforts.
Additionally, the operational focus that Jackson applied to his employment of
intelligence allowed the Confederate commander to better recognize potential threats
and opportunities suggested by that intelligence. Just as the reported movement of
Fremont's reinforcements to Franklin had suggested an increased threat to Jackson's
army, the initial reports of Milroy's isolated position, the news of Banks' withdrawal
to and fortification of Strasburg, and Ewell's confirmation of Shields' departure from
the Valley had all suggested opportunities that profoundly shaped Jackson's
operational planning.
In addition to the operational focus provided by Jackson's control over the
intelligence effort, this centralization of Confederate intelligence also led to an
increased ability to fuse information from all available sources into a unified picture
of enemy dispositions and intentions. While tactical reporting from Sheetz's cavalry
during the pursuit to Franklin effectively tracked the fleeing Federals, the
combination of this information with an understanding of the region's geography and
reports of Banks' movements allowed Jackson to recognize the benefits offered by
blocking the mountain passes into the Shenandoah Valley. In another example, while
individual reports from Ashby and Ewell might have provided some indications of
Bank's general movements and capabilities, the combination of various reports from
Ashby's scouts, Ewell's spies, and Munford's cavalry allowed Jackson to deduce
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Federal intentions in that part of the Valley and to propose a combined offensive
against Banks.
One of the key factors in Jackson's successful handling of Confederate intelligence
had been his own understanding of the capabilities and limitations of this
intelligence effort. As the operational commander controlling all of the Confederate
intelligence collection assets, the Southern general had clearly recoglized that some
uncertainty regarding the enemy would always exist, despite whatever extensive
intelligence efforts he might initiate. Although Jackson made extensive use of spies,
cavalry scouts, special reconnaissance parties, maps, and his own knowledge of the
art of war as means of determining the enemy situation, he also recognized the
inherent inadequacies in all of these sources and therefore sought to use these assets
in a combined effort to augment their overall reliability. Additionally, Jackson had
realized the inability of even the best intelligence to provide a prescriptive course of
action by dispelling all doubt about future enemy actions and had, therefore, taken
action even when the situation was somewhat unclear. The evolving plan to make
a combined attack against Banks, tihe decision to break off the pursuit at Franklin, and
the faulty decision to delay offensive action on 8 May had all been made by Jackson
with the realization that intelligenice and its use was an imperfect art.
The poor performance of Confederate intelligence during the battle at McDowell
had arguably been the low point of the Southern effort throughout this phase of
operations. Jackson's incorrect assessment of Federal intentions, the Confederate
commander's detachment from a position of influence on the battlefield, Johnson's
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failure to initiate any active tactical level intelligence during the battle, and the failure
to exploit any opportunities prov ided by tactical information all contributed to this
inadequate showing. Perhaps most significant, though, was a general inability to
translate successful operational level intelligence to the tactical level during
preparations for battle. As has been noted, the Confederate operational intelligence
effort, which supported Jackson's overall campaign planning and movements, had
been generally successful. As at Kernstown, however, the Confederates had been
unable to equate the same type of energy, operational focus, and fused reporting into
tactical intelligence preceding or d utring the battle. After making an initial assessment
of the situation, Jackson had failed to develop any kind of active and aggressive
reconnaissance plan, had remained physically detached from the tactical situation, and
had failed to effectively modify his own operational plan to exploit any opportunities
presented during the fight. Despite these shortcomings, the battle had been an
operational victory for the Confederates.
For the Federals, the tactical use and exploitation of intelligence at McDowell had
been the most positive use of intelligence during this phase of operations. Beginning
with Banks' inability to properly assess Jackson's general capabilities for offensive
action, the Federals had failed in their intelligence effort in the Valley. The lack of
coordination between Banks and Fremont, as well as between the various subordinate
elements within these commands, had led to a decentralized Union intelligence
apparatus that failed to meet anN, operational needs. Collection assets were never
aggressively used to answer operationally significant questions and were handled
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piecemeal rather than in an attempt to develop a unified enemy picture. Although
Union commanders shared some information regarding the possible movements or
disposition of the Confederates, no attempt was ever made towards a combined effort
between Banks and Fremont to determine enemy intentions. The efficient use of
tactical intelligence by Milroy and Schenck as a force multiplier for their numerically
inferior force was an anomaly, rather than a standard, for Union forces during this
phase of operations.
Finally, despite the actual perfurmance levels for each side's intelligence, Jackson
had clearly recognized the fundamental ability of intelligence to shape an operational
commander's planning. This is nowhere clearer than in his use of deception during
the westward move towards Staunton. Because Jackson realized the impact that
intelligence should have on a commander's planning and of the fundamental way that
intelligence could shape the future actions of an enemy commander, the Confederate
leader took great pains to falsify Banks' impressions regarding Confederate intentions.
By leading Banks to the false conclusion that the Confederates were on their way for
a rendezvous in Richmond, when in reality they were headed toward a junction with
Johnson, the Southern general had intensified the uncertainty of war into a fog that
the Federals were unable to penetrate until it was too late.
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Senior Officer Present - Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck
Milroy's Brigade. -Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy
25th Ohio - Lt. Col. W.P. Richardson
32d Ohio - Lt. Col. Ebeneezer H. Swinney
73d Ohio - Col. Orland Smith
75th Ohio - Col. Nathaniel C. McLean
2d West Virginia - Col. John W. Moss
3d West Virginia - Lt. Col. Francis W. Thompson
9th Ohio Battery"4 - Capt. HenrN F. Hyman
12th Ohio Battery - Capt. Aaron C. Johnson
1st West Virginia Cay. (3 Co's) - Maj. John S. Krepps
Schenck's Brigade - Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck
55th Ohio - Col. John C. Lee
82d Ohio - Col. James Cantwell
5th West Virginia - Col. John L. Zeigler
1st Battalion Connecticut Cav. - Maj. Judson M. Lyon
11th Ohio Battery - Capt. William L. DeBeck
'"Battles and Leaders, Vol. 2, 301.
5'4 All of the numbered Ohio batteries in Fremont's army were subordinate
elements of the 1st Ohio Artillery Regiment. Although letter designations for these
artillery batteries may be more correct when compared to the official table of
organization for the regiment, contemporary sources consistently used number
designations (Battery I is the 9th, K is the 11th, L is the 12th).
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Valley District - Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson
Army of the Valley - Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson
First (Stonewall) Brigade - Brig. Gen. Charles Winder
(NOT BROUGHT TO THE BATTLEFIELD)
Second Brigade - Col. John A. Campbell
21st Virginia - Lt. Col. R.H. Cunningham
42d Virginia - Maj. Henry Lane
48th Virginia - Maj. James C. Campbell
1st Virginia (Irish) Battalion - Capt. B.W. Leigh
Third Brigade - Br~g. Gen. William B. Taliaferro
10th Virginia - Col. S.B. Gibbons
23d Virginia - Col. A.G. Taliaferro
37th Virginia - Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson
Army of the Northwest - Brig. Geo. Edward Johnson
First Brigade - Col. Z.T. Cornier
12th Georgia - Maj. Willis A. Hawvkins
25th Virginia - Col. Georgcý H. Smnith
31st Virginia - Lt. Col. Alfred H. Jackson
Second Brigade - Col. W.C. Scott
44th Virginia - Maj. Norvell Cobb
52d Virginia - Col. Michael G. Harman
56th Virginia - Lt. Col. F.H. Boai-d





Command Killed Wounded Captured Total
or Missing
Milroy's Brigade 20 177 2 199
Schenck's Brigade 6 50 1 57
TOTAL 26 227 3 256
Confederate Forces 5 7
Command Killed Wounded Captured Total
ur Missing
Army of the Northwest
1st Brigade 43 223 - 266
2d Brigade 20 102 - 122
TOTAL 63 325 388
Army of the Valley
1st Brigade NOT ENGAGED
2d Brigade - 9 - 9
3d Brigade 12 89 - 101
TOTAL 12 98 110
GRAND TOTAL 85 423 - 498
5
"O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 462. Official return compiled from nominal lists of
casualties.
"
71bid, 476. This record is based upon a compilation of nominal lists and surgeon
reports immediately following thlw battle.
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BATTLE OF MCDOWELL: CONFEDERATE REPOSITIONING
225
MAP 11







THE CONFEDERATE PURSUIT TO FRANKLIN-
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V. THE MARCH TO THE POTOMAC
A. FRONT ROYAL
Prior to his meeting with Ewell on the 18th, Jackson had accompanied Jedediah
Hotchkiss on a reconnaissance of the nearby North River in a search for useable
fording points. To begin the next phase of his intended offensive, Jackson would
have to move his force to the other side of the river. Although no suitable fords were
found, Hotchkiss proposed the construction of a temporary bridge for the dry passage
of Confederate infantry and ammunition caissons over the waterway. Large farm
wagons, which were plentiful throughout the area, could be driven into the river to
serve as temporary supports and wood planking then laid across to form a walkway
over the river. The general approved the plan and Hotchkiss began gathering the
necessary equipment for the span.
At 3:00 a.m. on the 19th5 ", Jackson's army began its passage over the river. The
expedient "...bridge made of planked wagons""' worked remarkably well and the
soldiers made the crossing without incident. Despite a rather leisurely pace during
that day's march, fair weather and high morale in the Southern ranks allowed for




Dayton and there went into camp for the night (MAP 12).'s While the rest of the
army was crossing the river, Hotchkiss and Lt. Boswell, Jackson's Chief of Engineers,
were dispatched to gain infornation about the enemy situation to the north.5'1
Travelling via the Valley Turnpike and passing through Harrisonburg, the two staff
officers went about 36 miles before reaching Col. Ashby in New Market. Ashby
reported the main Federal force to be in Strasburg while a large Union outpost and
supply depot were located in Front Royal, at the northern end of the Luray Valley.
Confederate scouts also reported that Shield's division had crossed the Massanutten,
marched to Luray, and then continued on to Front Royal after Banks had abandoned
Harrisonburg.5 '2 The Federals continued to send patrols to the region south of
Strasburg and a detachment of Union cavalry was presently known to be operating
along Pugh's Run near Woodstock. Additional information regarding the movement
and activities of the Federal forces was also provided to Hotchkiss by some of the
local inhabitants who considered themselves roughly handled by the invading Union
troops.5 '
Gen. Banks, commander of the main Federal force in Strasburg, was growing
increasingly concerned about the whereabouts of Jackson's army. Gen. Shields'
'"Hotchkiss, 46.
' I1 bid., 46-47.
%'2Ibid., 46.
s' 3Ibid., 47. A local citizen named Negg, a pacifist Dunkard farmer, had reported
the movement of a Federal division across the Massanutten when Banks had left
Harrisonburg.
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division had been transferred from the Valley to reinforce Gen. Irvin McDowell's
command east of the Blue Ridge, near Fredericksburg. Secretary of War Stanton had
also ordered Banks to establish a regimental-sized outpost at Front Royal and this
further reduced the number of troops with Banks in Strasburg."' The Union
commander now had only Gen. Williams' understrength infantry division and a
brigade of cavalry to protect the entire lower Valley (TABLE 7A). By mid-May, Gen.
Banks realized that his much redtuced Federal command was too small to effectively
defend its position at Strasburg. ; The Federals would have to maintain a close
watch on Confederate forces throughout the Valley to provide warning of any
developing threat. Confederate cavalry, however, had formed a near impenetrable
screen to the south. Confederate patrols were active around Columbia Furnace and
Woodstock"6 and 300 Southern horsemen had recently been noted within 10 miles
of the Federal outpost at Front Royal." Although some of Col. Ashby's cavalry
rejoined Jackson's force at Bridgewater on the 18th, the Confederates still left a
sufficient number of mounted troops to the north to continue this screen.'




'Ibid. 16 May letter from Banks to Stanton.
"'Ibid. 17 May message from Banks to Stanton.
"67Ibid., 523. 18 May letter from Banks to Stanton.
"5'Ibid., 701. Jackson's official report of operations during May 1862.
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On the afternoon of the 19th, Jackson ordered Ewell to send Brig. Gen. Richard
Taylor's brigade of Louisiana troops to New Market the following day.'" Taylor
was generally familiar with the area around Ewell's camp and immediately began to
plan for the movement. Taylor's brigade had been posted
...near a pike leading south of west to Harrisonburg, whence, to gain New
Market, the great Valley pike ran due north. All roads near our camp had been
examined and sketched, and, among them was a road running northwest over
the southern foothills of Massanutten, and joining the Valley pike some
distance to the north of Harrisonburg. It was called the Keazletown road, from
a little German village on the flank of the Massanutten; and as it was the
hypotenuse of the triangle and reported good except at two points, I decided
to take it. That night a pioneer party was sent forward to light fires and repair
the road for artillery and trains.570
Taylor's awareness of the roads and topography in the area was the direct result
of an informal intelligence effort designed to increase his understanding and use of
the region's geography. In a conscious attempt to increase his own effectiveness as
a military leader, the Confederate brigadier had
...early adopted two customs and adhered to them throughout the war. The
first was to examine at every halt the adjacent roads and paths, their direction
and condition; distances of nearest towns and crossroads; the country, its
capacity to furnish supplies as well as general topography, etc., all of which
was embodied in a rude sketch, with notes to impress it on memory. The
second was to imagine while on the march an enemy before me to be attacked,






Armed with this elementary planning and his own broad knowledge of the immediate
operating area, Taylor consistently responded to perceived enemy threats and executed
orders in an exemplary manner.
On the morning of the 20th, the Confederates resumed their march. While Taylor
began the westward movement of his brigade to New Market at "early dawn'",
Jackson moved the rest of his army north towards the proposed rendezvous. Ashby's
cavalry continued to provide an effective screen in front of the Federal position at
Strasburg and thus helped to conceal the Confederate movements."73 So effective
was this screen that Gen. Banks remained convinced that Jackson's main force was
now 8 miles west of Harrisonburg, a reasonable deduction given the earlier
Confederate expedition against Milroy to the west.57' Like the previous day, the
weather was good and the Southern troops were able to march at a leisurely pace.
After passing through Harrisonburg, the Army of the Valley linked up wiih Taylor's
brigade on the Valley pike, south of New Market, and there went into camp for the
evening."' 5
While the Confederate troops were marching toward their junction at New Market,




574O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 523. 21 May letter from Banks to Stanton.
"5"Worsham, 66-67.
516Hotchkiss, 47. Diary entry for 20 May.
231
pair travelled to Woodstock where they learned from some of Ashby's scouts that a
group of Federals were only 4 miles away at Maurertown. Banks' main body was
reported to be entrenching and building field fortifications at Strasburg. Although
the Southern cavalrymen warned the two staff officers that Union patrols still made
frequent trips to the vicinity around Woodstock, the pair now separated to expand
their investigation of the area. Boswell went towards the northern end of the
Massanutten, in search of a vantage point from which he could observe the Union
activities in Strasburg. Hotchkiss, meanwhile, travelled to Myer's Forge via Middle
Road to ascertain the presence of any Federal patrols and to determine the general
condition of the roads throughout the area. Intelligence provided by these
subordinates would allow the Confederate commander to remain intimately aware of
his area of operations and any changes in the enemy situation.
The next morning Jackson continued his march. Because of the placement of the
previous night's camp, Taylor's brigade led the Confederate column in its northward
advance. "After moving a short distance in that direction, the head of the column was
turned east and took the road over the Massanutten gap to Luray."'" Although
Federal cavalry patrols attempted to locate the position of Jackson's force on this day,
Ashby's mounted troopers blunted the Federal probe after a brief skirmish in
Woodstock.s"s
""Taylor, 51.
"7O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 523. 21 May message from Banks to Stanton.
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After completing its descent of the eastern face of the Massanutten that afternoon,
the Southern army continued onward and crossed the east branch of the Shenandoah
that night before again going into camp along the river. With typical secrecy, Jackson
had withheld his destination and intentions from all subordinates except Gen. Ewen.
This sense of secrecy and close hold on information regarding the objective and
missions of ongoing operations was probably something of a concern for Gen. Taylor,
who remained unacquainted with the commanding general's standard procedures.
After two days of marching, Taylor had arrived at a point just a few miles north of
Conrad's Store, a distance that might have taken only a few hours if approached by
a more direct route. Of Jackson's use of this circuitous route Gen. Taylor wvrote, "I
began to think that Jackson was an unconscious poet, and, as an ardent lover of
nature, desired to give strangers an opportunity to admire the beauties of his
Valley."57' This march, however, like the trek across the Blue Ridge a couple weeks
before, was another attempt to deceive the Federals as to Jackson's true whereabouts
and intentions. If Federal collection assets had noted Jackson's northward movements
from Harrisonburg or the junction with Taylor's brigade, the Union commander might
deduce that a frontal attack against Strasburg's fortifications was developing and
would, therefore, concentrate his force tn protect the town. Jackson, however, planned
to strike the Federals at their weakest point. Later that evening, the Confederate
75 'Taylor, 51.
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commander met with Gen. Ewell at a small church near the White House Bridge to
discuss their next move.560
While Jackson marched his army across the Massanutten on the 21st, trusted
subordinates were continuing their own activities to the north, in anticipation of
Jackson's arrival. Ashby was still in front of the Federal force at Strasburg acting as
an effective screen for Jackson's movements. Hotchkiss continued to make maps of
all the available roads in the area around Strasburg and Middletown."' After
receiving word of a possible enemy advance from Strasburg, Hotchkiss also
dispatched a trusted local inhabitant to Middletown to investigate any possible enemy
movement in that direction. Noting the obvious intelligence gathering nature of the
topographer's actions and the fact that his civilian clothes were blue, several of
Ashby's scouts arrested Hotchkiss as a suspected spy. Only when convinced of the
staff officer's true identity did the Southern troopers finally release Hotchkiss.
On the 22nd, Ewell's division formed a junction with Jackson's force near
Luray.m With the consolidation of the Army of the Northwest, the Army of the
Valley, and Ewell's division, Jackson now had about 17,000 troops available for an
attack down the Valley (TABLE 7B). The combined Confederate force continued its





sQO.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 702. Jackson's report.
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to within 10 miles of Front Royal and headquarters was established at Cedar
Point.5
Confederate reconnaissance activities durirg the day continued to support
Jackson's operational planning. While continuing his watch of the Federals in
Strasburg, Ashby had cut off all communications up and down the Valley."S
Updated information continued to come in from various civilipns in the area and
Jedediah Hotchkiss observed the Federal defensive line at Pugh's Run near Fair
View.' The Southern commander had used his intelligence assets in the initial
planning of the Confederate offensive and continued to make use of current
information from various sources to refine his plan.
Jackson's position in the Luray Valley offered several operational advantages to the
Confederates." 7 From this new location, the Confederate commander could easily
interpose his own force between Gen. Banks and apy of the mountain passes ieading
to eastern Virginia through the Blue Ridge, thus preventing Banks from reinforcing
McDowell in Fredericksburg or McClellan near Richmond. Similarly, Jackson's
position could prevent any reinforcements from reaching Banks' isolated coinmmand.
Second, by crossing the Massanutten, the Southern general had again used the






protective and masking heights of the Blue Ridge on one side and the Massanutten
on the other, Jackson's true whereabouts would remain a mystery to the Federals.
Neither Banks nor any of the Union commanders to the east could determine
Jackson's position, and thereby hope to deduce his next probable course of action,
without first penetrating the Confederate-held mountain barriers. Third, the threat
which the Confederates now posed to Banks' flank and rear might cause the Federals
to abandon the extensive fortifications they were building in Strasburg and withdraw
northward as a means of protecting their lines of communication to Harper's Ferry.
Such a movement on the part of the Federals might, in turn, allow the Confederate
force to meet Banks in an open battle at an obvious Confederate advantage.
At his headquarters in Strasburg, Banks was still trying to assess tile next
Confederate move. Information from local inhabitants, prisoners, deserters, and
Federal cavalry scouts all confirmed that Jackson had indeed returned to the Valley
from his expedition in the Alleghennies"S but little else was known for certain. The
Federal commander firmly believed, though, that Jackson now contemplated an attack
on Strasburg. Banks judged that Jackson's previously illustrated determination,
combativeness, and sense of maneuver were key indications that the Confederate
commander would continue his offensive against Union forces throughout the Valley.
Further, after noting the relatively small size of his own Federal force, the still
incomplete fortifications at Strasbuirg, and the operational significance of Strasburg's
geographic position in relation to Union protection of the Baltimore and Ohio
mO.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 525. 22 May letter from Banks to Stanton.
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Railroad, Banks concluded that "Our situation certainly invites attack in the strongest
manner.'
At dawn on 23 May, Jackson resumed his advance towards Front Royal."'
Although the Confederate commander knew that he had a superiority of numbers
over the isolated Federal force in the town, Jackson also understood that he would
still need to make good use of the terrain to maximize his offensive power. After
travelling up the Luray Valley Road several miles, the Confederate column diverged
to the right along a less travelled path."90 To avoid direct observation by Federal
pickets and to minimize the possible effects of the Union artillery known to be in the
town, Jackson decided to use the Gooney Manor Road, a narrow and winding dirt
road which ran along the hillsides, as the main route of approach. Two major
objectives of the Confederate attack would be the complete capture or destruction of
all the enemy forces in the town and the destruction of the railway and telegraph
lines linking Front Royal to Strasburg.59' With the 1st Maryland and Taylor's
brigade in the lead, followed by the rest of the Confederate infantry, the Southerners
travelled along this road which "...led north between the east bank of the river and
the western bank of the Blue Ridge.'' 92 While the Southern infantry advanced along






was proceeding along the west bank towards Buckton. The presence of the mounted
Southerners west of Front Royal would help to isolate that Federal outpost from
Banks' main body and, by cutting the communications lines leading to Strasburg, it
was hoped that word of the Confederate attack might be delayed until a Confederate
victory was secured. Other Confederate cavalrymen, travelling ahead of the infantry
as an advance guard, were able to capture some of the advanced Union infantry
pickets several miles south of Front Royal and thereby delayed Federal warning of the
upcoming attack."93
The Federal forces in Front Royal could hardly hope to match the might of
Jackson's army (TABLES 7A and 7B). Nine companies of the Union 1st Maryland,
two companies of the 29th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and 38 artillerymen with two 10-
pound Parrot guns formed the entire strength of the Federal outpost."'4 The
aggregate total of the Federal force numbered only about 1063 men compared to
Jackson's force of about 17,000. While the rifled Parrot guns made the Federal
artillery capable of firing at extended ranges, the infantry's arms were of inferior
quality. On the previous day, 22 May, Col. Kenly had written to Gen. Banks that the
1st Maryland was still armed with outdated smoothbore muskets and inquired when
new firearms for the regiment might be available.59 Kenly had no cavalry attached
19 3 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 536. Banks' report.
94Ibid., 555. Report of Col. Kenly, commander of the Union 1st Maryland.
"'Banks MS. 22 May 1863 letter from Col. Kenly, commanding at Front Royal, to
Gen. Banks.
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to his command and had to rely strictly upon infantry patrols for warning of an
enemy's approach.
Sometime between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., the Southerners came in contact with the
Union pickets about 1 and 1/2 miles from the town. Although the Federal troops were
able to sound the alarm about the Confederate approach, they quickly fled back
toward the town to rejoin their unit. After easily driving in these scattered guards,
the head of the Confederate column moved forward at an even quicker pace and soon
came in sight of the town.:'
From his vantage point at the head of the Confederate column, Gen. Taylor soon
noted "a young, rather well-looking"'97 woman hurrying towards the Southe, ers
from the direction of the town. This was Belle Boyd, an inhabitant of Front Royal
who was already noted for providing reliable information regarding 'the movements
of Northern troops throughout the area to the Confederates. After regaining her
breath, Boyd provided her information quickly and precisely: the main Federal camp
was west of the river; the Federal artillery could easily cover the wagon bridge but not
the railroad bridge which crossed the river; the Union commanders believed that
Jackson's main force was still west of the Massanutten near Harrisonburg; Gen. Banks
was reportedly attempting to concentrate his forces at Winchester.5 "





When presented with this information, Jackson decided on an immediate assault
against the town. Following instructions from the senior Confederate commander,
Taylor quickly deployed some of his troops as skirmishers and began to push toward
the town.'" The Confederate 1st Maryland and the Louisiana Special Battalion
would form the main elements of the Southern assault while Col. Hays' 6th Louisiana
would move in support on the left (MAP 13).
After receiving word of the Confederate approach from the Union pickets, the
commander of the Federal garrison, Col. Kenly of the Union 1st Maryland, had
deployed his troops to meet the threat.°'0 One company of the 1st Maryland was
deployed forward as skirmishers south of the town. The remaining companies of the
regiment formed near their camp, north of the town and between the two forks of the
river, to await the expected Southern assault. The two Union guns also took position
near the camp and were especially oriented to provide effective fire against the wagon
bridge. The Federal position was somewhat higher than the ground on the east bank
and thereby afforded some slight advantage to the Northern troops. The two
companies of Pennsylvania infantry were dispatched to guard the single bridge across
the North Fork of the river, the only useable route for a Federal retreat.
The Confederate assault columns quickly pushed through the town, driving the
few Union skirmishers back towards their camp. As the Southern soldiers cleared the
town, Taylor rode ahead of his troops to personally reconnoiter the enemy position
""IbilU.- 53.
"°O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 556. Kenly's battle report.
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and to examine possible crossing sites over the river."'0 Although Federal infantry
and artillery opened fire on the Confederate brigadier as he neared the river's edge,
Taylor successfully completed his survey and reported his findings to Jackson. The
Union position was well situated between the two forks and, because recent rains had
swollen the river, the two bridges offered the only axes of assault against the Federals.
The placement of the Federal artillery would make an open crossing costly for the
Confederates. Faced with this situation Jackson now considered bringing some of his
own artillery to bear against the Union guns. Because Southern smoothbore artillery
could be too easily outranged by the Federal 10-pound Parrots, the Confederates
would have to use rifled pieces for effective counter-battery fire. Upon further
investigation, however, Jackson found that all of his rifled pieces were far back in the
Confederate column and could not be brought to the front quickly along the narrow
route of the Gooney Manor Road. Col. Crutchfield, Jackson's Chief of Artillery, had
only recently been appointed to his staff position and still had much to learn
regarding the proper placement of the artillery during an offensive march."2
Instead, the Confederates would have to use unsupported infantry if they hoped to
maintain the tempo of the attack.
Taylor's Louisiana brigade would continue as the main Confederate effort because
of its forward position along the river. On the Confederate right, the soldiers of Col.
"'Taylor, 53.
"
2Jackson Letters, 228. Jackson's previous Chief of Artillery had been relieved
from duty on 16 May for drunkenness and insubordination. Crutchfield would,
therefore, have assumed his post sometime between the 16th and 23rd.
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Kelly's 8th Louisiana rushed towards the railway bridge and carefully ran across the
cross-ties to secure a foothold on the opposite bank. Observing Kelly's success on the
right, Taylor ordered the rest of his brigade to seize the wagon bridge which the
Federals were now attempting to burn. While some of the Southern troops attempted
to extinguish the flames, others simply rushed headlong into the smoke and dashed
across the span. Among the first to cross were both Taylor and Jackson who then
continued to direct the Confederate units in their attack against the Federal
position.'0 3 After forming a thin line-of-battle on the west bank to skirmish with
the Union force, the Southern troops put out the fire at the wagon bridge and
completed the crossing of Taylor's brigade.
Although Kenly's small Federal command had done remarkably well in delaying
the Confederate advance, the situation was becoming increasingly dangerous for the
Northern detachment. The size of the Confederate force to their front continued to
grow as more of Jackson's units arrived on the scene. Two companies of the 5th New
York Cavalry had arrived at Front Royal at around 3:00 p.m. but these Federal units
brought Kenly little additional firepower to resist the Southern onslaught. At around
4:30 p.m. the Union commander received a report that Southern cavalrymen were now
moving towards the North Fork bridge in his rear. With this information also came
the startling news that the Pennsvi vania troops were withdrawing northward fro m the
bridge on orders from the senior officer present there.'°4 Faced with the increasing
6I'Taylor, 53.
6040.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 556. Kenly.
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pressure to his front and the threat to his line of retreat, Kenly ordered his command
to the opposite bank of the North Fork and attempted to hold a position on Guard
Hill. By 6:00 p.m., Kenly realized the relative hopelessness of his position. His
command had held up the advance of the overwhelming Confederate force for over
four hours but no relief was in sight. The site on Guard Hill was a good position but
Kenly had too few men and artillery pieces to adequately continue his defense. The
Federal commander now prepared to withdraw farther north, this time in the hope of
reaching the road to Middletown and perhaps linking up with any Union
reinforcements that might be on the way. The two artillery pieces and the cavalry
were dispatched first and then the Federal infantry followed (MAP 14)."'
Faced with the sight of the fleeing enemy, Jackson again lamented the absence of
his rifled artillery pieces. While Confederate infantry could only move at about the
same pace as the retreating Federals, artillery could have destroyed the closed enemy
formations from a distance. At this moment, however, Col. Flournoy arrived near
Jackson with four companies of the 6th Virginia Cavalry.'" Cavalry, rather than
artillery, would have to deliver the crushing blow against the Federals. Jackson
ordered Flournoy to pursue immediately then accompanied the group of mounted
troops himself. The inlantry men oi Col. Btadiey Johnson's Confederate 1st Maryland
followed the cavalry as quickly as they could. About 2 miles north of the bridge, near
the town of Cedarville, the Confederates caught up to the fleeing Federals. Although
'
0 5Ibid., 557. Kenly.
'
0 'Ibid., 702. Jackson's battle report.
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Kenly attempted to form his remaining troops into an effective defense in an open
field along the road, fatigue and the diminished size of his command limited his
capability to do so. One charge by Flournoy's troopers served to break the Union
formation and cause confusion throughout the Federal position. A second charge by
the Confederate horsemen and the arrival of Johnson's infantry regiment put an end
to Federal resistance. Although a few fugitives of the Federal artillery and cavalry
managed to make good their escape, the majority of the Federal command was forced
to surrender to the Confederate 1st Maryland.
While Jackson's main force had been engaged at Front Royal, Ashby had
skirmished with a small Union detachment near Buckton. The Confederate horsemen
had easily dispersed the Federal troops and cut the telegraph lines leading to
Strasburg but the action was not without cost. Three of the Confederate cavalry
commander's most competent subordinates, Captains Baxter, Fletcher, and Sheetz,
"Ashby's right hand'' 7, were killed in the brief clash.60 8  Although Ashby's
command had long been noted for its general lack of discipline, these subordinate
officers had consistently met all challenges of leadership and had proven themselves
to be reliable collectors of information regarding the location and movement of
enemy forces. Their loss would seriously diminish the performance of the Southern




The defeat of the Federal outpost at Front Royal was complete, although Jackson
was disappointed that the lack of rifled artillery had caused such a delay in the
successful execution of the task. The Southern commander could now turn his full
attention toward Banks' main force. That night. Jackson initiated some actions to
furnish notice of any Federal movement from Strasburg. All the roads leading from
Cedarville were patrolled by mounted Confederate scouts to provide warning of any
eastward movement by the Union troops."3" A few of Ashby's men were sent
towards Middletown and Strasburg to observe and harass Banks' main body.'1 '
Other Southern horsemen were sent towards Winchester to maintain a watch over that
area. The remainder of the army was then brought forward and placed into camp
near Cedarville for the planned continuation of the offensive the following morning.
Jackson's intelligence effort during the attack against Front Royal had been capably
handled. Although the numerical superiority of the Confederate force would have
almost guaranteed a Confederate victory over the isolated Federal outpost, Jackson's
use of intelligence throughout the advance and during the battle itself helped to
optimize the execution of the operation.
The Confederate commander's personal involvement in the direction of the
intelligence effort ensured that all collection efforts were focused toward the
fulfillment of operationally significant requirements and that essential pieces of
information were collected to support operational plans. Ashby's cavalry had reported
•'"Freeman, 382.
"610O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 703. Jackson.
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the general locations and dispositions of the Federal forces, thereby providing Jackson
with the initial foundation for his plan to attack Kenly's small Federal force.
Subsequent reporting by staff officers and the cavalry, initiated on Jackson's orders,
had updated this information and allowed for the continued refinement or
confirmation of existing plans. Jackson's use of Hotchkiss' maps and reconnaissance
reports had allowed the Confederate commander to use the physical features of the
area of operations to his own advantage and aided Jackson in understanding probable
Federal intentions with regard to their defense of the lower Valley.
Jackson's intelligence regarding the area of operations had also supported his
efforts at operational security and deception. Understanding the influence that
intelligence had on his own perceptions of the operational picture, the Confederate
commander sought to deny enemy access to or distort the information reaching
Federal commanders. In conjunction with the effective cavalry screen formed by
Ashby's command, Jackson's use of the terrain to mask his movements and the
deceptive routes of his advance helped to confuse Banks as to Confederates' next
course of action.
Finally, Jackson's position with the leading elements of the Confederate force
allowed him to rapidly assess and act upon key pieces of information as the tactical
situation became more fully developed. The Confederate general's quick access to
Belle Boyd's information led to the speedy decision to launch an immediate assault
against Kenly's command. A lengthy delay in the initiation of this attack might have
allowed the Federals to successfully retreat or to receive reinforcements. Jackson's
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access to and ready use of the information provided by Gen. Taylor's reconnaissance
of the river crossings had allowed the Confederates to continue their attack before the
bridges were destroyed. This forward presence had also allowed Jackson to capitalize
on the indications of the Federal retreat by committing Flournoy's cavalry to the
pursuit and thereby completing the Southern tactical victory.
B. WINCHESTER
At 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the 24th, Jackson resumed his operations against
Banks.'11 The Confederate commander knew that his own force outnumbered
Banks' and he wanted to destroy the Federal command before it had the opportunity
to escape or be reinforced. Because Jackson was still unsure about Banks' true
location, however, the Confederates would divide their force to locate and engage the
Federals (MAP 15). Ashby would proceed to Middletown while Ewell's two cavalry
regiments, the 2nd Virginia and 6th Virginia, now assigned to Gen. Steuart, would
move toward Newtown. In addition to the cavalry forces sent to locate the Federals,
Jackson also dispatched Jedediah Hotchkiss with specific instructions to find Banks
and report the Federal positions back to Jackson every half hour via mounted
courier."U Ewell would advance north from Cedarville, along the Winchester road,
in the hope of cutting the Federal line of retreat. Jackson, with his own division and




Elzey's and Taylor's brigades attached, would move west towards Middletown to
attack the Union force wherever he might find it."1
At Federal headquarters, Gen. Banks first became aware of the Confederate attack
on Front Royal through several telegraph messages which related various bits and
pieces of the action. Initial reports from Front Royal statel' that Col. Kenly and all
the other senior officers of the 1st Maryland had been killed, that the regiment had
been "...cut all to pieces ......, and that the size of the Confederate force was between
15,000 and 20,000 men."1' Capt. E.L. Hubbard, commanding the Federal guard at the
bridge several miles east of Strasburg, reported that his position had been attacked
around 4:00 p.m. by Confederate cavalry. Although Hubbard had retained control of
the span, he requested reinforcements before any Southern attacks were renewed.'15
In the wake of these reports, several infantry regiments were ordered to prepare for
a movement toward Front Royal to reinforce Kenly and to block any further
Confederate advance towards Strasburg.616
Banks still needed more information about this obvious enemy threat before he
could efficiently plan his own next course of action. To Gen. Williams, the di%.ision
commander, Banks wrote that "For the purpose of gaining information of the enemy
'
13Ibid.
614Banks MS. 23 May United States Military Telegraph from Lt Saville,
commanding Company B, 1st Maryland, to Gen. Banks. Also found in O.R., Vol. 12,
Pt 1, 525.
"•I5 bid. Copy of 7:00 p.m., 23 May message from Capt Hubbard to Gen. Banks.
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it is desirable that the commanding officer should throw out a small party and scouts
on the Front Royal road."b7 When news of a strong Confederate presence along this
route was reported back to Banks, the intended reinforcements were quickly recalled
to Strasburg. Reconnaissance patrols were dispatched to all roads leading from
Strasburg toward Middletown, Newtown, and Winchester but Confederate cavalry
patrols were also discovered covering each of these routes."'
If the Federals remained in Strasburg, they would surely be surrounded by the
superior Confederate force. Gen. Banks now believed he had three options available
to avoid almost certain defeat at the hands of Jackson's army: "First, a retreat across
Little North Mountain to the Potomac River on the west; second, an attack upon the
enemy's flank on the Front Royal road; third, a rapid movement .irect upon
Winchester...." 19 A westward movement would take the Federals awly from the
Confederate threat and toward a possible junction with Fremont but would also
involve the abandonment of the entire Union supply train. An attack against the
Confederate left flank offered a chance to surprise Jackson's army and possibly
continue an eastward move across the Blue Ridge. This option was also the most
dangerous, however, since it involved an attack against a vastly superior enemy force.
A retreat toward Winchester would allow the Union troops to keep their lines of
617Banks MS.
"6190.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 546. Banks.
6"Ibid.
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communication to the north open but also allowed for a possible intercept by
Confederate forces along the way.
Banks concluded that his best option was to retreat towards Winchester..In a letter
to President Lincoln, the Union general stated that, upon "...learning from a great
variety of sources that the force at Front Royal was endeavoring to get possession of
the road between Strasburg and Winchester...in order to cut off our retreat and
prevent reinforcements, I concluded the safest course for my command wvas to
anticipate the enemy in the occupation of Winchester."'20 This northward retreat
could also allow Banks to unite with any reinforcements that might be sent to his aid
from Harper's Ferry or would allow for a continued retreat across the Potomac if the
Confederates pressed the pursuit. While the Federal infantrymen readied themselves
for the march, other Union assets prepared to provide some warning of the
Confederates' approach. Lt. Rowley of the Signal Corps established signalling
stations along the proposed route of march to report any indications of an enemy
advance and to allow for better control of the Federal units during movement."2'
Union cavalry scouts continued to patrol the roads leading to Front Royal and other
points east of Strasburg.
At 9:00 a.m. on the 24th, the Federal column got under way. Because the Union
commander expected the greatest threat to be coming from behind once his units
"
2 0Banks MS. 24 May letter from Banks to Lincoln.
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began their movement, the baggage wagons led the line of march.'a Williams'
division followed closely behind. Donnelly's brigade led the infantry, followed by
Gordon's brigade. Hatch's cavalry brigade and several unattached units acted as the
rear guard of the Federal column. In the hope of delaying the Confederate pursuit,
Banks had also issued orders for Capt. Abert of the Topographic Engineers to burn
the bridge over Cedar 2reek as soon as the last Federal units had passed.
The Federal column made little progress before it was intercepted by the
Southerners. About 3 miles north of Strasburg, the Federal wagons were attacked by
Confederate cavalry.'23 Ashby's men had observed all of the Federal preparations
and had sought an easy target in this first strike against the Union procession.
Although the Southern attacking force was relatively small, the clash threw the
Federal column into confusion and temporarily halted the retrograde. Some Northern
teamsters panicked at news of the Confederate attack and wagons scattered in various
directions, often becoming easier targets for capture in the process. A soldier of the
5th Connecticut, serving with the quartermasters, reported that his wagon was
"...stopped by some cavalry who said the rebels were just ahead so we turned around
and run back about a mile....""24 Donnelly's infantry brigade was ordered forward
to reopen the route of retreat but the confusion in the baggage train hampered this
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of our train had been fired into by a large force of rebel cavalry, but no one could tell
where the cavalry was posted, nor the probable number ....." of the Confederate
attackers."• The few Confederate horsemen within sight, however, were soon
driven off by the line of Federal infantry and the column continued its retrograde.
The remaining wagons of the Federal baggage train now travelled in the rear near
Hatch's cavalry.
While on the march, Banks received confirmation that the Confederates were
indeed trying to cut oft his line of retreat to the north. Captains Lane and
Richardson, along with 11 other men of the 29th Pennsylvania, had escaped capture
at Front Royal and now reported their observations.12' 6,000-10,000 Confederates
were believed to be moving north on the Front Royal-Winchester road with the object
of reaching the latter place in advance of the Federals. Now that he had opted for the
northward retreat, Banks had to reach Winchester before Jackson if he was to retain
any hope for his command's survival.
Although Ashby's cavalry had successfully reached the turnpike to harass the
Federal movement, Jackson's main column had yet to arrive. While the Confederate
commander had ordered some of his subordinates to begin their movement earlier in
the morning, Jackson had apparently delayed his own start of the 7-mile march from
Cedarville to Middletown. About 4 miles east of Middletown the advancing
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Maine and 1st Vermont."" After brushing aside this Union detachment, the
Confederates drove onward. Several subsequent skirmishes and Jackson's
unfamiliarity with the road over which he now travelled, however, served to slow the
Confederate advance. Despite Hotchkiss' extensive mapping efforts in the area, the
region through which Jackson now passed was marked "Unexplored" on the Valley
map.'
With Maj. Wheat's Louisiana Special Battalion and the Rockbridge Artillery to
accompany him, Jackson now assumed the lead in the Confederate column and soon
outdistanced the rest of the Southern force.62" With this small advance party, the
Confederate commander, sometime during the mid-afternoon,630 struck the "...pike
at Middletown, twelve miles south of Winchester, along which a large body of Federal
horse, with many wagons was hastening north."*31 Jackson was initially unsure
whether he had intercepted the front or rear of the Union column. After a quick
questioning of some local inhabitants, the Confederate commander determined that
most of the Federals had already passed Middletown.'32
'
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Although he had failed to intercept the head of the retreating Federal force, Jackson
decided to inflict what damage he could on the enemy at hand. Maj. Wheat's
Louisiana Tigers "...attacked at once and cut their marching column in two...'"` The
Parrot guns of the Rockbridge Artillery bombarded the crowded turnpike and sent the
Union troops fleeing. While the Federal units north of the Confederate position
continued their retreat, those units to the south realized that they were cut off and
prepared for a fight. This small Union force consisted of six companies of the 5th
New York Cavalry, five companies of the [st Vermont Cavalry, Collis' Zouave
infantry company, and Hampton's Battery of four 10-pound Parrot guns.'34 After
forming a hasty defensive position south of Cedar Creek, the Federals opened fire on
Jackson's advance. Capt. Abert, the Topographic Engineer, also attempted to burn the
bridge across Cedar Creek to prevent any further Confederate attack against the
isolated detachment.'" Although Jackson had perhaps been more interested in
continuing his pursuit of the main enemy body to the north, the opening of the Union
artillery prompted an immediate Confederate response. Jackson now ordered three
of his five available brigades, Taylor's, Winder's and Campbell's, to engage the
Federal force south of Middletown."'
'6Worsham, 70.
'6Freeman, 389.
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Although the Federal detachment had remained organized and established a good
position after the opening Confederate attack, the obvious superiority of the now
advancing Southerners led the Union commander to consider a hasty withdrawal.
Capt. Abert had discovered that burning the bridge over Cedar Creek would be a
wasted effort since there were numerous fording sites nearby which would allow the
Confederates to continue their advance."37 The Confederate lines overlapped both
flanks of the Federal position, thereby allowing for probable envelopment if the
Federals stayed in their present position. At around 7:00 p.m., the Union troops began
an organized retreat from their position and moved along a road leading
westward.' In turn, the Southerners abandoned their attack at Cedar Creek and
returned north to continue the pursuit of Banks' main body."3" The separated Union
force eventually made its way safely north and crossed the Potomac into Maryland on
the 25th.
Although darkness was beginning to fall, Jackson decided to continue the pursuit
of the main Federal column towards Winchester. Any delays might allow the Union
troops to erect defensive works or to escape across the Potomac. Cavalry would have
been the ideal arm to use in this pursuit of the retreating enemy but no mounted
troops were at hand. Following the initial attack against the Union baggage train,





wagons that few, if any, soldiers of that command were now available for action. The
loss of Ashby's three subordinates on the previous day had contributed to a
corresponding loss in leadership and discipline during the present situation. Jackson
would have to rely on the strength and speed of the Southern infantrymen to continue
his pursuit of Banks. To remain abreast of the latest tactical developments and to
position himself where he could best influence the course of the ensuing operations,
Jackson again placed himself with the point of the Southern advance.'
As the Confederates passed through Newtown along the turnpike, they were
ambushed by the 2nd Massachusetts, one of three infantry regiments that Gen.
Williams had detached as rear guards for the retreating Federal column.'4 ' From his
position with the Confederate vanguard, Jackson quickly ordered the 33rd Virginia
to counterattack and the Union unit was forced to resume its retreat.4 2 At
Bartonsville the Southerners were again ambushed by a Federal rear guard unit firing
from the protective cover of a stone wall bordering the turnpike. Although the
Northern troops were easily driven away, these ambushes helped to harass and delay
the Southern advance. The Confederate commander was now forced to dispatch
reconnaissance patrols and flanking columns to investigate potential traps along the
line of march.
"'Taylor, 58.
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Jackson pushed his command onward until around 1:00 a.m. when he finally
allowed his weary troops a brief rest.' While his men slept, the Confederate
commander maintained a solitary watch along the road."' Sometime after 3:00 a.m.
Jackson roused his men and again resumed the march. The Confederate general now
ordered two companies of the 5th Virginia, men who had lived in Winchester, and
one company of the 2nd Virginia, whose members were familiar with the terrain
leading to the town, to assume the point position in the advance. Their familiarity
with the local area would allow them to suspect potential areas of ambush and to
reconnoiter these positions in advance of the main Confederate body."'
While Jackson's column toiled along the Valley Turnpike, Ewell's force, consisting
of Trimble's and Scott's brigades, the 1st Maryland, and two artillery batteries, had
taken a much more direct route towards Winchester. Although Jackson had
temporarily halted his subordinate's movement during the skirmish at Middletown,
Ewell was permitted to resume his march at around 5:45 p.m.' 46  By 10:00 p.m.,
Ewell's force was within 3 miles of Winchester and went into bivouac for the
night."7 Pickets were established to maintain a watch toward the town and to look
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From his new headquarters in Winchester, Banks sent a telegraph message to
Secretary of War Stanton in Washington... in which he stated that he fully expected
a Confederate attack against his position the following day. Banks also offered the
opinion that Ewell was trying to cut off his line of retreat and noted that enemy
cavalry had been seen near Winchester earlier on the 24th. Stanton had already
ordered three regiments of reinforcements from Baltimore to be sent to Col. Miles'
command at Harper's Ferry'.. Gen. Fremont had been ordered to lead his entire
force to Harrisonburg to threaten the Confederate rear."' In another letter to
Fremont, President Lincoln had enjoined that officer to move speedily to Banks' aid:
"Much-perhaps all--depends on the celerity with which you can execute it.''651
Stanton had also ordered Gen. McDowell, commanding the Union force near
Fredericksburg, to suspend his advance towards Richmond and to send 20,000 troops
to the Valley."'5
In less than two days, Jackson's offensive against Banks had already shattered
Federal control of the Shenandoah Valley, stalled the Union's northern advance
against Richmond, postponed plans for a push into eastern Kentucky, and caused
6UIbid., 527. 8:00 p.m. 24 May message from
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panic throughout the government in Washington. Over 40,000 Northern troops were
being diverted from other important operations to aide Banks' imperiled command.
More setbacks for the Union were forthcoming.
The retreating Federals had begun arriving in Winchester shortly after dark and
continued to stream in until about 1:00 a.m.'s3 Following the loss of the 1st
Maryland and the scattering of various units on the march from Strasburg, the Union
forces in Winchester amounted to only about 3600 infantry, 1500 cavalry, ten rifled
Parrot artillery pieces, and six smoothbore brass guns (TABLES 7A and 7B).'"
During the night, Banks deployed his available forces on a line of low hills just south
of the town (MAP 1 6 )."'5 Several companies of Michigan cavalry were positioned
on the extreme right of the Federal line to guard against any Confederate flanking
movement. The Third Brigade, under Col. George Gordon, held the right wing of the
line while the First Brigade, commanded by Col. Dudley Donnelly, was stationed on
the left. Between the two infantry brigades, several artillery batteries were massed
to cover the main approaches from the south. Signal stations had also been
established to link the two wings with the center and to provide competent






Although Gen. Williams had hoped to reconnoiter the suspected Confederate
positions early in the morning, the Southerners allowed little time before commencing
operations."" At around 4:00 a.m., Ewell opened artillery fire against the Federal
positions."5 Jackson's column had yet to arrive but Col. Crutchfield had delivered
a message to Ewell earlier that morning and was now directing the artillery
bombardment. At 5:40 a.m. Ewell committed some of his infantry in an attack from
the Confederate right."59 The 21st North Carolina and the 21st Georgia were sent
forward in an attempt to turn the Federal left."6 Despite a heavy fog that had fallen
during the night and now obscured much of the battlefield, the Federal commanders
could clearly see the approaching Southern regiments and prepared to meet them.",
As the two Confederate regiments neared the Union line, which had been positioned
behind some stone walls to provide cover, the entire firepower of Donnelly's brigade
poured into the Confederate ranks. Losses in the Southern units accumulated q uickly
and progress on the Confederate right was brought to a halt.
Jackson's force had begun to arrive in the vicinity soon after Ewell had opened








had remained hidden from view in the wooded terrain on the Confederate left."
2
Although the Union commanders were aware of a growing Confederate presence, they
remained unsure of its size or location. Col. Donnelly, however, soon observed nine
Confederate regiments moving toward the Federal right and reported this informnation
to Gen. Williams. The Federal division commander then went to the right wing
himself to personally observe the enemy activity."3
Throughout the advance on Winchester, Jackson had been aware of the ridgelines
located south and southwest of the town and of their potential importance in any
assault.' While control of the ridge immediately south of the town, the one on
which the Federals had established their position, might offer some benefits,
command of a higher second ridge, 400 yards south of the first, could prove even
more important. As Jackson's column approached the town, Confederate scouts had
reported this southern ridge unoccupied except for the presence of some Federal
skirmishers. The Confederate commander had himself ridden forward to confirm the
report."' As the Stonewall Brigade reached Jackson's position, the senior
Confederate general pointed to an eminence along this ridge and ordered Brig. Gen.
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Stonewall Brigade and the nine regiments of these commands advanced up the hill
unopposed."'
As the Confederate soldiers reached the crest of the ridge, however, they were
subjected to an intense fire by Federal artillery and infantry posted "...behind a stone
wall that ran entirely across the open field..."O" on the opposite height. Because of
their position on the far left of the Confederate line, the 27th Virginia an'd 2nd
Virginia were particularly exposed to this fire and were, therefore, moved back to the
protective cover of the reverse slope."' By 6:00 a.m. Cutshaw's, Carpenter's, and
Poague's batteries were also stationed on the hill to provide counter-battery fire
against the Federals. 70
During these initial deployments and actions, Jackson had remained at the front
of his lines. This position allowed him to remain abreast of any changes in the
enemy situation and to employ his own force so that it could meet any enemy threats
or exploit any vulnerabilities in the enemy deployments. As the fire from the enemy
lines increased, the Confederate commander now reconnoitered the opposite ridge.
Pressure against the Union position would have to be increased to maintain the
Confederates' offensive momentum. Accompanied by Col. Campbell and two






position and "After satisfying himself as to the location of the enemy, he quietly
turned his horse and rode back in a walk. ',7' The reconnaissance had led Jackson
to decide on his next course of action.
The Suuthern commander summoned Brig. Gen. Taylor to his side and ordered
him to assault the enemy position from the Confederate left. While Taylor also went
forward to personally inspect the ground over which his unit would have to
advance,6 "Z Jackson led the brigade to a suitable staging area from which the attack
could be launched.'73 As the Louisiana units passed in the rear of Winder's brigade,
behind the cover of the hill, Jackson placed the 10th Virginia on the left and the 23rd
Virginia on the right of Taylor's formation to strengthen this main effort of the
Confederate attack.b74
At around 7:30 a.m., Taylor moved his brigade into the hollow between the two
ridgelines and formed for the assault. Because of the open nature of the ground,
Taylor's deployment had undoubtedly been seen by the Federals on the opposing
height. As the Southerners advanced up the hill, Federal cavalry charged the






organized counterattack by several companies of the 8th Louisiana repelled the Union
cavalry and allowed the Confederate foot soldiers to continue their assault.b,`
As the Confederates reached the crest of the hill, the Federals began to give way.
The three Southern artillery batteries posted near Winder were demolishing the
Federals' stone wall with solid shot and the Confederate infantry poured repeated
volleys into the now exposed Union ranks. Taylor's assault was too much for the
Northern soldiers to resist. On the Federal far right, the 27th Indiana broke and ran
back towards the town.,,7 , This in turn exposed the flanks of other F-ederal
regiments on the right and Col. Gordon ordered the Federal right wing to fall back
towards the town. Faced with the complete collapse of the right, Gen. Williams now
ordered a genera: withdrawal of the entire Union line. The Federal position had
collapsed.
As Jackson noted the wavering within the Union position he ordered an advance
by the entire Confederate line.67' Taylor quickly formed his brigade into column
so that it could pursue through the narrow streets of the town. Winder and
Campbell's brigades moved down the ridge on which they had been posted and
advanced towards the fleeing Federals. Elzey, who had been held in reserve on the
turnpike, moved directly up that thoroughfare towards Winchester. On the right,
Ewell also ordered Scott, Trimble, and the 1st Maryland to join the pursuit.
""Taylor, 60.
"676O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 597. Williams.
'"Worsham, 73.
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Although the Federal units were initially able to retire in an organized manner, the
restrictive roads through the town and the lack of directive leadership on the roads
north of town soon resulted in a temporary route. The 27th Indiana, the unit which
had first fled from the Federal right, reformed behind a stone wall north of town to
cover the Union retreat and delay the onrushing Confederates.'" Federal cavalry
helped to collect the straggling infantry into formations along the road and the retreat
toward the Potomac was begun.
Although the Federal troops remained generally unfamiliar with the region's
geography and the routes leading toward the Potomac, guides were soon found to
help provide direction. Sgt. Anderson, of the 2nd Massachusetts, remembered that
"Among our guard was a Lieutenant - belonging to the twenty seventh Indiana who
said that he was somewhat acquainted with this part of the country having travelled
in it before the war."'79 The young officer was quickly pressed into service as the
group's navigator and the unit commenced its northerly trek. One Federal brigade
was aided in its movement when:
A young man, a citizen afterwards better known as the Berckley County spy,
came to Col. Donnelly and told him if he continued long in the direction he
was moving, he would run into a force of rebels that were waiting for him. He
could not tell their numbers but they had two guns in position for raking the
road. He then offered his services as a guide, saying he was acý.uainted with
every foot of land between there and the river."'
"678O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 597. Williams.
"'Anderson MS. Anderson and some of the other members of this fugitive group




Donnelly's brigade and the other Federal units travelled first in the direction of
Martinsburg and then moved along different roads to try and reach the Potomac.
As the Confederate units entered the narrow streets of the town they too became
somewhat disorganized and intermixed. Under these circumstances, Jackson could
hardly use his infantry as an effective means of pursuit. Although the routed and
rapidly fleeing enemy offered a perfect target for cavalry, no Southern horsemen were
to be seen. Until some mounted troops could be located, the Confederate commander
would have to make the best use he could of artillery and infantry to pursue the
defeated Federal soldiers. Jackson ordered all available batteries in pursuit and
commanded the infantry to follow in support. The fatigue from the previous days'
operations was becoming obvious, though. Although the infantry would pursue "...the
enemy about five miles below Winchester...'"' to the area around Stephenson's
Depot, the Federals would still make good their escape.
As the artillery and weary foot soldiers began their pursuit, Jackson dispatched his
aide, Lt. Sandie Pendleton, to locate Gen. George Steuart, commanding Ewell's
cavalry. Ashby's force, which had seen some light action on the Confederate left, was
still disorganized in the wake of the looting on the 24th. In contrast Steuart's
regiments were still reasonably fresh, cohesiv e units.
Pendleton finally located Steuart's unoccupied cavalry about 2 and 1/2 miles east of




Noting that his command was part of Ewell's division, Steuart refused to comply with
Jackson's orders unless they were properly routed through Ewell first! Although
Pendleton eventually found Ewell and got the shocked division commander's
approval, the resulting two hour delay allowed the Federals to get well away.
Although Steuart pushed his troopers to within 1/2 mile of Martinsburg, the presence
there of large numbers of reorganized Federals led him to halt the pursuit. The
Southern cavalry remained in this position south of Martinsburg to watch for any
opportunity to renew the contest.
By 2:40 p.m., most of Banks' shattered army had reached Martinsburg."s2 After
a rest of several hours, the Federals divided their force and took different routes
toward the Potomac. Col. Donnelly led his brigade toward Dam No. 4 and, using
small boats found along the river's edge, ferried his command across the Potomac
during the night."8 3 Banks led the main Federal column on the road to Williamsport.
Throughout the night and into the following day the Federals slowly ferried the
troops to the Maryland shore while the supply trains and heavy equipment crossed
at a shallow ford.'8
Throughout the advance on Winchester, the Confederate commander had used his
intelligence assets to locate the positions of tle Federal forces, to assist in determining
enemy intentions, and to provide notice ot enemy strengths and vulnerabilities.
"
2 0.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 528. 24 May telegram from Banks to Stanton.
"
3 Ibid., 597. Williams.
"4'Ibid., 551. Banks.
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Jackson had then incorporated this intelligence into the development and execution
of his own flexible operational plans, thereby, providing a realistic assessment of his
own courses of action based on the realities of the operational situation.
After his capture of Col. Kenly's command at Cedarville, Jackson had immediately
dispatched intelligence assets to locate Banks' main body and had even delayed his
own advance on the 24th until some word of the Federals' position had been received.
The Confederate commander continued to emphasize this need to monitor Banks'
location throughout the drive to Winchester, largely because the destruction of Banks'
force was the primary objective of Jackson's attack. Because he had a numerically
superior force, Jackson could afford to divide his own army to fix the Federal position
and then reconcentrate his army in an attack against the enemy.
With the location of Banks' main body, the determination of federal intentions
became much clearer. While Jackson himself may have been concerned that Banks
would move westward to link up with Fremont or skirt the Confederate army in a
quick eastward dash across the Confederate flank, the sighting of the Federals on the
turnpike illustrated their intent to retreat toward Winchester. Once Jackson had
determined what the Federal course of action was, he could plan his own operation
to foil the chances of Union success.
Again, Jackson's forward position near the unit of main effort contributed to the
Confederates' ability to correctly respond to current information and to capitalize on
potential opportunities suggested by various reports. The Confederate general's
location with the Southern vanguard and associated access to significant tactical
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intelligence had allowed him to launch an immediate attack against the Federals at
Middletown, press the pursuit towards Winchester, and seize the important ridgeline
south of the town. Further, Jackson's presence near the front led him to order
Taylor's assault against the Federal right and to order the pursuit of the Federals
following the collapse of Col. Gordon's brigade.
C. THREATENING THE POTOMAC
On the 26ttn, Jackson allowed his command to rest and ordered religious services
to be held throughout his command."'• The Confederate commander would not,
however, let his army remain idle in Winchester for long. Although most of Banks'
troops were now safely across the Potomac, the Confederates might still be able to
ca-ise additional damage to the Union's war effort. Jackson realized that a cont. ,led
threat against the Potomac might cause Union commanders to divert additional troops
and resources from the east and would thereby relieve some of the pressure against
Richmond (MAP 17). Later that same day, Steuart's cavalrymen occupied
Martinsburge and Taylor's Louisiana brigade "...was moved ten miles north on the
pike leading by Charlestown to Harper's Ferry.'" 7 The following day, Jackson
pushed his forces even farther from Winchester. Taylor's brigade was now moved









Confederate cavalry was also dispatched from Martinsburg and destroyed the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridge near the North Mountain Depot."'
Jackson's operations were already causing alarm throughout much of the Federal
leadership. In Washington, the War Department took over control of all railroads in
the North after officials noted that "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt
that the enemy in great force are advancing on Washington."w President Lincoln
wrote to Gen. McClellan that Jackson's movements appeared to be part of a general
northward advance and that McClellan's a'rmy might be required to return to
Washington for a defense of the capital."'' Although McClellan replied that the
Confederate actions were more likely an attempt to prevent reinforcements from being
sent to the Federal army near Richmond, this realization failed to change the need to
divert some Union forces toward the Valley.
In eastern Virginia, Gen. Geary reported to both the Federal War Department and
Gen. McDowell that Jackson was crossing tlie Blue Ridge with at least 20,000 men.692
Although subsequent reports by other Federal commanders proved Geary's account
to be false"3 , these alarmist reports helped to confuse the intelligence picture and
weakened the Union's ability to respond properly.







While Jackson continued his aggressive posturing along the Potomac, Union
reinforcements continued their movement toward the Valley. When word of the
Confederate attack against Front Royal reached Fremont, many of that general's
soldiers had still believed that Jackson's force was still to their own front."
Although President Lincoln, hoping to cut off Jackson's line of retreat, had ordered
Fremont to proceed to Harrisonburg, the Union general had instead marched his
command to Moorefield."; Fremont had found the roads from Franklin to
Harrisonburg still effectively blocked by numerous obstacles and, citing the poor
condition of his troops, he had opted for a less demanding route to the Valley. The
three infantry regiments that had been dispatched from Baltimore, the 3rd Maryland,
87th Pennsylvania, and 111th Pennsylvania, had arrived at Maryland Heights near
Harper's Ferry on the night of the 26th and had beeai deployed to defend against any
possible crossing of the Potomac by Confederate forces."' Brig. Gen. Rufus Saxton
had been ordered to Harper's Ferry to assume command of the strengthened Federal
forces there and had also arrived on the 26th. McDowell was dispatching Shields'
and Ord's infantry divisions and two cavalry, brigades, about 23,500 men total, across




""James Jenkins Gillete, Manuscript. Papers, 1857-1884. Manuscript Division,
library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
"'97Lincoln, 246 and 251. Letters from McDowell to Lincoln, 7:20 p.m., 28 May and
12:30 p.m., 30 May.
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Jackson again increased his pressure against the Federals on the 28th. At 5:00 a.m.
brig. Gen. Winder led the Stonewall Brigade from its camp near Winchester towards
Charlestown.'" Several miles from the town, the Confederate scouts returned to
Winder with news that 4,000-5,000 Federals were nearby. After dispatching his aide,
Lt. Garnett, to inform Jackson of the enemy location, Winder cautiously continued his
advance. Capt. Chew, Ashby's artillery commander, volunteered to lead a small
reconnaissance party to determine the location and disposition of the enemy force.
After several hours Chew returned with word that about 1500 Northern troops were
in line of battle about 3/4 mile beyond the town.
Although this force was roughly the same size as Winder's own, the brigadier
decided to attack rather than await the arrival of Confederate reinforcements. After
passing through the town, Winder deployed his unit in line of battle and immediately
charged the Union position. The Federal force quickly dispersed and fled northward
towards Harper's Ferry.
Winder pursued the retreating enemy as far a Halltown before halting his own
force. Sizeable Union forces could be seen in positions on Bolivar Heights and any
further advance would risk engagement with these well placed enemy units. Seeing
little use in remaining at Halltown, Winder returned to Charlestown where Gen.
Ewell arrived with reinforcements around sunset.
The following day, 29 May, the Confederates continued their threats against
Harper's Ferry. Col. Allen's 2nd Virginia, of the Stonewall Brigade, was sent to
"698 O.R., Vol. 12, Pt. 1, 738. Winder.
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occupy Loudon Heights, overlooking the town.'" From two friendly sources,
Winder learned the general strength of the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry and also
discovered the presence of Federal heavy artillery on Maryland Heights."'Q While
the Federal position was too strong for the Confederates to launch a direct assault,
occasional shelling of the town by Southern artillery and light skirmishing by the 2nd
Virginia helped to harass the Federal troops and remind Gen. Saxton of the continued
threat to his post.
Even without the posturing against Harper's Ferry, Union commanders in the area
had remained keenly aware of the Confederate presence. The possibility of a
continued Confederate offensive across the Potomac had worried Washington officials
and field commanders were straining every effort to determine Jackson's intentions.
Since the 26th, Banks had maintained a careful watch on the Confederate pickets
opposite Williamsport."' Although the actions of the Southern pickets appeared to
be defensive, information provided by Confederate prisoners and other sources had
indicated that Jackson was planning to invade Maryland with up to 25,000 troops. 70
2,000 Southern soldiers, probably Steuart's cavalry, were known to be in Martinsburg,
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Potomac.' Winder's attack against Charlestown on the 28th and the subsequent
occupation of Loudon Heights on the 29th helped to support the picture of an
impending attack against Harper's Ferry. On the 29th, Banks had reported to
Washington that the Confederate pickets opposite Williamsport were
withdrawing."' Were the Confederates massing for an attack? A reconnaissance
party from Gen. Saxton's command and information provided by a liberated Union
prisoner indicated that the Confederate cavalry was preparing to cross the river and
isolate Harper's Ferry in preparation for a larger attack."' By the night of the 29th,
the Union field commanders and most officials in Washington clearly believed that
the Confederates were preparing for an attack against the Federal position. "
Although Jackson may have contemplated a continuation of his offensive across
the Potomac, the relatively small size of his command and the ever increasing length
of his lines of communication made him realize that such an operation was unrealistic
at this time. While the Confederate commander may have been willing to pressure
the Federals by maneuvering his forces to various positions around Harper's Ferry and
shelling the town from a distance, he was utiwilling to pay the cost of a direct attack
against the post. Jackson was also aware that Federal reinforcements were on the
way. Confederate scouts had reported the movement of troops from McDowell's force
""3Ibid., 531. Banks.
704Ibid., 533. 2:30 p.m. 29 May telegram from Banks to Stanton.
'°Ibid., 646. Saxton.
7'6Ibid., 534. 11:30 p.m. 29 May telegram from Stanton to Banks.
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and, on the 30th, a civilian informant told the Confederate commander that Gen.
Shields' division was marching towards Front Royal and was less than a day's march
away."' Confederate scouts had also noted Fremont's approach from the west. If
either of these forces, both of which were superior to Jackson's own army, succeeded
in getting south of Jackson, the Confederates would be cut off and could be easily
defeated. By the morning of the 30th, Jackson had begun preparations to meet this
new threat.
During the five days since the battle at Winchester, Jackson's intelligence system
had continued to serve him adequately by maintaining a watch over those Federal
forces within the area of operations and by watching for the approach of any new
threats from outside the region. Subordinate units were pushed forward to maintain
a watch on Banks' force across then Potomac and to make contact with Saxton's
reinforced command at Harper's Ferry. Reconnaissance patrols had allowed these
subordinates to make proper operational decisions in their advance and had also
provided important information regarding enemy strengths. As Union forces from
outside the Valley began to advance towards sackson's area of operations, Confederate
scouts had provided warning of their approach and allowed Jackson to begin planning
his next move.
Jackson's own perceptions on the proper use of intelligence had influenced his
operational decision to threaten Harper's Ferry and the Potomac line. By maneuvering
his own army to various points along the river and by aggressively posturing for an
""'Freeman, 412.
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attack against Saxton's force, Jackson had hoped that alarmist reports of the
Confederate actions would elicit a response by the Federal authorities in Washington.
With the diversion of Fremont's and McDowell's forces from their proposed
operations, Jackson had achieved a strategic goal of the Confederate operation.
D. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE ADVANCE
Jackson's intelligence effort had perhaps been at its best during the offensive
against Banks' command. The Confederate commander had taken a conspicuously
active role in the direction, analysis, and use of intelligence throughout this phase of
offensive operations and the operation's positive results reflected this involvement.
Jackson's emphasis on understanding the area of operations, his personal control over
the intelligence effort, and his forward positioning with the main effort all
contributed to this superior performance.
Much of the Confederate success had been the result of Jacson's use of the
Valley's geography to his own operational advantage. Jackson was only able to make
effective use of the area of operations in his plans after he had fully analyzed the
physical features of the region. Taylor's march to join Jackson and the subsequent
Confederate crossing of the Massanutten helped to conceal the Confederate intent to
attack Front Royal and move against Banks' flank. This move could only be
undertaken by a commander who fully appreciated the various roads in the area and
the obstacle to movement and observation that the Massanutten constituted. The
advantages of launching an offensive from the Luray Valley could only be understood
after an evaluation of the region's geography with regard to enemy positions both in
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and outside the boundaries of the district. Similarly, the various routes selected for
the advance on Winchester and the ridgeline chosen for the attack position could only
have been appreciated by an operational planner familiar with subtleties that might
n't be immediately apparent without a detailed study of the terrain.
Jackson's personal control over the intelligence effort was another factor in the
success of Confederate intelligence. As the chief operational planner, Jackson used
his intelligence assets to optimize his own understanding of the operational picture
and to recognize potential threats and opportunities as they developed. Requirements
for information and subsequent tasking of intelligence collection assets remained
focused on operationally significant concerns because Jackson himself played an
active role in the direction of the intelligence effort. The location of Federal forces
and the determination of Federal intentions remained the focal point of both Jackson's
own operational concerns and the intelligence effort. Ashby's cavalry constantly
monitored Federal activities and provided consistent reporting back to Jackson. As
gaps in the intelligence picture developed, the Confederate commander tasked staff
officers, subordinate units, or other collection assets to gather the information needed
in the proper development of his plans. Additionally, because the Confederate
general commanded the assets needed for both intelligence collection and combat
operations, he successfully balanced the requirements of these functions to ensure that
his operational goals were best met.
One of the most significant factors in the Confederates' successful use of
intelligence during the advance to the Potomac was the commanding general's
277
forward position throughout most of the operation. In contrast to Jackson's general
detachment from the field of action during the battles at Kernstown and McDowell,
this phase of the campaign saw him near the Confederate main effort at almost every
pivotal point in the action. Because of this presence with the unit of main effort,
Jackson was able to rapidly assess current tactical information in the context of
broader, previously provided operational level intelligence and make decisions could
optimize Confederate capabilities. Jackson's co-location with Taylor's brigade during
the march to Front Royal allowed him to capitalize on the intelligence provided by
Belle Boyd and issue orders for an immediate attack against the Federal garrison.
Because Jackson alone possessed the authority for ordering a general engagement, any
delay in transmitting the information back to some other location and then issuing
orders for the attack might have allowed the Federals to escape or be reinforced. The
Confederate general's presence with Maj. Wheat's advance guard on the 24th allowed
him to determine the true location of the main Federal body and to initiate an
immediate attack and pursuit against Banks' column. Jackson's location with the
Confederate advance near Winchester allowed him to confirm the absence of Federal
troops on the southern ridge and to appropriately order Winder's and Campbell's
brigades to occupy that position. Similarly, his personal examination of both the
terrain and the strengths of the Federal position during the battle at Winchester had
allowed him to assess the relative vulnerability on the Federal right and to exploit this
point with the assault by Taylor's brigade.
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Although subordinate commanders or staff officers may have performed similar
functions of observation or information gathering for the commander, only Jackson,
as the Confederate operational commander, possessed the necessary authority and
assets to exploit these opportunities. Based on current but perishable tactical
information, Jackson could seek to cut losses in one area or reinforce success in
another part of the line. By placing himself in the position where he could best
assess the current operational situation and positively influence the course of the
battle, Jackson had shortened the time lag between the collection, assessment, and use
of intelligence in the decision making process.
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The Opposing Forces at Front Royal and Winchester'(TABLE 7A)
The Union Army
(c. 5300 men at Winchester, 1163 men at Front Royal)
Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks
First Division - Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams
First Brigade - Col. Dudley Donnelly
5th Connecticut - Lt. Col. George D. Chapman
28th New York - Lt. Col. Edwin F. Brown
46th Pennsylvania - Col. Joseph F. Knipe
Third Brigade - Col. George H. Gordon
2d Massachusetts - Lt. Col. George L. Andrews
29th Pennsylvania - Col. John K. Murphy
27th Indiana - Col. Silas Colgrove
3d Wisconsin - Col. Thomas H. Ruger
Cavalry -
1st Michigan (5 Co's) - Col. Thornton F. Brodhead
Artillery - Capt. Robert B. Hampton
Battery M, 1st New York - Lt. James H. Peabody
Battery F, Pennsylvania Arty. - Lt. J. Presley Fleming
Battery F, 4th U.S. - Lt. Franklin B. Crosby
Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. John B. Hatch
1st Maine (5 Co's) - Lt. Col. Calvin S. Douty
1st Vermont - Col. Charles H. Tompkins
5th New York - Col. Othneil De Forest
1st Maryland (5 Co's) - Lt. Col. Charles Wetschky
Unattached Units -
10th Maire - Col. George L. Beal
8th New York Cav. (5 Co's, dismntd.) - Lt. Col. Charles R. Babbit Collis' Zouaves -
Capt. Charles H.T. Collis
Front Royal Outpost - Col. John R. Kenly
1st Maryland - Col. John R. Kenly
29th Pennsylvania (2 Co's) -
Battery E, Pennsylvania Arty. (1 Sect.) - Lt. Charles A. Atwell
"$Battles and Leaders,
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Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson
Jackson's Division - Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson
First Brigade - Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder
2d Virginia - Col. J.W. Allen
4th Virginia - Col. Charles A. Ronald
Sth Virginia - Col. W.S.H. Baylor
27th Virginia - Col. A.J. Grigsby
33d Virginia - Cul. John F. Neff
Second Brigade - Col. J.A. Campbell
21st Virginia - Col. John M. Patton
42d Virginia - Maj. Henry Lane
48th Virginia - Capt. Samuel Hale
1st Virginia (Irish) Battalion - Capt. B.W. Leigh
Third Brigade - Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson
10th Virginia - Col. E.T.H. Warren
23d Virginia - Col. A.G. Taliaferro
37th Virginia - Maj. T.V. Williams
Artillery - Col. S. Crutchfield
Carpenter's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. Joseph Carpenter
Caskie's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. William H. Caskie
Cutshaw's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. W.E. Cutshaw
Poague's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. William T. Poague
Wooding's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. George W. Wooding
"9Ibid.,
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THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WINCHESTER AND FRONT ROYAL
(TABLE 7B continued)
Ewell's Division - Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell
Second Brigade - Col. W.C. Scott
44th Virginia - Col. Scott
52d Virginia - Lt. Col. James H. Skinner
58th Virginia - Col. Samuel H. Letcher
Fourth Brigade - Brig. Gen. Arnold Elzey
13th Virginia - Col. J.A. Walker
31st Virginia - Col. John S. Hoffman
25th Virginia - Lt. Col. Patrick B. Duffy
12th Georgia - Col. Z.T. Conner
Seventh Brigade - Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble
21st North Carolina - Col. W.W. Kirkland
21st Georgia - Col. J.T. Mercer
15th Alabama - Col. James Cantey
16th Mississippi - Col. Carnot Posey
Eighth Brigade - Brig. Gen. Richard Taylor
6th Louisiana - Col. Isaac G. Seymour
7th Louisiana - Col. Harry T. Hays
8th Louisiana - Col. H.B. Kelly
9th Louisiana - Col. Leroy A. Stafford
Louisiana Special Battalion - Maj. C.R. Wheat
Maryland Line"0 - Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart
1st Maryland. Col. Bradley T. Johnson
Company A, Maryland Car. - Capt. Ridgley Brown
Baltimore Battery - Capt. J.B. Brockenbrough
Artillery -
Latimer's (Virginia) Battery - Lt. J.W. Latimer
Lusk's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. John A.M. Lusk
Raine's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. Charles I. Raine
Rice's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. William H. Rice
Cavalry - Col. Turner Ashby
2d Virginia - Lt. Col. James W. Watts
6th Virginia - Col. Thomas Flournoy
7th Virginia - Col. Turner Ashby
Chew's (Virginia) Battery - Capt. R.P. Chew
"'The Maryland Line had been organized by Jackson on 17 May in accordance











BATTLE OF FRONT ROYAL
284
MAP 14























The Confederate offensive in the Valley had ended. Without sufficient
reinforcements, Jackson could not continue his advance by crossing the Potomac and
invading Maryland. The Federal positions at Harper's Ferry appeared too strong to
attempt an attack against that garrison. Union reinforcements were reported arriving
across the Potomac to bolster Banks' position at Williamsport, Fremont was
approaching from the west, and McDowell was moving toward the Valley from the
east. Jackson now had to worry about saving his command from overwhelming
enemy force. that were rapidly advancing towards Winchester.
With the realization that superior Federal forces were closing on the Confederate
rear, Jackson began the southward withdrawal of his army on 30 May. The decision
to move was made none too soon. That same day, Gen. Shields' Federal division
arrived at Front Royal, surprising the 12th Georgia which had been left to guard that
position. Both Fremont and Shields were now closer to Strasburp, along the
Confederate line of retreat up the Valley, than Jackson was himself. While most of
the Southern troops began the retrograde, Jedediah Hotchkiss was dispatched to bring
Winder's brigade, which was still at Harper's Ferry, to Strasburg.
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By 2:30 p.m. on the 31st, all of Jackson's infantry except the Stonewall Brigade had
cleared Winchester."' An attempted advance by a Federal brigade from Front Royal
was halted by a Confederate outpost east of Strasburg. On the morning of 1 June,
Ewell's division skirmished with Fremont's army several miles west of Strasburg and
easily held the Federal force at bay.71 Late that afternoon, Winder's weary brigade
finally caught up with the rest of Jackson's army."3
For the next several days the Confederates continued their retreat up the Valley
turnpike with Fremont's Federals in hot pursuit. Winder's and Taylor's infantry
brigades and Ashby's cavalry fought a determined rear guard action throughout much
of the retreat to £rotect the Confederate main body. Attempts to slow the Federal
pursuit by burning several bridges along the line of march met with only limited
success. Fremont was able to use pontoons to construct expedient bridges over the
waterways and the Federal pursuit continued. As Fremont pressed the retreating
Confederates along the Valley pike, Shields was moving up the Luray Valley,
parallelling Jackson's route.71
Upon reaching Harrisonburg on the 5th, Jackson moved east toward the small








Confederate rear guard and Fremont's advance, Col. Ashby was killed while leading
a counterattack against some Federal infantry. The loss was an irreplaceable one for
Jackson. The deaths of Ashby, who "...seeetned to have the faculty of knowing what
the enemy were doing and when they were doing it,""' and the cavalry chief's three
most capable subordinates since 23 May would cause serious shortcomings in the
cavalry's ability to monitor and resist Federal movements. After reaching Port
Republic, Jackson placed his troops into camp for the next several days. Ewell's
division held the rear against Fremont's advance.
On the 8th, Fremont finally launched an attack against Ewell's division a couple
of miles west of Port Republic near the village of Cross Keys. At around 10:00 a.m.,
after driving the 8th Alabama, an advanced outpost, back to Ewell's main line, the
Federals advanced against Trimble's brigade on the Confederate right. The Southern
troops waited until the Union troops were in the open, close to the Confederate line,
and then easily repulsed the Federal attack with two volleys. After another 15
minutes of relative inactivity, however, the combative Brig. Gen. Trimble grew bored
and launched a counterattack against the Federals, driving Fremont's left back 1 mile
before stopping. Although Fremont's force of 10,500 still outnumbered Ewell by more
than 2-to-1, the Federals failed to resume the attack. That night, Ewell left Trimble
with seven regiments to hold Fremont in place and then withdrew the rest of his
division to Port Republic.
"7''Worsham, 77.
291
On the 9th, Jackson attacked part of Shields' division just north of Port Republic.
The Confederates substantially outnumbered the two Federal brigades that had
positioned themselves between the South Fork of the Shenandoah and the Blue
Ridge. Because of the superior placement of Union artillery and the open character
of the ground over which the Confederates advanced, however, the battle was not an
easy victory for Jackson. Winder's brigade, the initial main effort of the Confederate
attack, became stalled under heavy fire from the Union guns and three of Ewell's
brigades had to be moved forward to stabilize the Confederate line. Only after a
flanking attack by Taylor's brigade and the subsequent capture of the Union artillery
were the Confederates able to force the retreat of the Federals.'71
Following the fights on the 8th and 9th, Federal commanders decided not to press
the Confederates any farther. While Shields concentrated his force near Luray,
Fremont actually began withdrawing to the north. By the 12th, Confederate cavalry
had reoccupied Harrisonburg. Jackson's actions in the Valley had come to an end,
though. During the early morning hours of 18 June, in keeping with discretionary
orders of the 16th from Gen. Robert E. Lee, Jackson's troops began an eastward march
across the Blue Ridge. Jackson was going to reinforce Lee in the defense of
Richmond.
The results of Jackson's campaign were significant. The Union's strategic plans
had been severely disrupted, Federal attention had been drawn from Richmond, large
numbers of Federal troops had been diverted from other areas of operation, and
"'Freeman, 450.460.
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Federal field forces had been defeated in battle. The Valley had been saved from
Federal occupation. Although Union and Confederate forces would fight for control
of the Valley throughout the course of the war, it was not until the autumn of 1864
that the Federals would finally commit sufficient forces and energy to deny the South
access to the Valley's agricultural riches. Banks' army had been shattered as an
effective fighting force. The Federal force had suffered about 3,000 casualties during
the battles at Front Royal and Winchester. It would be months before it was again
ready for any active field service. Fremont's plan to march into eastern Kentucky had
been shelved in the wake of Jackson's attack on Milroy and the march to reinforce
Banks. Further, Fremont claimed that the actions against Jackson in the Alleghennies,
the march to reinforce Banks, and the ensuing pursuit of Jackson up the Valley had
also rendered his army unfit for active campaigning. Rest, reinforcement, and
reequipment would have to take place before this force was again ready to take the
field. McDowell's plan to unite with McClellan's army had been postponed and
temporary succor gained for besieged Richmond. Washington officials were hesitant
to allow Federal military commanders to take chances in the field and demanded
increased protection for the capital.
In contrast, the Confederates sought to continue the tempo of victory initiated by
Jackson's bold offensive. After crossing the Blue Ridge and uniting with Lee's army
northeast of Richmond, Jackson's troops were again in combat by the end of June.
Although Jackson's own performance during the Seven Days' battles lacked the
aggressiveness and drive that he had shown in the Valley, the presence of the veteran
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Southern soldiers from the Valley contributed to McClellan's defeat and Lee's seizure
of the operational initiative. When Jackson came under Lee's command, his
performance in subsequent campaigns continued to illustrate an aggressive execution
and exploitation of intelligence for operational success. At Chancellorsville, Jackson's
last and, arguably, the Confederacy's best conceived and fought battle, Jackson used
reports of the Union's open right flank as the basis for a bold flanking attack and
succeeded in rolling up the entire right of the Federal position.
B. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN
Throughout the course of the Valley campaign, Jackson had consistently used his
available intelligence as the foundation for many of his operational decisions. In
those situations where the Confederate commander specifically defined his
intelligence requirements, aggressively sought to collect information, and decisively
responded to intelligence assessments, Confederate operational capabilities were
improved. Conversely, in those instances where Jackson ignored intelligence
indications or failed to respond operationally to available intelligence, such as the
battles at Kernstown and McDowell, Confederate operational performance was
unsatisfactory.
Confederate intelligence during the winter expeditions against Dam No. 5 and
Romney had served as the very basis for the development and refinement of Jackson's
operational plans. Intelligence assessments based on reporting from a variety of
sources had helped the Confederate commander to identify potential operational
objectives, determine enemy dispositions, remain aware of possible Federal threats,
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and recognize exploitable opportunities as they arose. During this phase of
operations, Jackson began to develop an intelligence eftort that would meet
Confederate needs throughout the course of the Valley campaign.
Jackson was already somewhat familiar with the area of operations when he
assumed control of the district in November 1861. His pre-war travels and residency
in the region, and his previous command of the Confederate garrison at Harper's
Ferry, had exposed him to some of the significant features of the Valley that had to
be considered in any operational planning. This general knowledge of the region
allowed him to understand the military situation in the context of its geographic
surroundings. Initial reports from cavalry scouts and civilian informants had rounded
Jarckson's preliminary intelligence picture by providing data on Federal force strengths
and locations. Given this broad understanding of the operational military situation
within his district, the Confederate commander was able to select some possible
objectives and narrow the focus of his planning.
After deciding on Romney as the first objective of his planned offensive, Jackson
began to focus his intelligence effort on that area as a means of refining and updating
his operational plans. Although the Southern general had concluded that an attack
against Kelley's Federal command in Romney would yield positive results,
intelligence reports of Kelley's strengthened position then caused Jackson to change
his objective to Dam No. 5, a target that was assessed to be important to the Federal
war effort.
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Jackson, therefore, concentrated his cavalry's scouting efforts at Dam No. 5 to locate
the presence of any Federal forces in the area that might interfere with the destructive
raid. At the dam itself, the Confederate general selected an officer who was
knowledgeable about both the dam's construction and the surrounding area to lead
the demolition party in its efforts to breach the structure. After the appearance of
Federal forces near the site, Jackson openly dispatched Gen. Carson's brigade to
another location to deceive Federal intelligence efforts as to the Confederates' true
location.
Following the raid against Darn No. 5, Jackson again turned his attention toward
Romney after Confederate scouts reported the continued reinforcement of that Federal
post and the growing threat that it posed to Confederate operations in the Valley. As
Confederate forces concentrated at Winchester for an advance against Kelley's Union
force, Jackson directed Ashby's mounted scouts to specifically determine the location
and movement of any Federal forces in the vicinity of Romney that might interfere
with his own advance against the town. The Confederate commander even reminded
Ashby that his own operational planning would have to wait until the scouts had
provided this essential information.
During the actual westward advance against Romney, Jackson's continued
emphasis on intelligence allowed him to flexibly respond to changes in the
operational situation and capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities. The commander's
forward positioning at Bath allowed him to properly deploy the Confederate units
once the enemy positions were identified and also permitted the rapid pursuit of the
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fleeing Federal troops after the collapse of the Union position. Continuing
reconnaissance helped Jackson determine when it was time to call off his subsequent
offensive actions against Hancock and return to the advance against Romney. Capt.
Sheetz' diligent surveillance of Kelley's force allowed for the rapid occupation of
Romney following the Federal evacuation and kept Jackson informed about the
succeeding positions of the Union units as they moved north into Maryland.
Jackson's disposition of Confederate forces following the successful occupation of
Romney had been a perfect balance of intelligence and operational considerations.
Based on his own understanding of the characteristics of the area of operations and
the relative strength and locations of Federal forces, Jackson had deployed his own
units to provide for both warning of any change in the enemy situation and an
operational response to those changes. Confederate scouts, outposts, and patrols were
scattered throughout the region to monitor Federal activity while Southern operational
units were placed in positions to quickly respond to any perceived threat. Although
the War Department's peremptory orders of 30 January 1862 were a basic rejection of
Jackson's intelligence assessment and resulting operational decisions, the Confederate
commander continued to correctly base his own dispositions upon the operational
reality that his intelligence assets revealed.
During the Federal offensive in March and April, Jackson aggressively used his
intelligence assets as a means of monitoring the potential threat that Banks' force
posed to the Confederates and also sought to identify enemy vulnerabilities that
might suggest an operational opportunity. Jackson also attempted to minimize
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Federal intelligence efforts throughout this period while consistently directing his
own collection assets to look for enemy weaknesses. Although Jackson's failure to
aggressively collect and operationally respond to intelligence during the battle of
Kernstown contributed to the Confederate loss there, the subsequent revitalization of
Confederate intelligence led to successful operational decisions later in the campaign.
Information from scouts, spies, and open source reporting had kept Jackson up-to-
date on the growing Federal presence near Williamsport and opposite Harper's Ferry.
Based on his own knowledge of the region's geography and the importance of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Confederate commander was able to deduce the
Federal commander's intent to advance on Winchester and clear the Confederates from
the lower Valley. Jackson had, therefore, concentrated his reconnaissance assets near
Harper's Ferry and, following the Federal river crossing in late February, had directed
his scouts to constantly monitor the progress of the Federal advance. Although
Jackson maintained a centralized control over all of the intelligence assets within his
command, he ensured that subordinate commanders received pertinent intelligence
reports and were also kept abreast of all enemy activity near their own areas of
responsibility.
During the Federal advance on Winchester, the Southern general also began the use
of his cavalry to screen the activities of the Confederate force and to prevent Union
reconnaissance patrols from gaining any useful information about his main body.
While Gen. Banks was consistently aware of Ashby's mounted presence, he was rarely
able to determine the true location of the Confederate infantry brigades. Denied of
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this vital intelligence, the Federals were forced into a cautious advance against the
hidden Southerners.
Based on his assessment of the Federal commander's lack of aggressiveness and his
desire to maintain some contact with the advance elements of the Federal column,
Jackson yielded to the numerical superiority of the Union force only when necessary
and slowly retreated up the Valley. By maintaining some contact with the Federal
advance guard, Jackson could regularly monitor the enemy's progress and react
accordingly. When any breaks in this surveillance occurred, the result was a
corresponding gap in the intelligence picture.
One such intelligence gap developed after the Federal force began to send units
east of the Blue Ridge. During the Union movements, Confederate cavalry scouts lost
track of some of the Federal units, but assumed they had left the Valley. Ashby's
unconfirmed intelligence report of a small, isolated Federal force at Kernstown
prompted an immediate operational response by Jackson despite the fact that the
whereabouts of all of the Federal units remained unknown. Ashby's initial actions
against the Federals on 22 March failed to disclose the full size of Shields' Federal
command and Jackson remained unaware that he was about to attack a superior force.
Various intelligence shortcomings contributed to the Confederate defeat in the
ensuing battle at Kernstown. The Confederates arrived at the battlefield and
deployed their units in plain sight of the Federal commanders, who were able to react
accordingly. Jackson failed to initiate any kind of reconnaissance of the area or the
enemy positions before committing his forces in an assault against the Federal right.
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The Confederate general remained detached from the scene of combat throughout the
battle and relied strictly on information from staff officers and subordinates in his
response to Federal pressure. Finally, even when apprised of the obvious strength
and composition of the Federal force, Jackson failed to respond appropriately to this
vital intelligence and, instead, remain fixed on an unrealistic operational goal.
Following the battle, Jackson sou ight to improve some of his recognized intelligence
shortcomings as part of an overall effort to enhance Confederate operational
capabilities. The cavalry was again directed to maintain constant surveillance of the
Federal force, especially the advance guard. An extensive mapping project was
initiated to better understand the characteristics of the area of operations and to
exploit the available terrain to the Confederates' advantage. Talented experts, such
as Hotchkiss, and reliable collection sources, such as Col. Ashby, Capt. Sheetz, and
selected civilian spies, were increasingly relied upon for essential information and
intelligence assessments. Suspected deficiencies, like the increasing lack of discipline
among the cavalry, were addressed in preparation for renewed operations.
As Jackson's command occupied its camp near Conrad's Store, intelligence from
various sources suggested an operational opportunity for the Confederates in the
Valley. Information regarding the Federal offensive against Richmond, reports of the
Fremont's slow advance in the Alleghennies, the continued diversion of troops from
Banks' command to Federal forces outside the Valley, and Jackson's own assessment
of probable Federal reactions prompted the Confederate commander to plan a daring
offensive of his own in the Valley. If Jackson's intelligence assessment was correct,
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the Confederates might be able transform Jackson's operational level offensive into
a campaign of strategic importance.
Based on intelligence reports from Gen. Edward Johnson, assessments of the
district's geography, and Ashby's surveillance of Banks, Jackson decided on an
advance against Milroy's isolated Federal force as the first phase of his offensive
campaign. While the Confederate commander executed a generally superior
intelligence effort on the operational level throughout this westward advance, he
occasionally failed to transfer this success to the tactical level. Jackson retained
centralized control over the various intelligence assets throughout the Valley District
and successfully monitored the activities of both Banks' and Fremont's commands.
Although Jackson was attacking Milroy in the Alleghennies, Banks' Federal
command at Harrisonburg still posed a potential threat to Jackson's flank and rear.
Ashby's command was, therefore, left behind to watch Banks and provide warning
of any southward movement by the Federals while Gen. Ewell's force, which had
occupied Jackson's former position in the Luray Valley, was to watch Banks from the
east. Spies were dispatched to provide Ewell with information regarding any Federal
movements and various local inhabitants furnished details about the local area.
The Confederate march across the Blue Ridge was a masterful deception designed
to capitalize un the masking characteristics of the terrain and to confuse the Federals
as to Jackson's whereabouts. The march reflected Jackson's own use of intelligence
as the basis for operational planifing and also illustrated his conscious desire to deny
credible intelligence to the eneni,. The surprised reaction of the citizens of Staunton
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and Banks' continuing confusion about Jackson's intentions illustrated the success of
the Confederate deception.
As the Confederates moved wvest from Staunton, Jackson focused his intelligence
effort on the local area and enenm• situation. Hotchkiss, who had previously surveyed
the region, and Gen. Johnson, who had been operating in that area for almost a year,
were relied upon for information regarding significant topographic and geographic
considerations. Reliable staff otiicers were detailed to scout in advance of the army
and, after sighting the Federals, %vere used as guides to move advance guard units into
proper position.
The commanders' reconnaissance of McDowell and Sitlington's Hill provided the
Confederate leaders with an updated, definitive picture of the Federal strength and
dispositions and allowed Gen. Johnson to deploy his brigades atop the hill in an
effective manner. Jackson's incorrect assessment of Federal intentions, however, set
the stage for the rest of the Contederate intelligence effort in the upcoming battle.
Although Gen. Johnson continued to reconnoiter his position and observe enemy
movements, he did not possess the organic assets necessary to decisively exploit any
perceived operational opportunities. Even after the initiation of the pre-emptive
Federal attack, Jackson failed to act decisively or initiate any concerted intelligence
collection to capitalize on Federal vulnerabilities. Instead, the Confederates reacted
to each successive Federal threat in a piecemeal manner. Jackson again remained
physically detached from the field of battle and simply fed more units to Johnson as
the pressure from the Federals increased. Although the Confederates were left in
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possession of the field, this victory was due more to strength of numbers than to an
efficient use of intelligence or operational decisiveness.
As the pursuit of Milroy's fleeing column commenced, Jackson again illustrated
the importance of understanding the area of operations. By blocking the Allegheny
passes to the Valley, Jackson not only prevented the possibility of Federal
reinforcement but also limited the courses of action available to the enemy. This
would make subsequent assessinents about enemy intentions much easier since
certain capabilities were now deniied to the Federals. Jackson's knowledge of the
terrain near Franklin, coupled with scouting reports of Fremont's impending arrival,
also contributed to the Confederate commander's decision to break contact with the
Federals and return to the Valle%.
While Jackson was engaged against Milroy and Fremont, Confederate intelligence
in other parts of the district indicated another potential opportunity. The presence
of several days' rations on some Federal prisoners and information from a Federal
deserter indicated an eastward movement by significant elements of Banks' command.
Ewell's subordinate cavalry tracked Shields' progress across the Blue Ridge and
helped to confirm the diminish,.d strength of the Federal force remaining in the
Valley. Reports from cavalry scouts and several civilian informants also revealed that
Banks was abandoning Harrison burg and was falling back towards Strasburg, a much
less desirable point for the Federal defense of the lower Valley.
After returning to the Valley in mid-May, Jackson prepared for the next phase of
his offensive. Reports regarding the weakened condition of the Federal forces near
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Strasburg, coupled with the increased size of Confederate combat assets, led Jackson
to opt for an attack down the Valley against Banks' command. Throughout the
Confederate advance to the Potomac, it might be argued that Jackson's intelligence
effort and resultant operational planning were at their best and were actually better
than the Confederate execution of the operation. While the Southern general
consistently directed his intelligence effort toward a better understanding of the
operational picture and then transferred this knowledge into effective plans,
shortcomings in the execution of combat operations led to a less-than-complete victory
for the Confederates. Nonetheless, the success of the resulting Confederate offensive
was sufficient to shatter the strategic plans of the Federal government.
Accounts from Ashby's scouts and local inhabitants allowed Jackson to locate the
positions of the Federal main budy at Strasburg and Kenly's outpost at Front Royal
and to grasp the suggested Vulnerability of the latter Federal detachment.
Supplementary reports by trusted staff officers and Jackson's assessment of the terrain
had then helped the Confederate commander devise his plan of maneuver for the
attack. The ensuing march across the Massanutten helped to deceive Federal
commanders as to true Confederate intentions and concealed the Southern troops in
their movement against Banks' fhaiik. Jackson's use of the Luray Valley as an avenue
of approach illustrated the Confederate commander's understanding of the use of
terrain to conceal his own movements, protect his own flanks, and speed the
northward movement of the Coufederate army.
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As Jackson approached Front Royal, he incorporated recent reports from Hotchkiss,
LL Boswell, and the cavalry to update the operational picture and to refine his
operational plans. Ashby's cavalry was dispatched to prevent the communication of
Federal intelligence from Front Royal to Strasburg and other mounted troops
continued to screen and watch Banks' command. Confederate cavalry actions against
Kenly's outposts helped to delay Federal warning of the Southerners' approach and
provided an advanced reconnaissance of the route of advance. Further, Jackson's
selection of the Gooney Manor Road once again revealed his use of terrain
assessments and helped to conceal the Confederate approach.
The Confederate commander's placement with the advance elements of the
Confederate force allowed for the consistent interaction of intelligence and
operational decision making duming the battle at Front Royal. Jackson's position near
the front of his column allowed for the rapid assessment of current information
provided by a civilian informant and the use of this intelligence in the decision to
launch an immediate attack on the town. Gen. Taylor's personal reconnaissance of
the enemy position and Jackson's co-location with Taylor's brigade, which constituted
the Confederate main effort, also contributed to the Confederate seizure of the bridges
and ensuing assault against the Federal position. Additionally, the Confederate
commander's forward presence alko ensured a rapid pursuit and capture of the fleeing
Federals at Cedarville. Although the absence of rifled artillery with the Confederate
vanguard had almost allowed the Federals to escape, Jackson's rapid grasp of the
situation and his authority, as thci commander, to order Flournoy's cavalry in pursuit
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had resulted in the complete destruction of the Federal corr.nand.
Following the victory at Front Royal, Jackson dispatched various intelligence assets
to determine the location and disposition of Banks' main body. No attack against the
Federals could take place until the main concentration of the enemy force was found.
Topographer Jedediah Hotchkisi and several cavalry detachments were sent to
specifically determine the Federal position. In his orders for the movement against
the Federals, Jackson also directed his subordinate commands to advance along
different routes in an effort to fiied and fix the Federal force.
Jackson's movement with the Confederate advance during the march to intercept
Banks and the subsequent pursuit of the Federal army increased his effective use of
current intelligence. After learning from civilian sources that most of the Federal
force had already passed Middletown, Jackson ordered an immediate attack against
the enemy column and brought tip other Confederate units to continue the northward
pursuit along the turnpike. Throughout the nighttime pursuit to Winchester, Jackson
remained aware of the Federal prcsence to his front, effectively countered Union rear
guard actions, and maintained the operational tempo of his command. The
Confederate commander also cap it.,lized on his men's knowledge of the terrain as he
used soldiers from the local area for the advance element of his column during the
pursuit to Winchester. Additionadly, his own assessment of significant terrain led him
to order the occupation of the stlithern ridgeline near Winchester.
During the battle at Winchester, Jackson's presence at the front of the Confederate
battle line again contributed to his ability to translate assessments of the operational
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situation into decisive actions. The Confederate commander perceived the increased
resistance offered by the Federal right and, after a reconnaissance of the ground,
ordered Taylor's brigade to ass.JUlt the enemy position. Jackson then personally
positioned the brigade in its atta,:i, position, an area he had selected during his survey
of the field. After observing Taylor's success, and the resultant faltering of the
Federal line, Jackson ordered his entire army to advance.
The Confedeiate general's interpretation of the strategic military situation and his
continued tracking of the fleeing Federals of Banks' command led him to continue his
pursuit of Banks and threateit the Potomnac line. Cavalry patrols and organic
reconnaissance efforts allowed subordinate commanders to press the Federals and
exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they appeared. Steuart's occupation of Martinsburg,
Winder's attack at Charlestown, and the maneuvers against Harper's Ferry were all
executed in the context of intelligence which revealed the potential advantages of
these moves. Jackson's decision, finally to end the offensive had been based on his
assessment of the growing threat to his rear, indicated by numerous reports of
Fremont's and Shields' approach, and the operational capabilities of his own force.
C 0HARACTERISTICS OF JACKSON'S INTELLIGENCE
Clearly then, intelligence hak formed the foundation for Jackson's operational
decisions throughout the campaign. While Jackson's consistent use of intelligence
during this period illustrates the itccessarv inclusion of intelligence in the operational
planning process, several questions are suggested by that use. What themes or
principles characterized Jackson'ws execution of the intelligence process, including its
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use, to make it an efficient compunent of his decision making process? Further, what
factors strengthened the effective interaction between Confederate intelligence and
operations functions during the campaign?
Several factors within Jackswii's execution of the intelligence process itself,
contributed to the Confederate. general's superior exploitation of intelligence
throughout the offensive. One of the primary characteristics of Confederate
intelligence during the campaign was its centralization at the operational level. While
most intelligence efforts during the Civil War were informal, haphazard, and
decentralized, Jackson's consolidIated approach to the intelligence function allowed
for effective centralized control and direction of the intelligence effort, the proper
assignment of collection assets, ., lack of duplicated effort, and the fulfillment of the
commander's stated requirements.
From the time Jackson assumed command of the Valley District in November 1861,
Confederate intelligence was f0, Used towards the needs of and controlled by the
district commander himself. The: direction of the intelligence effort, assignment and
use of various collection assets, ii;,)r analysis, and use of that intelligence were all
centered on Jackson, the operationai commander. Jackson himself identified those
pieces of information that were uf significance to Confederate operational planning
and then personally assigned tHe assets--Ashby's cavalry, staff officers, or civilian
spies-to obtain that information,. All intelligence reports were then sent back to
Jackson's headquarters, where Lhey were consolidated into a single, coherent
intelligence picture for use in the: dIevelopment or refinement of Jackson's operational
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plans. While the Confederate conmmander did ensure that subordinate commanders
also received pertinent intelligence reports for their areas of responsibility, he did not
dilute the efficiency of his own intelligence assets by attaching them to subordinate
commands, nor did he rely uii the unguided reconnaissance efforts of these
subordinate commands to meet his own operational level intelligence needs.
This concentration of the intilligence effort, like the concentration of operational
effort, resulted in numerous benefits for the Confederates. Given the limited assets
available for the collection ot information, the numerical inferiority ot the
Confederates when compared to tite combined strength of the Federals, and the small
and informal organization of Jacl.•on's staff, the centralization of intelligence allowed
for an effective approach to thb. intelligence problem. A focus on those issues of
greatest significance, the fusion of information from various sources, the avoidance
of conflicting reports and analysis, and a lack of duplicative effort also resulted from
this concentration. While a diffuse intelligence effort would have lacked the
necessary structure to fill all oi the operational commander's intelligence gaps,
Jackson's approach ensured that those elements that could have most impact upon
Confederate operations received the most attention. The Confederate commander,
therefore, consistently directed his collection assets to determine the location and
activities of the enemy forces ami also initiated a fundamental analysis of the area of
operations to ensure maximum uiderstanding and exploitation of significant physical
features within the region. Because Confederate intelligence was centralized at the
operational level, intelligence reports from various sources all flowed in to Jackson's
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headquarters for inclusion in a comprehensive analysis of the operational situation.
The resulting fusion of this all-source information allowed for a more coherent
understanding of the potential impact of both the area of operations and the enemy
situation on Confederate plans.
Another important element in Jackson's execution of the intelligence effort was the
great deal of emphasis that he pl.ced on analysis of the area of operations. While the
examination and assessment of thie Federal enemy situation remained the major focus
of the Confederate intelligence ef fort, the potential impact of topography, production,
and the local population on Confederate operational plans was also examined in
detail. This allowed the South,*rn commander to exploit the various significant
physical features of the district ivhile his Union adversaries remained unaware of the
potential threats and opportunities posed by the Valley's geography.
The Confederate commander's understanding of the significant features of the area
of operations had formed the basis for many of his own operational plans. Jackson's
inherent knowledge of the regi)I k formed the foundation of his decisions to attack
Dam No. 5 in the destructive -lid of December 1861 and to establish his own
headquarters in Winchester while leaving Loring in Romney after the winter
expedition of January 1862. The extensive mapping and topographic study executed
by Jedediah Hotchkiss had pros en invaluable during the planning of operations
against Milroy, Kenly, and Ba.ks. Route reconnaissance patrols and personal
observations of the terrain at Fri,,,t Royal and Winchester had served as the basis for
subsequent troop movements aji. assaults.
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The thorough study of the ark.a of operations, as a result, provided Jackson with
an understanding of the significant impact that the region's physical characteristics
could have on military operations. It was only after this analysis had been included
in the broader context of the opterational situation that the Confederate commander
was able to recognize the weakne-,.-es of previously selected defensive positions or the
opportunities suggested by the v..ploitation of masked axes of approach against the
Federals. While analysis of the :aerny situation allowed Jackson to identify various
Federal threats or vulnerabilities, the included evaluation of the region's geography
permitted the Confederates to opt imize the impact of their military operations against
the enemy.
Jackson's emphasis on eneni)* intentions, instead of just enemy capabilities,
provides another interesting elei,..nt of Confederate intelligence. While the analysis
of Federal troop strengths, weaponry, supporting equipment, and organizational
structure were important to the development of Confederate operational plans,
Jackson clearly recognized that 'i was equally, if not more, important to assess what
the enemy planned to do with thc-,e assets. While the determination of intent was far
more difficult than the evaluation of capabilities, the insights provided by this
analysis demanded its consideration during the analysis phase of the intelligence
process. Jackson considered the. determination of enemy intent so important to his
own operational plans that he oft:ii initiated actions that served to limit the possible
courses of action available to a F&..iral conmiander thereby narrowing possible enemy
intentions.
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Jackson's knowledge about tho growing enemy presence at Wiliainsport and his
understanding of Winchester's operationally significant location allowed him to
deduce Banks' intent to attack the Confederate position at Winchester. Similarly, the
Confederate commander's interpretation of Banks' slow pursuit after Kernstown led
Jackson to conclude that the Federal commander did not intend to press his offensive
up the Valley and allowed Jack-,on to opt for an offensive of his own. Jackson's
failure to correctly interpret Mil roy's intent to attack at McDowell led to a series of
tactical errors that diminished the results of the Confederate victory in that battle.
The obstruction of the Alleglhiiy passes helped to narrow Fremont's possible
intentions since it destroyed the capability to retreat eastward or be reinforced by
Banks. Jackson's imposition of his own army between Banks and the Blue Ridge
after the battle at Front Royal likewise helped the Confederate commander to deduce
Banks' probable intent to retreat irom Strasburg.
This emphasis on enemy inteiitions consistently aided Jackson in the subsequent
application of the principles of ,var in his own operational plans. Because of his
knowledge of the probable Fed..-al courses of action, the Confederate general was
able to seize the initiative from iti enemies by preempting or countering the Federal
moves. The Confederates maintained a rapid tempo of operations and consistently
surprised the Union commanders, who had been unable to assess Jackson's intentions.
Additionally, Jackson was able to successfully concentrate his main effort at the
decisive point and exploit this ittuation through the habitual interpretation of his
opponent's next move. Althougi, knowledge of Federal capabilities provided a broad
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framework on which Jackson co ti id base his own operational plans, the determination
of Federal intentions furnished Jackson with the necessary tools to refine his plans
for optimal effect.
Jackson's reliance on and use uf talented experts and experienced subordinates in
the performance of particular intelligence functions also distinguished his approach
to intelligence during the ValleN campaign. As both the operational commaider of
all Confederate forces in the Valivy District and the chief operational planner for that
command, Jackson did not have c.aough time to thoroughly analyze all of the vitally
important specifics that contribuLted to his intelligence effort. Nor did he have the
expertise in certain areas, such as topography, to effectively interpret all of the
significant considerations that iiad to be included in the overall intelligence
assessment of the operational pietyLre. Instead, Jackson learned to rely on individual
staff officers, whose knowledge . ithin a particular field was superior to his own, or
on experienced subordinates whuse previous intelligence assessments had proven to
be reliable. While this exploitation of individual strengths, knowledge, and talent
might seem like an obvious appruach to competent intelligence, it was a factor often
ignored during the Civil War.
Within weeks of his arrival in the Valley, Jackson had learned to trust the
information and resulting assesaiuents from his cavalry chief, Col. Turner Ashby.
Ashby's assessments of Federal intentions and probable courses of action during the
early phases of the campaign b,. .ame known for their accuracy, leading Jackson to
increasingly rely on Ashby's inp,., in the formulation of operational plans. Although
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the notable failure at Kernstown a.iay have temporarily decreased Ashby's credibility
with Jackson, the cavalryman's .ability to interpret intelligence reports within the
context of his own understandii.,, of the dynamics of military operations, made him
an invaluable asset to the Confederate commander. Subordinate mounted officers,
such as Capt. Sheetz, had proven similarly dependable in their interpretation of
enemy actions and their input to jackson's intelligence effort was considerable. Gen.
Taylor's evaluation of the Fedvi..I position at Front Royal had been accepted by
Jackson as the foundation for the -ubsequent decision to seize the bridges and launch
an immediate assault. Talented individuials, whose superior technical knowledge
made them valuable assets, vvice also heavily relied upon by the Confederate
commander. At the time of his ippointment to Jackson's staff, Jedediah Hotchkiss
held no military rank and lack.L.i formal training as an engineer. Within days of
Hotchkiss' posting, however, jackson had accepted several of the self-taught
topographer's assessments as thI basis for changes in the Confederate position and
was relying increasingly on l-iotchkiss' knowledge of the geography in the
development of offensive operat i,,ial plans. Effective analysis and reporting by other
staff officers led Jackson to use these individuals as personal reconnaissance assets
who were frequently dispatched to update key pieces of the intelligence picture.
Conversely, Jackson had also liown a willingness to reject assessments from
subordinates and officers whose judgement he did not trust. Both Jackson's rejection
of Loring's assessment of the FeL.i.ral threat to Romney and his willingness to accept
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Hotchkiss on his staff, despite thie% presence of other engineer officers, illustrate this
point.
Perhaps the most important topect of Confederate intelligence during the Valley
campaign was its immediate suppurt to cont bat operations. Throughout the campaign,
intelligence was an integral of Jackson's operational plans. Intelligence formed the
foundation upon which the Cunfederate commander developed his operational
objectives, task forces, schemes wi maneuver, and timing. The refined planning and
conduct of Confederate operat i,,is, in turn, concentrated the intelligence effort
towards specific requirements aii.1 helped to focus intelligence on those areas which
were of significance to the coni•iander. In this way, intelligence and operations
functions acted as interrelated ind inseparable parts of a larger whole. Several
aspects of Jackson's approach to both intelligence and operations contributed to the
successful integration of these iit erdepen dent functions.
The first element in Jacksoni', linkage of intelligence with operations was the
active role that he played in both functions. Like most operational commanders
during the Civil War, Jackson i%..S the chief operational planner for his command.
While modern military commaiiiers are served by extensive staffs which perform
much of this operations functin, staff- during the Civil War were small and
commanders did much of the w,:. themselves. Almost entirely on his own, Jackson
envisioned the operational objectives of the campaign, conceived the necessary
schemes of maneuver to achieve t Ihese objectives, and developed the subordinate unit
tasks necessary for the executioik of the plan. While this involvement in operational
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planning was common for commanders of the period, Jackson also took an
extraordinarily aggressive role ait the direction and use of intelligence. Jackson
ensured that he remained the fo,.ii point for all intelligence reports and that analysis
of both the enemy and the are., of operations was done to meet his needs. As
particular gaps in the intelligence picture appeared due to corresponding changes in
the operational situation, Jackson quickly committed various collection assets to fill
the gaps.
Jackson himself had desigii.,ccd that the location and monitoring of Federal
movements were his primary inti.lIigence concerns during the winter expeditic, is and
the Federal advance up the V.aley. The Confederate commander had ordered
subordinate units to determine tLhis information and to keep him updated of any
changes in the operational situai.on. The general had specifically reminded Ashby,
before the Romney expedition, w, the need for complete information on the Federals
and had urged Sheetz to be especially vigilant as Banks prepared to cross the
Potomac. Jackson had repeatedl) dispatched members of his personal staff to gather
key pieces of information and to confirm reports from other sources. When he could
obtain information through no tnier acceptable means, Jackson had been willing to
perform reconnaissance activitie, nimself to ensure the practical basis for operational
decisions. This personal invol vinent in staying in touch with reality had thereby
ensured the use of intelligence m every aspect of the decision making process.
The Confederate commander', flexible operational response to changes in the
intelligence picture was another a.ctor which contributed to the positive association
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of intelligence with operations. -1 kroughout the campaign, Jackson repeatedly altered
his operational plans when cUrrent intelligence suggested the need to do so.
Information regarding an incf.'ased Fvderal threat to Confederate forces, or
assessments of a potential CoII,!derate opportunity led the Southern general to
change his operational objectiv,:-, schemec, of maneuver, and force deployments to
best meet these new circumstances.
In December 1861, for exampl1., .ackson had shifted his objective from Romney to
Dam No. 5 when intelligence 1,bdicated the superior size of the Federal force in
Romney. Reports of an appareiatly isolated Federal force at Kernstown, although
faulty, led the Confederate cojL,inander to shift from a defensive posture to an
immediate offensive against the tkederals. Although Jackson desired to continue his
attack against Milroy and Schenci. at Franklin, information about Fremont's approach
influenced the general's decisioi. to return to the Valley. Jackson's plan to continue
his offensive across the Potoma. in late May was canceled when the Confederate
commander balanced his own op:,-,ational capabilities with the intelligence about the
approaching Federal reinforcements.
In those instances where JaJIson failed to show this flexibility, Confederate
operations suffered. At Kernsto,. i, Jackson had remained fixed on the defeat of the
supposedly isolated Federal fore.- and, even when apprised of the inferior size of his
own force and the counterattac,. developing on his left, failed to appropriately
respond to intelligence that wa.-, counter to this operational goal. At McDowell,
Jackson failed to alter his own %..tensive posture and delay of an attack against the
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Federal position even after it became evident that the Federals were launching a pre-
emptive attack of their own and would not idly await the development of a
Confederate attack the followi±,, day. In both cases, Confederate assets were
unnecessarily wasted and opporanities were missed.
One of the factors which conti .buted to Jackson's flexible operational response to
updated intelligence was his forward positioning dvring much of the action. In those
situations where Jackson had pla.ced himself near the force assigned the main effort,
he had been able to make use ,, the latest combat information, rapidly assess the
situation in the context of the o ,:rall operational picture, and respond accordingly.
During the attack on Bath in J.nuary, Jackson's presence with the Confederate
advance allowed him to become a ware of the Federal dispositions at first contact with
the enemy, deploy his own force- for an assault, and direct the pursuit of the Federals
toward Hancock. During the ad% ., ice to the Potomac, the general's consistent location
with the Southern vanguard ga\ him immediate access to current information and
allowed for an immediate reactioii. At Front Royal, Jackson's ability to quickly assess
information from the front an i his status as the overall Confederate commander
allowed for the quick decision L,) launch Taylor's brigade in an attack against the
town,the prompt issuance of ordt-. - to seize the bridges and assault Kenly's command,
and the use of Flournoy's tro,,ys to capture the Federals. At Winchester, the
Confederate commander's positi,, at the front allowed him to decisively respond to
the growing Federal resistance OML the opposite ridge and to order a general advance
when the first signs of a Federal collapse became apparent.
Finally, the fact that the intelligence effort was controlled and managed by the
individual who was most active iii the development of operational plans contributed,
perhaps more than any other factur, to the successful integration of intelligence with
operations. In his role as his o%,, operations planner, Jackson was initially guided
in his selection of broad objectives by a general understanding of the intelligence
situation and Confederate operaltonal capabilities. Jackson was then able to focus
additional intelligence assets to-v .ird those objectives to refine his plans and to answer
those specific requirements that ite deemed as the most significant in the formulation
of operational plans. Every pit!,, of information provided by his collection assets
could always be analyzed in tl,,. context of its operational significance. Further,
intelligence which suggested ney, opportun ities or dangers could immediately be used
to refine his plans. Because Jack-,on was directing the collection and analysis phases
of the intelligence process, there could never be any disconnect between his own
priorities and the priorities of ti,.- intelligence effort. Appropriate collection assets
were, therefore, always made ava;llable to fulfill the commander's requirements and
any shortcomings which resulteo ,iom the failure to commit some asset in a collection
role were clearly understood. B,:..ause of Jackson's control over every aspect of the
Confederate intelligence effort, ,s operational planning was based on focused and
comprehensive intelligence sup p'.j rt.
D. APPLICATIONS FOR TOD,, i'
The principles which charact,. 1ized Jackson's approach to intelligence during the
Valley campaign continue to ha. value and the potential for application in modem
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military campaigns. While the imiiplements of war, character of military forces, and
organization of military staffs hav'e undergone radical changes since the time of the
Civil War, the fundamentals wi military operations and the manner in which
intelligence may support these operations remains more independent of time, place,
and technology. Based on Jack,.n's conduct of intelligence in 1862, several broad
principles may then be deduced Lor the successful conduct of intelligence in modern
military ground operations.
Military intelligence must reii,.iin centralized at the operational level to maximize
its effectiveness during combat .,perationms. This concentration of the intelligence
effort should involve the centrali, .d direction of the overall intelligence effort, control
of collection assets, and focus .,i analysis to meet the needs of the operational
commander. While the needs kuf subordinate commands may not be met by the
execution of this centralized ihaielligence effort, the emphasis on fulfilling the
operational commander's reqi,-,mnents must remain the primary object of all
intelligence throughout the area, ,f operations since this commander will determine
the overall direction and imple-..-ntation of operational plans.
This centralization of intelligtz ice at the operational level will yield several positive
results. The most important of tlhese is that, given the limited number of intelligence
assets in both personnel and equA,.)mnent, the pooling of collection resources allows for
their most efficient use. Assets ... be co icentrated in a prioritized manner on those
requirements that are of gre.it,.st significance to the proper development of
operational plans. Unnecessary atuplication of effort can be eliminated, conflicting
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assessments avoided, confirmatori collection initiated, and analysis focused on central
issues of concern only through the centralization of all intelligence assets.
Additionally, because of the wide. ranging concerns of operational level intelligence,
many of the requirements of -,-Oordinate commanders will be met as a natural
product of the larger intelligenc., :ffort.
Another lesson which may b. Jrawn from Jackson's campaign is that intelligence
must focus on understanding the ignificant features of the area of operations. While
analysis of the enemy's potenti.,l impact on friendly operations usually receives
plenty of attention, analysis of tI,. potential impact, positive or negative, that the area
of operations may have on opet.,Lions is often overlooked or incomplete. In some
cases, the existence of obstacles to niiovement or observation, patterns of transportation
networks, the presence of popul &iion centers, types of vegetation, or products of an
area may impose more restrictiwis on the conduct of friendly operations than an
enemy force could. Similarly, co,,Lrol of a particularly significant feature or denial of
enemy access to an area ma) offer operational advantages that must not be
overlooked.
While the existence of accurat.. ,naps, advanced photographic systems, and modern
reconnaissance assets may make access to information about an area of operations
much easier than during the C1, 11 War, this information must be analyzed in the
context of its operational sign,..cance to be of value to a military commander.
Features that might restrict mov•..tent, provide suitable points of defense, or furnish
favorable axes of advance shoult .,c emphasized in the intelligence assessments given
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to the commander and operation.a planners. Only through a complete understanding
of the significance and value of ttise otherwise esoteric features can opportunities be
recognized and exploited.
In its analysis of the enemy sit L,ation, operational intelligence must also emphasize
the assessment of enemy intenti,,as, not simply enemy capabilities. Throughout the
Valley, campaign, Jackson's ability to deduce his enemy's intentions or to limit
possible enemy courses of actioiL, consistently improved his own chances for success.
Although the determination of intentions is inherently more difficult than the
specification of capabilities, tlIe assessments are of much more value in the
operational planning process. B) k-nowing or surmising what actions an opponent is
likely to take, a military comm.,,der may, in turn, plan his own operations to pre-
empt an enemy move or exploit Liiat mort to his own advantage.
The determination of enemy intentions is a much more complex process than an
assessment of enemy capabilitik-. While analysis of capabilities often focuses on
"hard intelligence" such as eneni, troop strengths, weaponry, locations, and military
doctrine, the efforts to ass% -s ;),obable e.nemy intentions generally rely on more
ambiguous evidence. The relat.",uship or the operational situation to the strategic
picture, an evaluation of the ei,,u.y commander's personality and past operating
patterns, characteristics of the ..,iemy's command and combat soldier style, and
increased activity in a particuL, functional area may all provide clues to enemy
intentions. Even an assessment ,, the enemny's probable order of adoption of several
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courses of action may provide .- erational planners with sufficient knowledge to
properly develop friendly actioiw-.
Just as Jackson capitalized oin the particular skills of Hotchkiss and Ashby, so too
must modem military comman,,rs and intelligence advisors recognize and make
effective use of the personal tale its, expertise, knowledge, and experience of various
analysts and subordinate persoiii:el to maximize the value and accuracy of their own
intelligence effort. Military pers.,iinel assignments by service headquarters are almost
always based on rank requirc.,ients, broad occupational specialties, and the
bureaucratic classification of spc..ific billets within an organization, rather than on
some particular talent, skill or t...ique qualification of an individual. This system,
therefore, fails to capitalize on ,,,cializesi knowledge, experience, or education that
may make an individual partii. alarly valuable in the analysis of technical or
specialized intelligence function,. To ensure the most effective collection, analysis,
and use of intelligence in militar) operations, commanders must demand access to the
most qualified personnel for iine tasks at hand. Similarly, commanders and
intelligence advisors must be %' ..Iing to Use, in their execution of the intelligence
process, individuals of proven t.,.mnt and experience, regardless of considerations of
rank, formal training, or billet -.tructure. Only in this way, can commanders be
assured of maximizing the poteiial impact of intelligence.
Various steps may also be ,,.Jertakeii to improve the interaction between the
intelligence and operations wilo..n modurn militaries. Although intelligence and
operations functions have beei, divided in the U.S. Armed Forces between two
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different staff branches, these .iisciplines must act in unison. Because of the
interdependency of these operdLions and intelligence, constant coordination and
communication is necessary for Littelligenrce to support operational planning.
The first consideration in the :,jrrelation between intelligence and operations is the
leader's role in that relationship. The commander must play an active role in the
intelligence process. just as i.,ckson was the focal point for all Confederate
intelligence activities during the %'alley campaign, the modem commander must also
ensure that his intelligence need, .ire being actively pursued and that the intelligence
effort is focused on areas of operrational significance. Given the complex nature of
modem military operations and Lte vast array of subjects that require a commander's
personal attention, many militar, .eaders often rely exclusively on sen ior intelligence
advisors to direct and supervis,, their intelligence effort. While this approach
illustrates trust and confiden,, in the intelligence advisor's abilities, it also
contributes to a less than optimai execution and use of the intelligence effort during
operational planning. The failum, to identify a particularly vital piece of information
to the commander's planning, t/i,: failure to collect that essential information, or the
improper interpretation and u-,,. of intelligence in the planning process could all
result from a commander's rela i, e detachiment from intelligence. If intelligence is
to form the foundation for the levelopment and refinement of operational plans,
commanders must personally setL tntelligeiice priorities.
The commander must be inv,... ,ed in the initial direction of the intelligence effort
by first outlining the operatioit.,i goals of the unit and by then identifying those
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pieces of intelligence that will Lte vital to subsequent operational planning and
execution. The commander aiil operations staff officers must understand the
capabilities and limitations of tlL-,Ar own intelligence assets and know what questions
can and cannot be answered bý intelligence. Because the comjmander naturally
controls the collection assets reqL ired to provide the information, he must ensure that
those assets are made available f,,. intelligence collection and understand the possible
shortcomings if those assets are i ,..c used. The commander must continue to supervise
the collection and analysis ot information to ensure that the proper focus is
maintained to meet the unit's operational needs. As potential gaps or new
requirements appear, the comni.,oder must refocus the energies of his intelligence
staff to meet them. The comiaander must demand the rapid dissemination of
intelligence to himself and thu operations staff to allow for the inclusion of this
intelligence in the development .,od revision of operational plans. It is only through
this personal involvement, that., commander can be assured of the possible use of
intelligence in his decision makinjg.
Another lesson that may bL- .Irawn from Jackson's use of intelligence is that
operational plans must remai,, flexible to ensure the appropriate response to
significant changes reflected by tqydated imtelligence. While the drafting of detailed,
comprehensive operational plan,. often involves an intense reliance on intelligence
input, many plans also fail to re,,,gnize the inherent need for flexibility once contact
with the enemy is made. The nat-. re of the uncertainty of war, the numerous frictions
that develop in the course of a.. V'e operations, and the realization that the enemy
325
almost always fails to react exacivly as expected, illustrate the need for operational
flexibility. At the operational le% .I of warfare, changes in any part of the intelligence
picture may warrant a corresponatiag need for change in the operations plan. Updated
intelligence should lead to update-d operations plans.
If a commander becomes too irmly fixed on the execution of a particular plan or
the attainment of a specific objective, intelligence may lose its ability to influence or
guide the decision making procet ,. Intelligence that is contradictory to the successful
completion of the assigned missi.Ii or that fails to report a commander's preconceived
conclusions may fail to influen,, an inflexible commander. Throughout the Valley
campaign, however, Jackson had -;iown a willingness, when presented with updated
intelligence, to change his opcrsIomnal objectives, alter existing plans, and capitalize
on transitory opportunities. 13-cause the intelligence effort is designed to help
support the development and .-4inement of operational planning and decision
making, this planning must rena i,. sufficiicn tly adaptable to recognize the appearance
of previously unexpected threats or to capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities revealed
through new intelligence.
One of the major factors th.,, may intluence a commander's ability to flexibly
respond to changes in the eneln,, situatiua is his position in relation to the area of
action. During Confederate op...itions ii. the spring of 1862, Jackson's co-location
with the force assigned the maij, effort and in the vanguard of the pursuit allowed
him to quickly react to the reahli, around him. Modern commanders should also
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position themselves as far forw,,J. as possible so they can maximize their influence
on the course of operations.
While there may be a tendc..:cy to view a commander's forward presence as
counterproductive because of th,-. .:sulting detachment from a large headquarters staff
and communications facility or bL-cause of the perception of micro-management, this
proximity to the force assigned ciie main effort may be the most important element
in the commander's ability to 1),,sitively influence the course of battle. Although
additional intelligence from nf,.,-organic assets may become available after the
initiation of combat actions, the. ,,iajority of valuable information that has a bearing
upon the operation will come frum units in contact with the enemy. By positioning
himself near the point of major .ffort or those elements in contact with the enemy,
the commander will become ,,.re accessible to current intelligence or combat
information from those units, bi. personaily aware of the condition of his own units,
and able to respond more quickl to changes in the operational situation. Because the
operational commander controls more assets than any subordinate leaders, his
position near the front can obvi,,Lisly be more decisive than that of a subordinate
commander. Based on current iihelligence reports from front line units and his own
unique perspective of the course. .f the action, the operational commander can then
decide to shift his focus of main .i fort, corn mit additional assets to the decisive point,
or call off the action.
Perhaps the most fundamemma.ml concept that should be applied to ensure the
optimal influence of intelligenc.. mi the commander's decision making and, in turn,
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the optimization of operational potential, is the organization of intelligence staff
functions within the operations Uranch. Organizationally, intelligence should be a
subordinate part of operations. . ,'hile this idea is contrary to much of U.S. Armed
Forces opinion regarding the rel.,tonship between intelligence and operations and to
the present practices and organLation of many military forces, it is also a logical
recognition of existing reality. lhe successful conduct of operations remains the
primary goal of all military org...iizations. The sole purpose of intelligence is the
support of those operations to -- itre thuir maximum success. Intelligence should
initially serve as the broad-base.; indicator of possible objectives and enemy threats
but must then be guided and fo,:...-;ed towards more specific operationally significant
requirements to allow for the refinement and maturation of operational plans.
Throughout its execution, the it,,elligence process must be guided by the ongoing
considerations of operational ..inners to ensure its continued relevancy. The
operations branch must de facto -,,pervise and focus the direction of the intelligence
effort and must also provide sL,, icient assets to allow for the collection of needed
information. Given these circL,,tastances, it would appear that intelligence must
operate, at least functionally, in subordinate manner to operations.
The placement of the intelliy;...ce staff within the operations branch would yield
numerous positive results to sti.cogthen tihe integral link between intelligence and
operational planning. First, i1L..Ligence efforts could be more positively focused
towards areas of operational relevancy if they were subordinated to those officers
responsible for the developmei,• of operational plans. While intelligence advisors
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may not inherently know whichl pieces of information were the most vital to the
development of a specific operat inal plan, operations officers would recognize their
own information gaps and realiL,, the priority of their own intelligence requirements.
Second, operations officers WOLLI have easier access to the most current intelligence
and could, therefore, more accur.,,ely reflect the realities of the intelligence picture in
the development of their operational plans. Although modem communications
systems allow for the rapid dis--,,iiiination of intelligence, the filtering and inherent
delays in the analysis phase o, intelligence lead to corresponding delays in the
passing of intelligence to the peto ie that most need the information--commanders and
operational planners. Third, U, cause the commander and the operations branch
control the organic collection .,ssets that intelligence must rely on to gather
information, an integrated operat •.)ns and intelligence branch would allow for a more
efficient execution of intelligenc. collection and understanding of the inherent trade-
offs in the use of particular assvt-..
While the subordination of iiLLiligencc to the operations branch would allow for
a more effective use of intelligc .ce in operational planning and a rmore realistic
approach to the supportive role ut intelligence, this reorganization would also involve
an assessment of other complex ... oblems. Training and education of operations and
intelligence personnel, realigni-. nt of aippropriate experience tracks and career
patterns, and a reorganization ofi. romanrd relationships with external agencies would
all have to be addressed to impki•-.ent thik fundamental change in the intelligence -
operations relationship within op -.rational military commands. Although these issues
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are complicated and have no easy solution, a closer correlation between these two
staff functions is necessary to improve intelligence support to operational planning
and, thereby, to optimize the success of military operations.
Jackson's organized execution and use of intelligence in support of Confederate
operations served as the very foundation of his operational victory in the Valley
campaign. His personal involvement in the direction of the intelligence effort,
aggressive pursuit of relevant information, and flexible response to current
intelligence allowed the Confederate commander to recognize various threats and
opportunities as they arose. While Jackson's personal addressal to intelligence
allowed for the recognition of factors that could impact on his own plans, it was his
approach to intelligence and operations as inseparable parts of a larger whole that
allowed him to achieve operational victories of strategic importance for the
Confederacy. Modem military organizations would do well to duplicate the
warfighting fundamentals of the situation operating within Jackson's command in the
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